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ABSTRACT

The dearth of empirical evidence across developing countries on whether trade
liberalization would lead a country to specialize in dirty industries to exploit its
comparative advantages in trade, motivates this thesis. The thesis uses the case of Kenya,
―a lower-middle income country with the largest economy in Eastern Africa― to
investigate two fundamental questions: (i) will Kenya’s realization of its comparative
advantages in trade, relative to those of its neighbors, heighten the risk of specialization
in dirty production? and (ii) will Kenya’s trade competitiveness be adversely impacted by
its implementation of an environmental tax that directly targets polluting energy inputs?
Compared to a 2009 base-run, the impact of three alternative ex-ante policies were
quantitatively evaluated: further trade liberalization, alone; pollution abatement, alone;
and joint implementation of these policies. A static computable general equilibrium
(CGE) model for Kenya, that is theoretically founded on the tradition of CGE models for
open developing economies by the World Bank (Dervis, et al., 1982), was developed to
investigate these fundamental issues. Deepening Kenya’s trade liberalization, alone, was
found to have beneficial effects on output, with the risk that the country could intensify
its specialization in dirty industries. In comparison, an environmental policy in the form
of a tax on energy inputs, alone, reduced pollution in energy-intensive industries, but was
costly in terms of falling output. Potential worsening of Kenya’s environmental situation
might, nevertheless, be mitigated without adversely affecting output through a mix of
policy interventions. In conclusion, even if political commitments for a cleaner
environment were in place in Kenya, which is far from certain, further trade liberalization
without concrete policy interventions to abate industrial pollution, might create or
exacerbate environmental degradation.

Keywords:

Kenya; trade liberalization; environmental tax; dirty industries; CGE.
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION
1.1.

Overview

A controversy over the linkages between trade opening and environment quality emerged
in the early 1970s leading to the incorporation of environmental concerns in the
agreement of the Uruguay Round (1986-1994) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) (Beghin, et al., 1994)1. The discussion pits environmentalists, who argue
that intensification of economic activities inevitably contribute to environmental
degradation and likely ecological demise, against trade economists, who contend that the
process of achieving economic progress itself will eventually resolve environmental
problems (Shafik, 1994). Developing countries with outward-oriented economic policies
are said to reap a relatively higher dividend from globalization (Beghin, et al., 2002b:314). On the contrary, however, critics of globalization contend that it quickly manifests
itself in depletion of ﬁnite natural resources, degradation of biodiversity, and
intensification of pollution (Kirkpatrick and Scrieciu, 2008:497). Above all,
globalization, and trade, if not the main cause of, are key contributors to, environmental
damage (Nordström and Vaughan, 1999; Beghin, et al., 2002b:3).

The discourse on free trade-environmental quality nexus is relevant in the case of Kenya.
Graduated only recently to the lower-middle income status by the World Bank, the
country has the largest economy in Eastern Africa, and in 2015 was ranked 8th in Africa
in terms of nominal Gross Domestic Product (GDP). A founder member of the World
Trade Organization (WTO), Kenya is a major player in free trade initiatives in the East
African Community (EAC), and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
(COMESA). Kenya’s trade openness ratio fluctuated between 52.2% and 64.6% over the
1961-2009 period (Musila, et al., 2015)2 and, according to the World Bank (2016),
averaged 52.5%, as a percentage of GDP, during the 2009-2015 period. To deepen its
1

Also see: “The environment: a specific concern” and “Trade and environment in the WTO”. World Trade
Organization (WTO, 2016). Available at: https://www.wto.org/english/.
2
Musila, et al. (2015) define trade openness ratio as a quotient between the sum of exports and imports and
GDP.

1

trade opening agenda, in September 2016, Kenya signed a free trade pack with the
European Union (EU), under the auspices of the EAC. Hence, Kenya’s trade openness
ratio is bound to rise further because of these trade-opening initiatives. On the whole, the
Kenyan economy is highly sensitive to trade liberalization reforms.
Kenya’s real GDP growth accelerated to 5.6% in 2015, up from 3.3% in 2009
(International Monetary Fund (IMF), 2016), thanks to its outward-oriented economic
policies. In 2014, the agriculture sector ―that provide essential raw materials for
industrialization―, and the manufacturing sector, contributed 30%, and 11%,
respectively, to Kenya’s real GDP (World Bank, 2016). Regarding the contribution to
value-added in production, the leading sector is services, followed by agriculture, and
then industry. Kenya’s outward-oriented economy is ubiquitously market driven, across
products, factors, capital, and foreign exchange markets. There are structural bottlenecks,
however. Unfavorable terms of trade shocks have caused Kenya’s current account deficit,
as a percentage of GDP, to widen from 4.6% in 2009 to 8.2% in 2015 (IMF, 2016) and,
furthermore, the country’s overall unemployment rate stands at about 9% (World Bank,
2016), and is even higher among the youth.
Kenya’s economic development is driven, mainly by its comparative advantages in trade,
factors, and natural resources. With regard to the latter, the country stands ready to
exploit its recently discovered coal and oil reserves 3 to further drive its economy to a
solid middle income status by 2030.

Clearly, this will have major environmental

consequences. Nevertheless, there is heightened civil society activism, that builds on the
Wangari Maathai (1940-2011) ―the 2004 Nobel Peace Prize Laureate―, who called on
her fellow Kenyans, and Africans in general, “to take charge of their environment”
(Green Belt Movement, 2015).

3

Kenya has recently discovered recoverable oil deposits and is building a 960 MW coal-fired power plant
in its coastal city of Lamu (Kant, et al., 2014). Exports of oil is planned to commence in mid-2017 (see
article by Bloomberg, “Kenya From Nowhere Plans East Africa’s First Oil Exports: Energy” at:
http://www.bloomberg.com/).

2

At present, Kenya is a low emitter of greenhouse gases (GHGs). However, the risks of
environmental degradation are rising because of a growing population at 2.7% per
annum, a demographic shift towards urban that is estimated at an annual rate of 4.15%
over the 2015-2020 period (United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs
(UN ESA), 2014), and a rapid pace of economic and infrastructure developments. Data
by the World Bank (2016) show that the proportion of Kenyan population exposed to
particulate matter, PM2.5 air pollution4 that exceed the World Health Organization
(WHO)’s guidelines, increased significantly, from 43.9% in 1990 to 59.8% in 2013. This
is as PM2.5 air pollution rose by 8.9% between 2000 and 2011 (World Bank, 2016). Over
the same period, emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) increased by 30.2%, those of nitrous
oxide (NO2) by 24.1%, and methane (CH4) by 24.5% (World Bank, 2016). The growth
of emissions from the energy and transportation sectors is projected to add 43 MtCO2eq
(million tons CO2 equivalent) of GHGs by 2030, compared to the situation in 2013
(Kant, et al., 2014). A major contradiction is that while the country’s National Climate
Change Action Plan (NCCAP) envisages a low-carbon economy by 2030, Kenya’s
Vision 2030 aims to drive industrialization through higher utilization of fossil fuels for
electricity generation (Kant, et al., 2014).

With freer trade, and given the classical theory of trade, a country might specialize and
expand economic activities in the area where it has a comparative advantage in trade (see
Kirkpatrick and Scrieciu, 2008:498). Cross-country empirical evidence concerning
whether a country might specialize in dirty production to exploit its comparative
advantages in trade is, however, lacking in many developing countries. In Mexico,
unilateral trade liberalization under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
was associated with a 3.2% rise in real GDP, and a 2.5% to 4.8% rise in all major
pollutants (Beghin, et al., 1995). Results that are more drastic were found for Costa Rica,
where comparative advantages in polluting sectors increased emissions by 15%-20% as
trade flows rose significantly, compared to a 2010 benchmark scenario (Dessus and
Bussolo, 1998).
4

Particulate matter (PM) ―also known as particle pollution―, comprise of tiny pieces of solids or liquids
that are found in the air, and if less than 2.5 micrometers, are harmful to human health when inhaled.

3

These outcomes suggest that trade opening damages the environment. If this were the
case, major concerns could emerge in Kenya, given the country’s economic
transformative agenda that is shifting the economy towards agroindustry manufacturing.
As discussed further in Chapter III, already, 17% of Kenya’s exports are in energyintensive activities with significant industrial emissions. As Kenya pursues the benefits of
globalization in the context of the planned oil production and exports starting 2017, its
primary energy sector, and energy-intensive manufacturing, are bound to expand
significantly in the short-term. This poses the risk that the country’s production
techniques might turn dirtier. Besides, given a growing population, and urbanization,
harmful emissions from the consumption of fossil fuels would rise. If so, this is bound to
pose rising and substantial public health risks, in the backdrop of an already highly
polluted urban transportation system.

Kenya, compared to its neighbors, has relatively higher factor endowments, including
capital. This, combined with weak environmental regulations is fertile ground for
“pollution havens” (see Copeland and Taylor, 2004; Cole, 2004; Cole and Elliott, 2005;
Kuik and Gerlagh, 2003)5. Consequently, expanding productive activities could turn
inefficient, dirtier, or worse, make Kenya a “pollution haven”. But, if Kenya implements
tough pollution abatement policies, the marginal costs of production are likely to rise
significantly. This in turn could adversely undermine the country’s current export
competitiveness. An environmental tax on polluting consumer goods could be imposed
but such a policy might significantly raise the prices of the targeted goods; this is a
politically sensitive issue. Does this suggest that Kenya has the incentive to specialize in
dirty industries? If this were the case, Kenya’s policy makers could be faced with tradeoffs between further trade liberalization and environmental quality; economic growth
being inimical to the environment, and environmental policy being detrimental to
economic growth objectives (Beghin, et al., 2002b:12).

5

The ‘pollution haven’ hypothesis hold the view that polluting industries in industrialized economies
where environmental standards are high will relocate to lax regulatory jurisdictions.
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Presently, academic literature offers very little guidance to Kenya’s policy makers on
these fundamental questions. The problem, with the current state of knowledge, is that
each developing country is faced with its own unique context on environment-trade
nexus. Beghin, et al., (2002b13) argue that the agenda for research in this area is huge,
and policy designers need to be informed by “case-by-case” empirical scrutiny. To close
the gap in the academic literature, this thesis employs a quantitative approach to
investigate whether the hypothesis of a trade-off between trade liberalization and
environmental quality might be supported in the case of Kenya. If this were the case, then
a higher level of environmental quality might imply a trade-off in terms lower real GDP
growth rates. Conversely, economic growth itself might partly be driven by deepening
international trade, but at higher environmental costs to Kenya. Empirical support for
such a finding might incentivize Kenya’s policy makers to take concrete steps to mitigate
probable environmental damage that may arise from further trade opening. Finally,
Kenya presents a good case for testing these trade-environment linkages, as reliable,
relevant, and recent data is available.

1.2.

Problem Statement and Objectives

1.2.1. Specific problem

This study is motivated by the dearth of robust empirical evidence on whether there exists
a trade-off between further trade openness and environmental quality in developing
countries, and specifically, Kenya. Using a static computable general equilibrium (CGE)
model, it aims to bridge this gap in knowledge by quantitatively evaluating the
interdependencies between Kenya’s trade liberalization and emission abatement policies.
The study’s goal is to provide evidence on whether the hypothesis that developing
economies tend to specialize in dirty industries to exploit their comparative advantages, is
supported in the case of Kenya.

5

1.2.2. Objectives of the study

This research employs a theoretically founded CGE model, that is founded on a reliable
database, to quantitatively investigate whether a trade-off exists between trade openness
and environmental quality in the case of Kenya. Kenya’s push to deepen trade
liberalization over time, and its willingness to exploit its relatively significant
comparative advantages in factors of production and natural resources to drive its
industrialization agenda as defined in its Vision 2030, is viewed as an incentive for the
country to specialize in dirty production.

To respond to these issues, a 2009 baseline scenario is defined. The objective is to
evaluate the quantitative ex-ante impacts of three alternative policy goals ―further trade
liberalization, alone; an environmental tax, alone; and free trade and an environmental
tax, jointly― over the short-term compared to the 2009 base-run.

The question of whether the assumed trade-off between trade liberalization and pollution
abatement does incentivize developing countries, like Kenya, to specialize in dirty
technologies leads to further questions. Will Kenya’s realization of its comparative
advantages increase the risks of the country specializing in dirty production? Will the
implementation of a policy of taxes on energy inputs adversely affect Kenya’s
international trade competitiveness?

Specific questions that this thesis will aim to

address, are:


What is the impact of further trade liberalization policy, alone, on the pattern of
specialization?



What is the impact of implementing an environmental tax policy, alone, on
competitiveness?



What is the impact of joint implementing of further trade liberalization policy,
and an environmental tax policy, on competitiveness and pattern of
specialization?

6

1.3.

Organization of this Thesis

The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. Next is Chapter II that reviews the
theoretical and empirical literature concerning the linkages between trade, economic
growth, and the environment.

The Chapter also outlines the outcomes of select

econometric and modeling techniques used by researchers to assess the trade-off between
trade liberalization and environmental quality, and importantly, the methodological
choices that are available for conducting such quantitative analysis.
Thereafter, Chapter III contextualizes this thesis by presenting Kenya’s economic, trade,
foreign direct investments flows, and environmental indicators, and analyzing how these
have evolved in the recent decades. Kenya’s quest to capture the dividends of
globalization through exploitation of its comparative advantages in trade is analyzed in
the backdrop of intensification of industrial emissions that such global driven growth may
cause.

This is followed by Chapter IV that presents the static computable general equilibrium
(CGE) model for Kenya in GAMS (General Algebraic Modeling System) software ―the
KenCGE Model― that is used to conduct the quantitative analysis.

Chapter V introduces the different experimental scenarios that are employed in the
analysis to address the objectives of this study. The Chapter also presents the outcomes of
this thesis. These include the patterns of Kenya’s trade specialization with deeper trade
opening, and the environmental implications of such changes.

Finally, Chapter VI concludes this thesis with a discussion on key take away messages,
limitations of the study, and suggestions for further research.

7

CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW
Chapter two presents a review of the theoretical and empirical literature underpinning the
relationships between economic growth, international trade, and the environment. An
introductory review is provided in Section 2.1 regarding the relationships between trade
and growth, on the one hand, and higher economic growth and environmental quality, on
the other. Section 2.1, also outlines the theoretical perspectives relating to the main
channels through which freer trade impacts the environment. Thereafter, Section 2.2
summarizes the key outcomes of econometric and modeling techniques that researchers
have employed to assess the trade-off between trade liberalization and environmental
quality. Next is Section 2.3 that covers the methodological choices that are available for
use in this thesis. Finally, Section 2.4 makes concluding remarks.

2.1.

Theoretical Literature

2.1.1. Trade, growth, and the environment

Literature contends that increased international trade foster growth, but also intensifies
pressures on the environment. In this regard, the links between trade and growth have
fascinated scholars since David Ricardo, in his 1817 publication "On the Principles of
Political Economy and Taxation" proposed his classical theory of comparative
advantage6. Building on the Ricardian theory of comparative advantage, Eli Heckscher
and Bertil Ohlin, proposed their influential general equilibrium, Heckscher–Ohlin (H–O)
Model of international trade (see Feenstra, Robert C., 2004; Leamer, Edward E., 1995),
asserting that a nation’s factor endowments drive international trade. If countries have
access to similar production technologies, the H–O Model predict that a country's
production and exports will be driven by its abundant and cheap factors, and imports by
its scarce factors.
6

The Ricardian theory on comparative advantage was in stark contrast to doctrine of absolute advantages
that Adam Smith had earlier proposed in his 1776 publication, “The Wealth of Nations”, as the basis for
international trade.

8

A major phenomenon that shaped international trade is the wave towards regionalization
of trade, which commenced with the launch of the European Economic Community in
1957. The decade and a half ending 2000 marked a reinvigorated interest by countries to
negotiate and sign agreements on regional economic blocs to draw benefits of
membership, including gains from trade (World Bank, 2000). The collapse, in 2008, of
the Doha round of trade negotiations that had commenced in 2001, created a new impetus
for countries to strengthen their regional trade agendas. In this regard, Africa signed
several trade agreements to further deepen regional trade and investments7. The pursuit of
trade specialization to exploit country comparative advantages fueled the growth of
globalization. Consequently, the heated discussions regarding the linkages between
economic growth and the environment that had emerged in mid-1960s (Kågeson, 1998)
intensified. The discussions were redirected to the linkages between trade opening and
environment quality, in the early 1970s, leading to the incorporation of environmental
concerns in the agreement of the Uruguay Round (1986-1994) of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) (Beghin, et al., 1994). It was, however, not until the 1990s
when the World Trade Organization (WTO)8 took over the leadership on tradeenvironment linkages that more focused discussions emerged relating to the effects of
trade on the environment (see Beghin, et al., 2002b:3; Kirkpatrick and Scrieciu,
2008:497).
Daly (1973) in “Toward Steady-state Economics” publication, favor the minimum
feasible physical production and consumption levels to contain the ever-rising demand
for finite natural resources. The alternative, that is supported by other scholars, including
Beckerman, W. (1974), view economic growth as an accelerator for efficiency in the
production processes. As a result, growth is said to foster substitution possibilities, away
7

Africa’s regional economic blocs are: Arab Maghreb Union (UMA); Common Market for Eastern and Southern
Africa (COMESA); Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD); East African Community (EAC); Economic
Community of Central African States (ECCAS); Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS);
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD); and Southern African Development Community (SADC).
8

The predecessor to the World Trade Organization (WTO) was the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) that was a multilateral agreement regulating international trade. WTO was launched at the
end of the Uruguay Round (1986–1994) of trade negotiations (WTO, 2016).
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from outdated and environmentally unfriendly technologies, to eco-friendly technologies.
The

trade

liberalization-environmental

quality

controversy,

overall,

pits

environmentalists who argue that the intensification of economic activities, inevitably
contribute to environmental degradation, and likely economic and ecological demise,
against trade economists, who contend that the process of achieving economic progress
itself will eventually, resolve environmental problems (Shafik, 1994).

In brief, although developing countries with outward-oriented economic policies are said
to reap relatively higher dividend from globalization (Beghin, et al., 2002b:3-14),
opponents argue that globalization quickly manifests itself in depletion of ﬁnite natural
resources, degradation of biodiversity, and intensification of pollution (Kirkpatrick and
Scrieciu, 2008:497). If not the main cause of environmental damage, then globalization
and trade, are major causes of environmental degradation (Nordström and Vaughan,
1999; Beghin, et al., 2002b:3).

2.1.2. Transmission mechanisms

The channels through which freer trade impacts the environment, are both indirect, and
direct. A trade liberalization policy might indirectly impact the environment through the
direct effects of freer trade on economic growth (see Kirkpatrick and Scrieciu, 2008:499).
Trade opening directly influences a country’s economic growth performance, by
subjecting domestic firms to international competition. In this case, globalization, over
time, enhances productivity of labor, through access to recent technologies. In turn,
higher labor productivity improves efficiency of firms, and enables countries to exploit
their comparative advantages, and intensify exports. This way, economic growth, itself
directly impacts environmental quality, and consequently, through economic growth,
trade has indirect effects on environmental performance. This indirect channel through
which trade affects the environment is founded on the theory of the environmental
Kuznets curve (EKC). Inspired by the work of Kuznets (1955), the ECK theory is
credited to the independent works by Panayotou (1993), Grossman and Krueger (1993),
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and Shafik and Bandyopadhyay, (1992)9.

The ECK hypothesis suggests that the

relationship between different types of pollutants and per capita incomes, is shaped as an
inverted-U (Kågeson, P., 1998).

In theory, the EKC hypothesis suggests that as income rises, pollution increase at low per
capita income, reaches a turning point, and thereafter declines at higher per capita
income. Lower degrees of environmental awareness characterize the initial stages of
industrialization, as the public is more preoccupied with having jobs and incomes to meet
their basic needs (Dasgupta et al., 2002). This, coupled with weak environmental
regulatory capacity, causes intensification of industrial pollution, and consequently, the
EKC rises rapidly. Nevertheless, industrial pollution diminishes when income levels
surpass a certain threshold, the citizenry concerns for cleaner environments mounts, and
there is capacity to enforce environmental standards (Dasgupta et al., 2002). Grossman
and Krueger (1995), using urban air pollution, and three river basins contaminants
―dissolved oxygen, fecal, and heavy metals―, found support for the EKC, and observed
that the turning point took place before a country attained a per capita income of
US$8,000 – US$10,000 (in 1985 dollars). Although the EKC hypothesis may be a useful
tool for explaining how growth, and consequently, trade, could impact emissions over
time, it is important to underscore that the nexus between growth, trade and pollution is
multifaceted. Trade and growth are intertwined through complex policy and institutional
arrangements. Adding environmental issues to create linkages from trade to growth and
then growth to environmental quality adds further complexities, and introduces a high
degree of uncertainty regarding to how trade could impact the EKC relationship (see
Kågeson, 1998 for further discussion on EKC).

As for the direct channels through which trade liberalization affects the environment, the
traditional approach is to conceptualize three mechanisms, namely, a scale effect, a
9

Kuznets (1955) postulated that the relationship between income inequality and economic development is
inverted U-shaped. EKC term was coined by Panayotou (1993) who developed a study for the International
Labor Organization. Grossman and Krueger (1993) assessed the environmental impacts of the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Shafik and Bandyopadhyay (1992) prepared a background
paper for the World Bank (1993)’s World Development Report, 1992.
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composition effect, and a technique effect (WTO, 2016)10. These trade-induced emissions
impacts were proposed through the pioneering work of Grossman and Krueger (1991)11,
and was later expounded by Grossman and Krueger (1993), and Copeland and Taylor
(1994, 1995). According to Antweiler et al. (2001) a scale effect occurs when an increase
in the scale of economic activity intensifies pollution, holding both the pollution
abatement techniques, and the production mix, constant. Alternatively, a technique effect
arises when pollution abatement is intensified leading to declining levels of emissions,
holding constant both the scale, and the composition, of economic activity. Finally, if
both pollution abatement techniques, and the scale of economic activity, are held
constant, but emissions rise as the composition of production shifts towards more
pollution-intensive production, then a composition effect is said to arise (Antweiler et al.,
2001).

Antweiler et al. (2001) theorizes the scale, composition, and technique effects by
proposing a simple model that decomposition the overall effect of a change in pollution,
after trade is liberalized. In their model, differences in factor endowment and income,
jointly determine the trade patterns. The model builds on the idea that industries that
pollute heavily are also highly capital intensive, and assume a small open economy that
comprises two industries each producing one final goods, under constant returns to scale.
The polluter is industry X, that is capital intensive and employs primary factor capital, K,
and generates pollution per unit of production, as a by-product. Abatement technology is
available for industry X, under the assumption of diminishing returns to abatement
activity. Firms in industry X, aiming to maximize profits will jointly choose gross output
of the dirty good X, and their respective abatement functions. The other industry (Y),
produces a clean good, Y, by employing the primary factor labor, L. Finally, the
economy has a government that decides on the level of the pollution tax, that is an
increasing function of the economy wide optimal tax (Antweiler et al., 2001).
10

Conceptualization of the three independent effects (scale, composition and technique) of freer trade on
the environment was first applied to analyze the impact of the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) on the environment (see: “The impact of trade opening on climate change” (WTO, 2016).
11
The terms trade-induced scale, and technique, effects were introduced by Managi, et al., (2009) to refer
to the impact on emissions from trade opening through the scale and technique effects.
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It is conjectured that because a country’s comparative advantage due to its resource
abundance could either be on pollution-intensive industries, or relatively cleaner
production, the sign of the composition effect might be ambiguous (Kuik and
Verbruggen, 2002; Managi, et al., 2009). Also, the strength of a country’s environmental
policy determines whether the composition effect is positive or negative. The impact on
a country’s level of pollution that is associated with resource abundance is called a
capital–labor effect, and the one relating to the strength of environmental policy, is called
an environmental regulation effect (Managi, et al., 2009).

In addition to the three direct traditional channels through which freer trade impacts
environmental quality, Kreickemeier and Richter (2014) adds a fourth one, which is, a
reallocation effect. On the margin, as competition intensify, efficient firms with lower
emission intensities edges out of the industry those that are relatively less efficient, and
have higher pollution intensities. For this reason, resources get reallocated towards
efficient producers. Accordingly, the reallocation effect is the marginal decrease in
overall emission intensity as productivity gains, from trade, increase. Holding the scale
effect constant, the impact of trade opening on the total emissions is negative, if and only
if, the level of industry-wide emission intensity falls strongly with rising productivity.
Kreickemeier and Richter (2014)’s model assume that firms are heterogeneous, and they
compete in monopolistically competitive goods market.

2.1.3. National borders and the environment
McAusland and Millimet (2013) modified Krugman (1980)’s model on scale economies,
product differentiation, and the pattern of trade to introduce new theoretical perspectives
on the linkages between trade ―both intranational (i.e., between regions in a country)
and international― and the environment. As in Krugman (1980), they assume that firms
operate under monopolistic competition, and employ a constant elasticity of substitution
function for product differentiation. Consumers, on their part, have Spence-Dixit-Stiglitz
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preferences for variety in goods. Unlike Krugman (1980), however, McAusland and
Millimet (2013) have environment quality variables in their model. The model predicts
that environmental quality improves, as trade intensities rise and, therefore, international
trade, rather than intranational trade, is more beneficial to the environment. Consumers
have access to a wider variety of goods and prices, thanks to international trade. This
leads to welfare gains for domestic consumers. Domestic environmental regulators,
however, are not concerned about pollution abroad, because of the independence that
exist between environmental jurisdictions. In this regard, theorists argue that authorities
in open economies have reason to ignore regulatory costs incurred abroad (see Lockwood
2001; Pflüger 2001; Haufler and Pflüger, 2004). Domestically, regulators can, therefore,
set tougher environmental regulations, because pollution costs are incurred by exporting
countries. In other words, as trade intensity increase, much of the consumer surplus is
transferred, through exports, to importing countries, and accordingly, regulators in
importing countries are less willing to sacrifice local environmental standards. This way,
growth is said to have a decoupling effect (Pflüger, 2001) that predicts that regulators set
inefficient emission taxes because of inducement by consumer price spillovers. The
decoupling effect is one of McAusland and Millimet (2013)’s channels through which
growth in a foreign economy impacts domestic environmental regulations. Other two
channels that are related to access by domestic consumers of a wider variety of goods, are
income and substitution effects, and which are opposing forces.

On the one hand,

variety-induced income effects increase the demand for stricter environmental regulation;
that is, as incomes rise because of access by consumers to a wider variety of goods at
competitive prices after trade, so will the demand for cleaner environments increase,
ceteris paribus. Nevertheless, the demand for stricter environmental regulations might fall
because of variety-induced substitution effects, with incomes held constant (McAusland
and Millimet, 2013).
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2.1.4. “Pollution haven” hypothesis

The environmental Kuznets curve (EKC) theory was concerned with the effects of tradeinduced growth on the environment. Another theoretical issue that preoccupied
economists was the real and perceived costs that environmental regulations themselves
impose, and that could adversely undermine a country’s comparative advantage. In this
case, the debate focused on the fear that free trade might “induce a race to the bottom”
through easing of environmental standards, as regions compete for industry and jobs
(Brunnermeier and Levinson, 2004). From this reasoning, there emerged the "pollution
haven” hypothesis, that hold the view that polluting industries in industrialized
economies, where environmental standards are high, might relocate to developing
countries, where environmental regulations are weaker, since the latter are perceived to
have comparative advantages in dirty production12. As a result, differences in emissions
across countries are attributed to varying environmental regulation and trade flows. A
related, but dissimilar concept to the “pollution haven” hypothesis, is the “pollution
haven” effect, that is discussed later in this thesis, and that as Taylor (2004) assert,
focuses on tightening of environmental regulations to deter exports (or to stimulate
imports) of dirty goods.
Copeland and Taylor (1994) formalized the "pollution haven” hypothesis in a static two
countries (North, developed, and South, less developed) general equilibrium model. In
this model, the North differs from South only in that the North’s per capita endowment of
human capital is relatively larger than that of the South. They consider the equilibrium
position where country North selects a relatively higher pollution tax than country South.
North, endowed in relatively higher income than the South, imposes a higher pollution
tax. Given that the North-South divide is only in respect of human capital endowments,
pollution becomes a relatively scarce, and consequently costly, input in the North in the
autarky, no trade scenario. Consequently, country North loses comparative advantage in
12

T h e simple factor endowment hypothesis, that posit that trade liberalization attracts dirty capital
intensive activities to developed countries as they are relatively capital abundant, is the natural
alternative to the “pollution haven” hypothesis (Antweiler, et al., 2001).
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producing dirty goods and only clean industries set up production facilities there.
Pollution-intensive industries prefer to migrate to the South. This is the model’s basis for
trade. The North and South are willing to exchange, in equivalent goods, effective labor
services that are abundant in the North, with pollution services that are relatively far in
excess in the South. Eventually, the gap between factor prices will close, because of
excess demand for pollution services in the South. The model is highly stylized, however.
It excludes many determinants of trade, other than human capital that is the only factor of
production, and income differentials between North and South. However, the authors
argue that their model forms a good basis of interpreting earlier empirical work. Given
the human capital factor that determines demand for environmental goods and the level
of environmental controls, Copeland and Taylor (1994)’s model predict that international
trade serves as a conduit for dirty industries’ migrations from developed, to developing
countries.

Several authors, including Bommer (1999), Levinson and Taylor (2008), Benarroch and
Gaisford (2014), propose theoretical explanations for or against, the “pollution havens”
hypothesis, and effect. In support for the "pollution haven” hypothesis, Bommer (1999)’s
simple signaling model demonstrate that trade liberalization in a domestic market where
environmental standards are stringent, cause dirty goods to be relatively more import
competitive.

Consequently, a firm’s decision to relocate production to a “pollution

haven”, became a strategically cheaper option. Thus, global environmental quality
deteriorates, as firms in the potentially cleaner environment deter governments from
imposing harsher environmental standards (Bommer, 1999). In contrast, Benarroch and
Gaisford (2014) propose a multi-country model covering intra- and inter-industry trade
under monopolistic competition, and that demonstrates how “pollution havens” would
not arise. All countries in the model produce two goods, a differentiated product that is
skill-intensive, and a homogenous one that is labor-intensive. Pollution, which is a byproduct of the production process, may be abated. The model predicts a fall in pollution
in all countries if the differentiated-good sector is amply cleaner, and conversely,
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pollution increases in all countries when the differentiated-good sector is sufficiently
dirtier (Benarroch and Gaisford, 2014).

2.1.5. Choice of policy instruments

The final theoretical piece of literature that we will discuss deal with the compatibility of
policy instruments that aim to tackle trade-induced pollution. An environmentalist
response to the trade liberalization and environmental quality trade-offs is the
implementation of effective regulatory controls that maintains the status quo on the net
overall environmental impact, as economic activities expand. In this regard, the
environmentalists prefer tougher standards for pollution abatement, arguing that
“polluters” should pay the maximum amount for the damage they cause to the
environment. Accordingly, the polluter pays principle is used to justify the use of specific
instruments to abate pollution (Lloyd 1992).

The ideal pollution abatement policy, is one that directly targets emissions (see Corden &
Falvey, 1985; Bragga, 1992; Kennedy, 1994; and Carraro, 1999). Economists contend
that a uniform per unit of emissions tax, that is targeted to discourage emissions, is an
optimal policy (Lloyd, 1992, Markusen, 1975a, and Markusen, 1975b). However, where
environmental instruments are lacking or are difficult to implement because of weak
institutional capacity (Bohm and Russell, 1985) ―that is, in a second-best world―, then
“trade policy interventions, alone or combined with environmental taxes, can be welfare
improving.” (Beghin, et al., 1994). In this regard, Copeland (1994) and Krutilla (1991)
explain the related issues for a polluted small, and a large trading country, respectively.

WTO rules concerning product regulations, food safety, and animal and plant health,
allows members to apply country specific trade-related actions to protect the
environment, but such actions should not be disguised barriers to free trade. Although the
WTO has no agreement on the environment, its rules relating to technical barriers to trade
and sanitary and phytosanitary measures (WTO, 2016) are used by countries to justify
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restriction of entry of agricultural goods into domestic markets. Kirkpatrick and Scrieciu,
(2008:506) refers to the European Union (EU)'s protectionist subsidies on production and
exports of agricultural products as an example of the use of trade policy as an instrument
for environmental control13. This approach was, however, discredited as inefficient by
Anderson and Blackhurst (1992), in their publication titled “The Greening of World
Trade Issues”.

Despite this contention, trade policy continues to be applied for

environmental controls (see Blackhurst and Subramanian, 1992; and Subramanian 1992),
and this, Beghin, et al., (1994:172) contend, is puzzling. From these discussions, there
emerged a consensus that more research efforts were needed on coordinated trade and
environment policies for abating pollution (see Copeland, 1994; Beghin, et al., 1994).

2.2.

Empirical Literature

2.2.1. Econometric results

Stringency of environmental policy

In a pioneering study covering the late 1960s and early 1970s, Tobey (1990) used a crosssectional model of international trade by Hechscher-Ohlin-Vanek (HOV), to test the
hypothesis that stringency of regulations in industrialized countries had significant effect
on international trade patterns in highly polluting industries. The author, however, did not
find overwhelming evidence in support of his hypothesis. The conclusion that stringency
of differing national environmental rules, had no effect on the world distribution of 'dirty'
industries, was in stark contrast to the unsupported argument by environmental skeptics
that stricter pollution abatement could have a small, but discernible adverse effect on the
‘balance-of-trade’ (Tobey, 1990).

Despite Tobey (1990)’s work, the debate on the causal impact of trade on the
environment, which is one of the most important debates in trade policy (Taylor, 2004),
13

Kirkpatrick and Scrieciu, (2008:506) argue that the challenge is how to decouple measures that protect
the environment from those that are protectionist in nature.
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has taken long to resolve partly because of inconsistent findings (McAusland and
Millimet, 2013). Using cross-country data covering the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and developing countries over 1973-2000 period,
Managi, et al., (2009) employed a dynamic generalized method of moments (GMM)
panel data approach to evaluate the effects of trade openness on the environment. For
their indicators of pollution, they found that freer trade was associated with lower
emissions in OECD countries. In developing countries, however, trade opening was
found to increase substantially the emissions of sulfur dioxide (SO2), and carbon dioxide
(CO2), but was associated with lower levels of biochemical oxygen demand (BOD).
These results support Tobey (1990)’s conclusion, and the findings by OECD (1993) and
Jaffe et al., (1995), that tougher environmental controls in developed economies do not
undermine trade competitiveness.

Grossman and Krueger (1993), who also empirically examined the pioneering work by
Tobey (1990), predicted that trade openness could have both positive and negative effects
on the environment. On the one hand, Antweiler et al., (2001) find that freer trade is good
for the environment ―a finding that is supported by Dean (2002)―, and at the worst, its
effects are environment-neutral. Frankel and Rose (2005), and McAusland and Millimet
(2013) also support the finding that trade is associated with lower emissions. Ederington
et al. (2005), and Levinson and Taylor (2008), however, find that pollution abatement
costs have adverse effects on net exports, which indicate that net exports increase as
pollution intensify. These inconsistent outcomes of empirical evidence have led to a huge
amount of academic literature on the trade-environmental linkages, a few of which are
explored next.

Environmental Kuznets curve (EKC)

Managi, et al. (2009) used econometric techniques to estimate an equation with terms for
per capita gross domestic product (GDP) and its quadratic to capture both scale, and
technique effects, respectively. For BOD, they found that average incomes remained
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negative for both the OECD and non-OECD countries (i.e., no change in sign as income
levels rises). This was a rejection of the predictions of the EKC hypothesis. However, for
both SO2 and CO2 emissions, average incomes were positive for non-OECD countries,
and negative for OECD countries, an indication of support for the EKC hypothesis. They
estimate that the average income turning point associated with this change in sign, for
SO2 and CO2 emissions, was US$14,045 and US$24,732 for non-OECD countries, and
US$24,616, and US$29,678, for OECD countries, respectively. The OECD countries
have a relatively higher capital-labor ratio because of their comparative advantage in
capital-intensive goods, and therefore, require a relatively larger average income turning
point, compared to non-OECD countries, for the technique effect to offset the scale effect
(Managi, et al., 2009).

A study by Torras and Boyce (1998) assessed the EKC hypothesis and found that factors
such as literacy, civil liberties, and political rights were influential in addressing
environmental quality in low-income countries in respect of air and water pollution. This
suggests that a generalization of the prediction of the EKC hypothesis across countries is
problematic because other complementary factors to income growth might play an
important role in influencing environmental outcomes. The general predictions of the
EKC hypothesis have also been qualified by De Bruyn, et. al., (1998) who found that
emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2), nitrogen oxide (NOx), and sulfur dioxide (SO2) in
selected developed economies declined because of the positive effects of growth,
technological progress, and structural reforms. Shafik (1994) used a panel data of 149
countries over the 1960-1990 period to investigate the relationships between per capita
incomes and environmental quality while controlling for climate, technology, and
policies that influence environmental performance. The author concludes that where
environmental costs are localized, and private and social benefits of abatement are
substantial, countries are more likely to implement policies to stop environmental
degradation that accompany growth (Shafik, 1994). Grossman and Krueger (1995) make
a similar argument suggesting that the strongest link between income and the
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environment is induced by policies that respond to citizenry demand for measures that
protect the environment.
The “pollution haven” hypothesis
The “pollution haven” hypothesis was given credence by an early study by Low and
Yeats (1992), that used the United States (US) data over the 1965-1986 period, to
investigate how changes in trade had impacted emissions intensities in the rest of the
world. The authors concluded that developing countries have revealed comparative
advantages for producing pollution-intensive commodities (Low and Yeats, 1992).
Akbostanci and Türüt-Asik (2007), evaluated using a panel data approach, the role of
dirty industries in Turkey's exports of manufactured goods over the period 1994–1997.
They found that higher exports were associated with an increase in dirty manufacturing
industries, an evidence in support of the “pollution haven” hypothesis. Feridun et al.
(2006) also supported the “pollution haven” hypothesis in the case of Nigeria where
trade-induced technique effect was small but negative. Cole and Elliott (2003a) used two
methodologies on US inter-industry trade data, and arrived at contradicting results. From
one point of view, they differed with Tobey (1990), and found support for the “pollution
haven” hypothesis when they employed the ‘new’ trade model with monopolistic
competition and differentiated goods. In this case, they concluded that environmental
regulations had a statistically significant influence on the share of inter-industry trade.
From another point of view, however, using the Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek (HOV) model
of trade they agreed with Tobey (1990)’s finding that the relationship between
environmental regulations and ‘dirty’ net exports was insignificant. This appears to
contradict the predictions of the “pollution haven” hypothesis (Cole and Elliott, 2003a).
Birdsall and Wheeler (1993)’s case studies and econometric evidence on Latin American
countries soundly rejected the "pollution haven" hypothesis, supporting the view that
there was no association between trade liberalization and higher foreign investment, on
the one hand, and freer trade and pollution-intensive industrialization, on the other.
21

Surprisingly, the authors find that trade openness increased demand for developed
countries’ cleaner technologies, and this was beneficial for the environment (Birdsall and
Wheeler, 1993). Jaffe et al., (1995)’s review of available evidence on the linkages
between environmental regulations and trade competitiveness in manufacturing in the
United States (US) found little evidence that stringent environmental regulations had a
large adverse effect on competitiveness, or relocation of "pollution-intensive" industries.
Their evidence, therefore, also discounted the “pollution haven” hypothesis, thus
supporting the findings of earlier studies, including the one by Tobey (1990) (Jaffe et al.,
1995).

Grether and De Melo (2003) who used a gravity panel model of bilateral trade flows and
production for 52 countries during the 1981-1998 period in five heavily polluting
industries, did not find much evidence in support of the “pollution haven” hypothesis.
They found that heavy polluting industries exhibited a North-South migration pattern
except for non-ferrous metals industries that migrated to the North. They argue that the
delocalization movements were a response to factor-abundances, and surprisingly, not
because of North-South environmental regulatory gaps (Grether and De Melo, 2003).
Ederington et al. (2004), who employed the Grossman and Krueger (1993) regression
approach to analyze shifts in US manufacturing toward cleaner industries over the 19721994 period, against industry-level data on US imports, found no evidence supporting the
“pollution havens" hypothesis. They concluded that tariff changes in the US after trade
liberalization did not disproportionately affect pollution-intensive industries, as there
were also shifts towards cleaner production and imports (Ederington et al., 2004).
The validity of the “pollution havens" hypothesis has also been empirically investigated
using foreign direct investment (FDI) flows. Broadly, there is mixed evidence in support
of the assertion that weaker environmental regulations attract relatively higher FDI flows.
This is what McGuire (1982) observed in the case where factors of production are freely
mobile across frontiers. This conclusion is supported by Eskeland and Harrison (2003)
who found weak evidence that multinationals relocate in sectors with high levels of air
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pollution. The authors also observed that, at best, results were ambiguous regarding the
pattern of FDI in the US towards industries with high pollution abatement costs. Javorcik
and Wei (2004), who used firm-level data of FDI inflows to 25 transitional economies in
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union economies found no systematic evidence to
support the assertion that dirty industries are relatively more attracted to jurisdictions
with weak environmental standards. More recently, Manderson and Kneller (2012),
using outward FDI by United Kingdom (UK) firms, did not find robust evidence to
support the assertion that dirtier, compared to, cleaner multinationals are more likely to
migrate to host countries with weak environmental policy. Rather, they found evidence
that countries that offer easier access to intermediate production inputs, and that are open
to international trade, are more likely to attract relatively dirtier FDI from the UK.
The weak evidence on the “pollution haven” hypothesis indicate that there are other
factors, other than differences in the costs of abating emissions, that influence industry
relocation decisions. These include factor endowments (Grossman and Krueger, 1993;
Tobey, 1990), and political economy factors. Furthermore, trade liberalization causes
trade openness to increase and induces technological change that could work against the
predictions of the “pollution haven” hypothesis (Taylor, 2004). Finally, econometric
methodological shortcomings that fail to control for unobserved heterogeneity, and
endogeneity, could lead to the likelihood of not observing important “pollution haven”
phenomena (Brunnermeier and Levinson, 2004).
The “pollution haven” effect
The failure to find support for the “pollution haven” hypothesis led to the strand of
literature relating to the “pollution haven” effect. The concept of “pollution haven” effect
refers to tightening of environmental standards to deter exports (or stimulate imports) of
dirty goods (Taylor, 2004)14. Levinson and Taylor (2008) developed a theoretical model

14

The “pollution haven” effect and the "pollution haven” hypothesis are two different, but related concepts.
Recall that the "pollution haven” hypothesis relate to the concern of possible relocation of dirty industries
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that they used to estimate a reduced-form equation that linked industry net imports to
local and foreign markets’ measures of environmental regulations, factor costs, and trade
tariffs. Their panel data included indicators of United States (US) environmental
regulations, and data on US trade flows with Canada and Mexico for 130 manufacturing
industries from 1977 to 1986. They argue that their findings support the presence of a
"pollution haven" effect, as pollution abatement (environmental regulatory) costs were
associated with a negative effect on net exports. They estimated that a 1% increase in
pollution abatement costs caused a 0.4%, and 0.6% increase in net imports by the US
from Mexico, and Canada, respectively. These results were statistically significant
(Levinson and Taylor, 2008). Ederington et al. (2005), like, Levinson and Taylor (2008)
also found that pollution abatement costs have adverse effects on exports, a support for
the “pollution haven” effect. Cole and Elliott (2005) who included in their study the
differentials in both factor endowments and environmental regulations found that US’
pollution-intensive FDI flows could be attracted to Brazil and Mexico, an evidence in
support for the “pollution haven” effect. This was because Brazil and Mexico were found
to have higher levels of capital endowments relative to the stringency of their
environmental regulations. Similarly, Mulatu, et al., (2010)’s investigation, using data on
16 manufacturing industries from 13 European countries, found evidence in support of
the “pollution haven” effect that was relatively similar in magnitude to other determinants
of industry location, such as supply of skilled labor. A recent study by Sawhney and
Rastogi (2015) investigated the India-US trade flows during the 1989–2006 period, and
concluded that there was no evidence in support of the “pollution haven” effect in the
overall manufactured trade flows, but there was some evidence in specific highly
polluting industries. Reasons have been advanced as to why the support for “pollution
haven” effect has been weak (Levinson and Taylor, 2008) or how, from a theoretical
perspective, such an effect might not arise (Benarroch and Gaisford, 2014).

from developed economies, where environmental standards are stricter, to developing economies that have
comparative advantages in dirty production because of weak environmental standards.
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Decomposition of environmental impacts
The failure to find support for the “pollution haven” hypothesis led researchers to explain
the impact of free trade on pollution by estimating the magnitude of scale, technique, and
composition effects. By estimating these effects, Antweiler et al. (2001) finds that trade
liberalization is good for the environment. Employing their theoretical model, and data on
sulfur dioxide (SO2) concentrations by the Global Environment Monitoring Project for
43 countries during the 1971-1996 period, they estimate that when the scale of
production, and accompanying income, increase by 1%, pollution rise by about 0.3% (a
positive scale effect), fall by about 1.4% (negative technique effect), and lead to
relatively smaller, but negative, change in pollution concentrations (negative composition
effect). Consequentially, if free trade increases GDP per person by 1%, the combined net
effect reduces concentrations of sulfur dioxide by about 1% (Antweiler et al., 2001).
Frankel and Rose (2005)’s findings support those of Antweiler et al. (2001). Using crosssectional data on 41 countries in 1990, and after accounting for endogeneity of trade
through instrumental variables, they found that freer trade lowers air pollution in the case
of concentrations of SO2, and to a lesser extent, nitrogen dioxide (NO2). They conclude
that despite their mixed results, freer trade was harmless to the environment (Frankel and
Rose, 2005).

Cole and Elliott (2003b), aimed to validate Antweiler et al. (2001)’s findings by
decomposing pollution into an overall effect combining scale and technique effects. They
also distinguish direct composition effect (the effect that emanate from shifts in the
capital–labor ratio), from the trade-induced composition effect (change in gross domestic
product that is related to shifts in the production of dirty goods in response to price
changes). They observe a relatively smaller trade-induced composition effect, compared
to the combined scale and technique effect and the direct composition effect. In the case
of SO2 emissions, as in Antweiler et al. (2001), their results suggest that both
environmental regulations, and shifts in the capital–labor ratio influences pollution, and
that these effects tend to cancel out each other. Specifically, on sulfur dioxide (SO2)
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emissions, they confirm Antweiler et al. (2001)’s finding that trade liberalization was
beneficial to the environment (Cole and Elliott, 2003b). However, regarding other
pollutants, Cole and Elliott (2003b)’s findings are more complex, as the magnitude and
signs of the combined scale and technique effect, and the trade-induced composition
effect, varied across pollutants. They find weak evidence regarding the impact of freer
trade on the environment in the case of carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions, and no effect at
all, in the cases of nitrogen oxide (NOx), and biochemical oxygen demand (BOD)
pollutants. Furthermore, results varied depending on base of measurement —per capita
emissions or pollution intensities. On the latter, the authors find good news as pollution
intensities fall with trade for all four pollutants (CO2, SO2, NOx, and BOD). On the
former, a 1% increase in trade-induced income reduced per capita emissions by 1.7% in
the case of SO2 emissions. They find that per capita emissions were likely to fall for
BOD pollutants, but rise, for both NOx and CO2 pollutants as free trade intensified. The
likely offsetting effects of environmental regulations, on the one hand, and capital–labor,
on the other, might explain why many studies fail to find evidence in support of the
“pollution haven” hypothesis (Cole and Elliott, 2003b).

Managi, et al. (2009), unlike, Cole and Elliott (2003b), aimed to derive an overall impact
(negative or positive) of trade openness on emissions, using indicators for SO2, CO2, and
BOD. The authors used both the fixed effects and a dynamic generalized method of
moments (GMM) estimation techniques on a panel of a large annual dataset for OECD
and developing countries over the period from 1973 to 2000. They find that trade
openness intensities cause a decrease in BOD in all countries. However, in the case of
SO2 and CO2 emissions the intensity of trade openness causes a decrease in CO2, and
SO2 emissions in OECD countries, and an increase in non-OECD countries. Specifically,
in the long-term, on average, a 1% increase in trade openness was associated with a
favorable impact of −0.155% in the case of BOD in non-OECD economies. The
corresponding effect on SO2 and CO2 emissions was an unfavorable impact of 0.920%
and 0.883%, respectively. Regarding the OECD economies, the long-term impact for
SO2, CO2, and BOD, were favorable at −2.228%, −0186%, and −0.224%, respectively.
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They explain that BOD decline in non-OECD countries because of availability of low
cost technologies for abating BOD that are sourced from OECD countries. Regarding the
decomposition of emissions, the authors find that a negative scale-technique effect
dominate a positive composition effect in OECD countries, and therefore, the short- and
long-term overall effects of trade openness on emissions was negative for all pollutants.
The overall results were mixed, however, in other countries. In developing countries,
SO2 and CO2 emissions were associated with positive scale-technique and composition
effects. In this case, the short- and long-term overall effects of trade openness were
positive. However, for BOD, a negative scale-technique effect dominated a positive
composition effect causing the overall effect of trade openness to turn negative. The
authors find that long-term elasticities were distinctly larger than the short-term
elasticities. They also suggest two changes through which trade impacts emissions, which
are, environmental regulation effect, and capital–labor effect. They argue that the
environmental regulation effect was likely to dominate the capital–labor effect (Managi,
et al., 2009).

Li, Xu, and Yuan (2015) arrive at different outcomes by finding that trade openness was
associated with significant negative effects on the environment in both OECD and nonOECD economies. Using the instrumental variables (IV) methodology of Frankel and
Rose (2005), and data from 134 economies over the period 1961 to 2004, the authors
claim that they are the first to use air visibility data to measure environmental quality.
They estimate that a 1% increase in trade openness could reduce air visibility in OECD
economies, and non-OECD economies, by about 0.09%, and 0.081%, respectively. The
fact that this finding holds for both developed and developing countries, unlike in Managi
et al. (2009)’s case where trade openness was found to reduce pollution only in OECD
countries, is a new finding in the literature (Li, Xu, and Yuan, 2015).
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Do national borders matter?

McAusland and Millimet (2013) use the ordinary least squares (OLS) and limited
information maximum likelihood (LIML) approaches to estimate a gravity model of
trade. Their aim is to investigate the impact of trade on the environment. Using
international and intranational trade data for the US and Canada they find evidence that
international trade has beneficial effects on the environment, but intranational trade does
not. A one percent increase in international trade intensity was associated with a decrease
in total pollution by 1.2% for the average US state, and by 10.1% in the average
Canadian province. Conversely, intranational trade was found to be harmful to the
environment. A one percent increase in intranational trade intensity caused total toxic
emissions to increase by over 5.3% and 3.3% for the average US state, and Canadian
province, respectively. This indicates that trade openness has positive effects on
environmental quality in the case of Canada and the US. The authors inform us that it
may not be possible to replicate their work in other country settings because of data
constraints (McAusland and Millimet, 2013). This is a major shortcoming of adopting
econometric approaches to evaluate trade-environmental relationships, especially in a
developing country setting.

2.2.2. Modeling results

Computable general equilibrium (CGE) models
Country studies: Beghin, et al., (1995) employ a CGE model15 to analyze the tradeoffs
between growth and environmental policies in Mexico in the context of trade
liberalization under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The effects of
three policies on Mexican growth, sectoral allocation, and trade are considered: pollution
abatement alone; trade liberalization alone; and coordinated environmental and trade
15

The CGE model used was the Trade and Environment Equilibrium Analysis (TEQUILA2) Model that
was an adaptation from the OECD Development Centre's prototype CGE model (see Beghin, et al., 1996

for a recent version of this model).
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policies. Mexico’s unilateral trade liberalization policy under the NAFTA was associated
with a 3.2% rise in gross domestic product (GDP) and a 2.5%-4.8% rise in all major
pollutants. The authors assert that coordinated policies mitigated the undesirable effects
of stand-alone policies. They show that trade opening could coexist with the tightening of
environmental standards. Further, they inform us that the assumed trade-offs between
growth and the environment was unlikely to attenuate Mexico’s economic performance
significantly. High contractionary impacts were associated with the abatement of only
one pollutant —the bio-accumulative toxic substances in water. The authors conclude
that, under freer trade, evidence rejected the hypothesis that Mexico could specialize in
dirty industries (Beghin, et al., 1995).

Dessus and Bussolo (1998) use a recursive dynamic prototype CGE model developed by
the OECD16 to analyze, quantitatively, the association between trade liberalization and
emission abatement policies in Costa Rica. The authors find that full trade liberalization
by the year 2010, could worsen Costa Rica’s pollution levels by between 15% and 20%.
This is because Costa Rica’s trade-induced scale effect (due to higher output) was found
to outweigh both the trade-induced composition (shift in output), and technological (use
of dirtier technology) effects. Joint implementation of free trade and effluent taxes
minimized this growth-environment trade-off (Dessus and Bussolo, 1998).
Beghin, et al., (2002b)’s publication presents the outcomes of a collection of empirical
investigations of the interactions between growth, international trade, and the
environment in seven developing economies —Chile, China, Costa Rica, Indonesia,
Mexico, Morocco, and Vietnam—, using a dynamic CGE methodology by the OECD17.
Beghin, et al., (2002b)’s presentation on Mexico and Costa Rica draw from the work by
Beghin, et al., (1995), and Dessus and Bussolo, (1998), respectively, as presented above.
A comparative analysis of outcomes of the Mexican case, with those for Indonesia and
Costa Rica, give interesting results (see Beghin, et al., 2002b: 233-250). In the case of
Mexico, no evidence was found that major environmental degradation could emanate
16
17

For a recent version of this model, see: Beghin, et al., (1996).
Ibid.
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from trade liberalization. Simulations for Mexico revealed that with free trade,
production would get less pollution-intensive because of resource allocation, and output
composition changes. There was a dominant scale effect, however, that potentially could
intensify emissions in many sectors, if an appropriate environmental policy to mitigate
the risks of environmental damage was not implemented. It was observed that some
pollutants were strongly complementary, for example, nitrogen dioxide (NO2) and sulfur
dioxide (SO2). Therefore, a pollution abatement tax that targets one such pollutant
reduced emissions by far more than a tax on any one of complementary effluents. This is
beneficial in reducing administrative costs of pollution control.

The cases for Costa Rica and Indonesia were, however, not promising. There was a
likelihood of increasing the risk of specialization in dirty industries because of significant
rise in pollution intensities after trade opening. Therefore, efforts to coordinate trade
liberalization and pollution abatement policies could bear higher dividends; a trade
opening policy alone was associated with substantial increases in trade-induced pollution,
while on the other hand, a pollution abatement policy alone, was associated with major
reduction in real output. For the cases of Costa Rica and Indonesia, trade was viewed as a
pathway for pollution abatement; abating pollution in domestic production could be
achieved by substituting dirty inputs produced domestically, with imports of pollutionintensive commodities in production (Beghin, et al., 2002b:233-247).

Regarding the seven cases, Beghin, et al., (2002b) argue that, with the exception of
China, where trade reforms were found to have a potentially damaging impact on the
environment, all the other cases support a “cautionary but favorable” impression of the
links between outward-oriented growth and the environment (Beghin, et al., 2002b:4).
The authors observe that their findings are consistent with those by Jha, et al., (1999),
Nordström and Vaughan (1999), Wheeler and Martin (1992), and Dasgupta and Wheeler
(1997), who used other methodologies. The case of China aimed to assess the country’s
trade liberalization and environment policies in the context of its accession to the World
Trade Organization (WTO), using a 1992-2010 base trend. China’s trade opening was
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viewed as potentially harmful to the environment for all pollutants. To start with, China’s
economy was assessed as pollution-intensive because of pervasive use of fossil fuel (soft
coal) energy and construction materials, which translate into a strong scale effect when a
pollution abatement policy is imposed. Because of this, trade opening heightened the risk
of specialization in dirty industries. Coordinating free trade and pollution abatement
policies might only minimize, but not eliminate, the growth-environment trade-offs in the
Chinese case (Beghin, et al., 2002b:7/8; 183/4).

Beghin, et al., (2002a) have analyzed trade liberalization reforms in Chile in the context
of the country’s accession to both the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),
and the Mercado Común del Sur (MERCOSUR) trade bloc18. Chile’s membership in
NAFTA was found to be environmentally friendly as it diverted trade that in turn reduced
the use of cheap energy inputs. The results under the MERCOSUR scenario, however,
are different as pollution was found to increase because of higher use of dirtier energy
inputs. Similarly, unilateral trade liberalization intensified pollution as cheaper and dirtier
energy inputs became more accessible. This had an adverse impact on urban mortality
and morbidity because of a substantial increase in pollutants related to SO2, and NO2,
and small particulates matter, PM10. Conversely, combined implementation of unilateral
trade integration and a tax on PM10 pollutants was found to be 16% more welfare
enhancing than isolated unilateral trade reforms. Freer trade was associated with an
intensification of pollution in the City of Santiago, but interestingly, because of a wide
scope for use of economic instruments, the environmental damage concerns were
manageable. Targeting a few pollutants was found to reduce emissions of pollutants with
complementary relationships. Consider the case of air pollutants comprising carbon
monoxide (CO), lead, nitrogen dioxide (NO2), particulate matter, PM10, sulphur dioxide
(SO2), and volatile organic compounds (VOC). Environmental taxes on NO2, PM10,
SO2, and VOC were found to significantly cause reductions in concentrations of lead of
6%-7%. Further, pollution taxes on either NO2, PM10, or SO2 contributed to substantial
reduction in concentrations of the other two, and in addition, some reduction in CO.
18

MERCOSUR (Spanish: Mercado Común del Sur; English: Southern Common Market) is a sub-regional
bloc whose full members are Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela.
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Despite these positive developments in Chilean case, there were increases in emissions of
untaxed pollutants caused by substitutability among some pollutants that are associated
with the composition effects (Beghin, et al., 2002a). In this regard, an increase in bioaccumulative toxic metals in water (BIOWAT), and in soil (BIOSOIL), were found to
induce decreases in levels of SO2, NO2, and PM10 pollution. These results arose because
of sectoral specialization in goods that are cheap to produce and that sharply intensify
pollution from untaxed emissions. The authors argue that the implementation of
coordinated free trade and environmental tax policies, is of outmost priority where
substitutability relationships among pollutants exist. Compared to a unilateral trade
liberalization policy alone, the pace of growth in total trade slackened under combined
policies. Further, at the sectoral level, certain imports (e.g. fish products) that increased
under a unilateral trade liberalization policy alone, increased even more under joint
policies. The authors argue that, in this situation, imports became a pathway for abating
emissions. In the case of Morocco, Beghin, et al., (2002b) inform us that the objective of
the study was to analyze the trade, environment, and economy linkages of a proposed free
trade agreement with the European union (EU). Trade liberalization was found to be
pollution-intensive in both production and consumption, if no mitigating measures are
taken to protect the environment. Finally, Vietnam’s trade liberalization reforms were
found to increase environmental damage, but the resultant trade-offs were judged as not
excessive (Beghin, et al., 2002b).

Lee and Roland-Holst (1997) use a calibrated general equilibrium model to analyze trade
with Japan. One of Lee and Roland-Holst (1997)’s experiments show that a combination
of an effective pollution abatement instrument and trade liberalization, achieves the twin
objectives of higher welfare (e.g. higher real GDP) and lower emissions. Using the SO2
emissions, the authors demonstrate that both higher welfare and lower pollution is
achieved by a combined policy of full trade tariff removal, and introduction of a uniform
tax that is designed to achieve a 3.2%-7.4% ex-ante pollution abatement target (Lee and
Roland-Holst (1997).
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O’Ryan et al. (2005) conducted simulation on Chile, using a static CGE model ―the
ECOGEM-Chile model. The authors simulate the direct and indirect effects on the
Chilean economy, of raising fuel taxes ―an environmental tax reform― by 100%,
accompanied by trade tariff reductions. A simulation of 100% increase in fuel taxes,
leads to negative outcomes on consumption, output, trade, and real GDP. At the sectoral
level, major changes occur, whereby oil extraction and production, and the transport
sector contract sharply, while the electricity sector that provide untaxed energy expand.
Households are also adversely affected by falling wages and falling employment as firms
reduce use of labor factors due to scaling down of productive activities. On the
environmental front, however, the results were positive as pollution was reduced for all
pollutants ―by 17% for SO2 and NO2 emissions, and by 15% for PM10 emissions. The
authors then emphasize the importance of coordinating the implementation of trade and
environmental policy reforms. In the joint scenario two policies are simultaneously
simulated: a fuel tax, and tariff reduction. The authors demonstrate that the adverse
impact of environmental reforms, such as a reduction in consumption and production,
could be mitigated by compensatory reduction in trade tariffs. However, the net results
will depend on the relationship between trade and energy use across sectors (O’Ryan et
al., 2005).

Li, J. C. (2005) uses a standard CGE model developed by the Trade and Macroeconomics
Division of the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) to investigates
whether a trade-off existed between trade liberalization and environmental quality. Using
Thailand’s 1998 social accounting matrix (SAM), the author evaluates the impacts of
three policy scenarios: an emissions tax on energy intermediate inputs and final consumer
goods with an aim of cutting emissions by 20% in reference to the base scenario; a 25%
trade tariff reduction; and combined trade and emissions tax. Li, J. C. (2005) conclude
that there was a modest risk for Thailand to specialize in producing dirty goods unless
pollution abatement measures accompany freer trade reforms. If pollution abatement and
free trade policies are jointly implemented, the author finds that economic growth is not
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significantly weakened. Li, J. C. (2005) results confirm findings by Dessus and Bussolo
(1998) and Beghin, et al., (1995).

Although some of the studies outlined above indicate that trade openness could lead to
significant rise in harmful emissions, other studies suggest otherwise. Kang and Kim
(2004) conducted a study on the relationship between trade policy reforms and the
environment using the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) CGE model19. The authors
found that the full removal of trade barriers between South Korea and Japan had
favorable effects of reducing the overall air pollution emission by 0.36% (Kang and Kim,
2004). A more recent study by Gumilang, et al. (2011) applied the GTAP’s static CGE
model to analyze the environmental impacts of Indonesian’s tariff reforms towards year
2022 under agreements with Japan and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN). The results were mixed; while CO2 emissions increased by 0.47% compared
to the base scenario, the impact on water pollution was negative. The authors conclude
that the impact of deepening Indonesia’s trade liberalization on the environment was
insignificant.

Global and regional studies: A comprehensive study on developing countries was
undertaken by Eickhout et al., (2004), using both GTAP CGE model and the Integrated
Model to Assess the Global Environment (IMAGE, 2001; Alcamo et al., 1998). The main
goal of the study was to quantify the effect of trade liberalization on the environment.
Across the regions covered, the authors found mixed evidence of the impact of trade
liberalization on the environment, in the context of the Doha Round of trade negotiations.
The authors argue that trade liberalization and environmental actions need to be
coordinated to minimize risk of environmental damage (Eickhout et al., 2004). These
findings are in line with those by Strutt and Anderson (2000) who employed the GTAP
CGE model to evaluate the effects of tariff reductions on Indonesia in the context of the
Uruguay Round (towards the year 2010) and the Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation’s
trade agreement (towards the year 2020). The authors found that trade policy reforms
19

See Hertel (1997). Global Trade Analysis: Modeling and Applications, T.W. Hertel (ed.), published in
1997 by Cambridge University Press (https://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/products/gtap_book.asp)
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were beneficial to the environment in respect of air and water emissions and that the
reforms mitigated the depletion of natural resources that are abundant in Indonesia. They
concluded that at the worst, trade reforms might only cause minimal environmental
degradation (Strutt and Anderson, 2000).

Using the GTAP model, Mukhopadhyay and Thomassin (2010) comprehensively
assesses the environmental effects to year 2020 of the ASEAN region + 3 (China, Japan
and Korea) free trade agreement. Air pollution effects (particularly, CO2) of trade
liberalization were judged to be fairly large in the case of Vietnam, Indonesia and
Thailand, but relatively smaller in the cases of China, Japan and South Korea. Vietnam,
for example, was judged to the main beneficiary of higher growth in output in a free trade
ASEAN region, and at the same time, the related impact on its environment was likely to
be unfavorable. Broadly, the impact of the ASEAN + 3 free trade agreement on the
environment was mixed. The authors observe that evidence, for or against, the “pollution
haven” hypothesis was also mixed. This is because both developing and developed East
and South Asian countries were equally likely to experience a negative or positive CO2
trade-induced composition effect depending on the selected trade liberalization scenario.
The analysis of total pollution change highlighted that activity changes played a major
role in driving pollution. Regarding greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, while the effect of
technology on pollution was negative in Japan, South Korea, and Singapore, they varied
in the other countries included in the study (Mukhopadhyay and Thomassin, 2010).

Other equilibrium models

Multisector models: Using a multisector, multiregion applied general equilibrium model
(GTAP-E), Kuik and Verbruggen (2002) analyzed the impact of unilateral
implementation by the North of the Kyoto Protocol on carbon leakage in the context of
full implementation of import tariffs reductions proposed under the Uruguay Round.
Regarding the South, they found a positive scale effect (+11.7 Mt C02 emissions), a
positive technique effect (+90.6 Mt C02 emissions), and a negative composition effect (35

22.17 Mt C02 emissions).

The Uruguay Round of tariff reductions enhanced the

competitive advantage of the North’s CO2-intensive industries, in comparison to a
scenario base of CO2 reductions without free trade. Evidence did not support that tariff
reduction would induce relocation of industries to the South (Kuik and Verbruggen,
2002).

Input-output analysis: In reference to the Heckscher–Ohlin (HO) theory, and using an
input-output analysis, Dietzenbacher, and Mukhopadhyay (2007) examined whether India
(a developing economy), could be regarded as a pollution haven. The authors compared
India’s extra emissions of CO2, SO2 and NOx that correspond to 1 billion rupees of
additional exports with a reduction in emissions arising from an increase of the same
value of extra imports. The authors found that between 1996/1997 and 1991/1992, India
moved away from being a pollution haven, and at the same time benefited highly from
trade (Dietzenbacher, and Mukhopadhyay, 2007).

Partial equilibrium models: Saunders and Wreford (2005) use a partial equilibrium
model to assess the impact of trade liberalization on agricultural production and
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. The authors find that New Zealand’s dairy sector
returns increase with full trade liberalization with the OECD economies. A GHG
emission abatement strategy without accompanying trade liberalization had adverse
effects on producer returns, while trade liberalization without an accompanying emission
mitigation strategy was likely to increase returns at the expense of higher GHG emissions
(Saunders and Wreford, 2005). Saunders and Cagatay (2004) use a partial equilibrium
model to investigate cross country linkages between trade liberalization policies, dairy
production systems, and groundwater nitrate levels in developed economies. Trade
liberalization was found to have an adverse effect on the European Union (EU) dairy
production, but it reduced EU nitrate emissions marginally. Dairy production rose in
other developed countries, accompanied by a marginal rise in emissions (Saunders and
Cagatay, 2004). Gallagher and Ackerman (2000), developed a simple, partial equilibrium
framework for analyzing the effect of trade policy changes on the relative concentrations
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of “clean” and “dirty” industries in two countries or regions in the context of the
“pollution haven” hypothesis. An application of this model by Gallagher (1999) suggest
that NAFTA did not significantly affect the location of “clean” or “dirty” industry in the
US versus Mexico (Gallagher and Ackerman, 2000).

Table 2-1, while not exhaustive, outlines the models examined during this literature
review. Empirical literature on the linkages between trade and environment quality have
followed two strands of methodologies. Studies have used econometric techniques to fit
regressions to estimate the impact of trade liberalization on the environment. However,
there are only a few of such studies on developing countries because of lack of quality
environmental indicators to support cross-country empirical analysis.

Conversely, computable general equilibrium (CGE) models that emerged in the early
1970’s (Shoven, et al., 1972), have become important tools for analyzing economic effect
of policy changes in developed countries. CGE models were popularized for developing
countries’ contexts by the World Bank through its pioneering project that developed the
theoretical foundations of CGE models for open developing economies (Dervis, et al.,
1982). CGE models are very popular in analyzing the impact of policy changes in a wide
range of economic contexts (see Dixon and Jorgenson, 2013). The book edited by
Batabyal and Nijkamp (2010) on research tools in natural resources and environmental
economics informs us that CGE models have several advantages. These include their
utility for measuring the impacts of policy shocks in a theoretically consistent manner,
and for quantifying changes in the economy. The CGE models’ ability to capture indirect
effects of policy shocks that are at times difficult to quantify otherwise, make the models
popular with researchers who aim to assess economy wide inter-linkages between
markets (factor and goods) and institutions (households, public and private sectors, and
the rest of the world). As Table 2-1 illustrate, far more studies relating to developing
countries have employed the CGE modeling approach, to investigate the policy trade-offs
in the trade liberalization and environment nexus.
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2.3.

Methodological Choices

Table 2-1: Methodological Approaches - Trade Liberalization-Environmental Linkages
Author(s)

Key aim of study

Sawhney et al.,
(2015)
Li, Xu, et. al.,
(2015)
McAusland et. al.,
(2013)
Chang (2012)

Test of "pollution haven" effect

Country/region
Methodology
(time-frame)
Econometric Techniques
US-India
Regression analysis
(1989–2006)
134 countries (1961–
Instrumental Variables (IV)
2004)
US and Canada (1997
Gravity model estimate
and 2002)
China (1981–2008)
Vector autoregression

Impact on environment

OECD & other countries
(1973-2000)

Generalized method of
moments/panel

Panel data and two stage least
squares (2SLS)
Ordinary least squares (OLS)
and generalized least squares
(GLS)
Gravity model estimation
with IVs
Grossman and Krueger
(1993) regression approach
Fixed effects and random
effects panel, with two
models: ‘new’ trade, and
Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek
(HOV)
Regressions analysis

Non-OECD (SO2 & CO2 increase; BOD
decrease); OECD economies (all
decrease). EKC hypothesis supported in
cases of SO2 & CO2, but not BOD
Increase in US abatement costs caused
increase in net imports
"Pollution haven" hypothesis supported

Managi, et al.
(2009)

Effects of free trade on
environment
Impact of national borders on
environment
Examine openness-environment
linkages
Impact of trade openness on
environmental quality

Levinson et al.,
(2008)
Feridun et al.
(2006)

Effect of environmental
regulations on trade
Freer trade and pollution
linkages

US trade with Canada,
Mexico (1977/86)
Nigeria (1980/19921999/2000)

Frankel et. al.,
(2005)
Ederington et al.
(2004)
Cole et al., (2003b)

Trade-environment effects for
given levels of GDP
Free trade & dirty industries’
migration
Decompose pollution into an
overall (scale & technique)
effect. Introduces capital–labor
endowments

Cross-section of 41
countries (1990)
US (1972 -1994)

Antweiler, et al,
(2001)
Tobey (1990)

Estimate of scale, technique,
and composition effects
Impact of environmental policy
on 'dirty' industries

44 countries
(1971-1996)
World-wide (late
1960s/early 1970s)

Cross-country (1975–
1990/1995)

Ordinary least squares (OLS)
regressions with HOV model
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Mixed evidence on "pollution haven"
effect
Reduction of air visibility with trade
openness
Unlike intranational trade, international
trade is associated with lower emissions
Mixed results for both exports and imports

Trade lowers pollution concentrations
"Pollution haven" hypothesis not
supported
Supported "pollution haven" hypothesis
under ‘new’ trade model, but not under
HOV model. Technique effects dominate
in some cases, and scale effects in others
SO2 concentrations fall as freer trade raise
GDP per person
Stringency of environmental policy has no
significant effect on patterns of trade

(Table 2-1: Methodological Approaches - Trade Liberalization-Environmental Linkages) (continued)
Author(s)

Key aim of study

Gumilang, et al.
(2011)
Mukhopadhyay et
al., (2010)

Trade liberalizationenvironment linkages
Economy wide analysis of
freer trade and environment

Zhu et al., (2006)

Free trade, factor mobility,
and the environment

Li, J. C. (2005)

Beghin et al.
(2002b)
Beghin et al.
(2002b)
Beghin et al.
(2002b)

Trade liberalization and
environment trade-offs
Impact of raising fuel taxes
and tariff cuts
Trade liberalization through
regional trade blocs and
environment
Free trade and environment
given entry into WTO
Analysis of growth, trade, and
environment linkages
Trade-environment, linkages
given free trade with EU

Dessus, et al.
(1998)
Lee et. al., (1997)

O’Ryan et al.
(2005)
Beghin et al.
(2002b)

Beghin et al.
(1995)

Country/region
Methodology
(time-frame)
Applied General Equilibrium Techniques
Indonesia
Static global CGE model
(2001-2022)
(GTAP)
ASEAN + China, Japan Static global CGE model
& Korea (2001-2010(GTAP)
2020)
EU, Central & Eastern
Static CGE model
European Countries
(1998)
Thailand (1998 base
Standard CGE model
year)
(IFPRI)
Chile (1996 base year)
Static CGE model
Chile (1992-2010 base
trend)

CGE model of trade and
environment

China (1992-2010 base
trend)
Vietnam (1995-2010
base trend)
Morocco (1995-2005
base trend)

CGE model of trade and
environment
CGE model of trade and
environment
CGE model of trade and
environment

Trade liberalization and
emission abatement

Costa Rica (1992-2010
base trend)

Recursive dynamic CGE
model

Trade, environment, and
welfare impacts
Growth, openness, and
environment links

Indonesia (1985 base
year)
Mexico (1990-2010
base trend)

CGE model – free trade
with Japan
TEQUILA2 (CGE) model

Source: Author
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Impact on environment

Mixed results
Large impact in Vietnam, Indonesia, and
Thailand.
Positive economic welfare effects
without increases in GHG emissions
Modest risk of specialization in dirty
production
Positive results with environmental-trade
policy coordination
Freer trade intensify pollution; doubledividend conjecture on joint
environment and efficiency gains
For all pollutants, trade reforms harm the
environment
Trade reforms increases environmental
damage but trade-offs are not excessive
Freer trade, without mitigating
environmental policies is production &
consumption pollution-intensive
Free trade might increase pollution
because of comparative advantages for
manufacturing
Coordinated policies enhance welfare
and lower emissions
Unilateral trade liberalization increases
GDP and pollution

2.4.

Summary

Overwhelming evidence suggest that pollution intensity is higher in low-income
countries compared to developed countries (Hettige, et al., 1992; Lucas, et al., 1992).
However, empirical evidence on the nexus between the environment policies and
competitiveness is not conclusive. Further, to paraphrase (Beghin, et al., 1994:176)
“studies do not find strong evidence that environmental regulations per se have
influenced competitiveness”.
Furthermore, studies have failed to support the “pollution haven” hypothesis that predicts
that weak environmental regulations foster higher foreign direct investment inflows
(Beghin, et al., 1994). In fact, Birdsall and Wheeler (1993)’s empirical study on Latin
American countries reject the "pollution haven" hypothesis, supporting the view that
there is no association between trade liberalization and higher foreign investment, on the
one hand, and freer trade and pollution-intensive industrialization, on the other.

Surprisingly, the authors find that trade openness increased demand for developed
countries’

cleaner

technologies

with

beneficial

effects

on

the

environment.

Dietzenbacher, and Mukhopadhyay (2007) make similar observations in the case of
India, which was found to have moved away from being a pollution haven while at the
same time benefiting from trade openness.

Quantitative empirical studies that have analyzed the theorized linkages between trade
liberalization and environment have applied either econometric techniques, or economic
modeling approaches, mainly computable general equilibrium (CGE) models. The wide
variations of empirical outcomes of CGE studies on trade liberalization and
environmental quality presents an opportunity to expand such studies to the African
region, and Kenya, specifically.
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Many subjects have been covered in studies on Kenya that use the CGE models. These
include: liberalization of services (Balistreri, et al. 2015); consequences of avian flu
(Thurlow, 2011); Doha Round of trade negotiations (Zepeda, et al. 2009); agriculture and
income of adjustment to terms of trade shocks (Karingi and Siriwardana, 2003); impact
of second oil price shock and resultant energy tax policies on the economy (Semboja,
1994); and technical efficiency changes in Agriculture (Akinboade, 1993). However,
Kenya appears to have been overlooked in the literature relating to the hypothesized
trade-off between trade liberalization and pollution abatement.
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CHAPTER III: THE KENYAN ECONOMY
Chapter three presents Kenya’s key economic, trade, and environmental indicators, and
examines how these have evolved in the recent decades. It shows that the real Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate has picked up over the past 5 years, a trajectory that
is expected to continue in the medium term. It illustrates the trade liberalization initiatives
that the country is undertaking to drive faster economic growth and industrialization. As
Kenya intensifies its globalization agenda by exploiting its comparative advantages in
trade, so will industrial emissions rise. These are some of the main issues that are covered
in this Chapter that starts by presenting Kenya’s recent economic developments, covering
both the macroeconomic performance, and the structure of the economy. Next is Section
3.2 that outlines the recent developments on the international trade arena. Here issues
related to Kenya’s trade openness, imports, and exports transactions, and import tariffs
are discussed. Thereafter, Section 3.3 provides a brief overview of the foreign direct
investments flows to Kenya. Finally, before concluding in Section 3.5, Section 3.4
outlines the country’s environmental policy and performance in recent years.

3.1.

Recent Economic Developments

3.1.1. Macroeconomic performance

Kenya, a lower-middle income country, has the largest economy in Eastern Africa, and
the 8th largest in Africa, as measured in nominal GDP20. The country’s population was
estimated at 44.23 million in 2015 (Table 3-1) which, according to the Economist
Intelligence Unit (EIU) (2016) is expanding at an annual rate of 2.7%. Over the decades
prior to 2009, Kenya’s economy was adversely affected by political shocks that emanated
from ethnic conflicts in 1992, 1997, and over the 2007-2008 period (Odero, et al., 2015),
20

Kenya rebased its GDP in 2014 raising its per capita GDP from USD 994 to USD 1 246. The 2014
rebasing changed the base year to 2009 from 2001, updated the production, relative prices, and
consumption patterns, and introduced innovations related product changes. Further, the rebasing exercise
changed the utilization and acquisition of capital goods, and adopted an economic activity classification
that follows international practices (Government of Kenya, 2014b).
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and that caused the economy to contract significantly. Thanks to the enactment of the
2010 Constitution that introduced a more equitable economic and social order in a
devolved system of 47 county governments, Kenya appears to be enjoying a period of
renewed good fortune.

Table 3-1: Kenya's Selected Economic and Social Indicators, 2009-2015
Indicator
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
Real GDP (%)/1
3.31
8.40
6.11
4.56
5.69
5.33
GDP, current prices
(KSh, trillions)/1
2.86
3.17
3.73
4.26
4.73
5.36
GDP per capita (US$, Units)/1
982
1,039
1,062
1,239
1,314
1,417
Inflation, annual,
consumer prices (%)/1
8.02
5.77
18.93
3.20
7.15
6.02
Exchange rate, period average
(KSh per US$)/2
77.35
79.23
88.81
84.53
86.12
87.92
General government revenue
(% of GDP)/1
18.79
19.80
19.46
19.15
19.76
19.93
General government total
expenditure (% of GDP)/1
23.13
24.21
23.57
24.18
25.47
27.38
Total investment (% of GDP)/1
19.33
20.74
21.67
21.51
20.11
21.37
Gross national savings (% of GDP)/1
14.93
14.81
12.54
13.07
11.24
10.97
Current account balance
(% of GDP)/1
-4.56
-5.92
-9.13
-8.44
-8.87
-10.40
Trade (% of GDP/2
50.86
54.23
60.45
55.22
51.28
51.12
Exports of goods and services
(% of GDP)/2
20.03
20.66
21.63
19.82
18.15
16.92
Imports of goods and services
(% of GDP)/2
30.83
33.57
38.82
35.41
33.13
34.20
/3 , /2
Tariff rate (%)
12.55
12.50
12.42
12.21
12.76
12.77
Population/1
37.70
38.50
39.50
40.70
41.80
43.00
Unemployment, total/4 , /2
9.40
9.30
9.20
9.20
9.10
9.20
Source: Author based on data by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2016) and the World Bank (2016)

2015
5.59
6.05
1,388
8.01
98.18
20.22
28.60
22.55
14.39
-8.16
44.81
15.77
29.04
44.23
-

Notes: /1: Source - IMF’s World Economic Outlook (GDP values, in 2015, are estimates)
/2: Source - World Bank, World Development Indicators
/3: Most favored nation, simple mean, all products
/4: International Labor Organization (ILO) modelling estimate

Table 3-1 show that although there are imbalances, broadly, the Kenya's recent
macroeconomic performance is stable, and is improving. The real GDP growth rate
reached 5.6% in 2015, up from 3.3% in 2009. This growth trajectory, per the
International Monetary Fund (IMF)’s projections, is expected to continue in the medium
term. GDP per capita increased by 41% from United States dollar (US$) 982 to US$
1,388 over the 2009-2015 period. The government successfully brought down the annual
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inflation rate ―measured in consumer prices― to a single digit of 8% in 2015, after a
spike to 18.9% in 2011. Investment, as a percentage of GDP, has risen by a modest 17%
between 2009 and 2015. Kenya’s exchange rate regime is fully liberalized and imposes
high volatility in the domestic foreign exchange market. The Kenya Shilling (KSh) per
US$ period average exchange rate depreciated by 27% from KSh 77.35 in 2009 to KSh
98.18 in 2015. The fiscal deficit, as a percentage of GDP, deteriorated to 8.4% in 2015
compared to 4.3% in 2009, as the government’s spending outpaced its revenue
mobilization capacity. Unfavorable terms of trade shocks have caused Kenya’s current
account deficit to widen, as a % of GDP, from 4.6% in 2009 to 8.2% in 2015. The overall
unemployment rate is 9%, and is higher among the youth. Despite structural bottlenecks
that sustain relatively high interest rates, the Kenyan economy is otherwise markets
driven, with prices of factors, goods, and the exchange rate, being broadly determined by
forces of supply and demand.

3.1.2. Structure of the economy
Kenya’s official policy has long viewed a productive agricultural sector as the foundation
for industrialization (Government of Kenya, 1965). While in 1980, the shares in GDP
were 32.6% for agriculture, 20.8% for industry, and 46.6% for services, a decade later the
contribution to GDP had risen to 51.4% for services, while that for agriculture had fallen
to 29.5%, and for industry to 19.1%. A country is classified as semi-industrialized if the
composition of agriculture and services sectors’ output exceed 40% (Dervis, et al.,
1982:262), a threshold that is exceeded in the Kenyan case. The value added 21 in
services, agriculture, and industry sectors, as a percentage of GDP, averaging 52%, 29%
and 19%, respectively, over the 1990-2014 period.

21

“Value added is the net output of a sector after adding up all outputs and subtracting intermediate
inputs.” (World Bank, 2016).
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Chart 3-1: Kenya’s Agriculture, Industry, and Services Sectors’ Shares in GDP, 1990-2014
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Source: Author based on data by World Bank (2016)

Table 3-2: Kenya's GDP, and Sectoral Contributions to GDP, 2001-2014
2001
2,138
3.98
11.66
31.33
5.50

2002
2,148
0.48
-3.50
29.13
2.35

2003
2,212
2.95
2.43
29.03
6.12

2004
2,314
4.64
1.75
28.04
4.07

2005
2,445
5.67
6.91
27.20
4.39

2006
2,588
5.85
1.73
23.16
5.89

2007
2,766
6.85
5.09
23.27
6.13

0.29
17.22
11.00
-0.14
51.45

0.08
17.41
11.07
2.70
53.46

5.97
17.58
10.92
2.53
53.40

4.46
18.23
11.25
5.12
53.73

4.66
19.09
11.82
4.59
53.71

8.21
21.88
14.32
7.67
54.97

4.38
21.82
14.46
7.00
54.92

2008
2009
GDP (billion KSh)1
2,772
2,864
Real GDP growth rate (%)1
0.23
3.31
Agriculture growth rate (%)2
-4.98
-2.30
Agriculture (% of GDP)2
24.92
26.14
Industry growth rate (%)2
-0.05
3.70
Including manufacturing
growth rate (%)2
1.14
-1.05
Industry (% of GDP)2
20.87
20.98
Including manufacturing (% of GDP)2
13.58
13.39
Services, etc. growth rate (%)2
2.74
6.23
Services, etc. (% of GDP)2
54.21
52.87
Source: Author based on data by the IMF and the World Bank

2010
3,104
8.40
10.06
27.83
8.68

2011
3,294
6.11
2.35
29.27
7.25

2012
3,444
4.56
2.95
29.09
4.18

2013
3,640
5.69
5.25
29.42
5.02

2014
3,834
5.33
3.46
30.27
6.51

4.50
20.79
12.62
7.30
51.38

7.24
21.04
13.08
6.09
49.68

-0.56
20.71
12.26
4.73
50.20

5.60
20.07
11.93
5.41
50.51

3.41
19.36
11.11
5.79
50.37

GDP (billion KSh)1
Real GDP growth rate (%)1
Agriculture growth rate (%)2
Agriculture (% of GDP)2
Industry growth rate (%)2
Including manufacturing
growth rate (%)2
Industry (% of GDP)2
Including manufacturing (% of GDP)2
Services, etc. growth rate (%)2
Services, etc. (% of GDP)2

Notes:

(1) The GDP is at constant 2009 KSh prices (IMF, 2016)
(2) These are value-added annual % growth rates (World Bank, 2016)

Chart 3-1 depicts the evolution of the sectoral distribution of GDP in key sectors of
services, agriculture, and industry, during the 1990-2014 period. The dominant sectors of
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services and agriculture, recorded annual average growth rate of 4.1% and 2.5%,
respectively, over this period. On the other hand, industrial sector grew by an annual
average of 3.3% over the 1990 to 2014 period. Manufacturing sector, however, stagnated
contributing only 11% to GDP in 2014, down from an average of 13.7% in the 5 years
preceding 2010. The 5 years ending 2014, however, reveal a more promising picture for
the industrial sector. The sector recorded the highest average annual growth of 6.3%,
surpassing those for the services sector, and the agriculture sector, that averaged 5.9%,
and 4.8%, respectively (see Table 3-2).

Agricultural sector

Strong growth in the agricultural sector, that averaged 4.8% per annum, over the 5 years
ending 2014, pushed the sectors’ GDP from KSh 669 billion in 2009 to KSh 844.7 billion
in 2014. However, although the agricultural sector supports the livelihood of 80% of the
population, and 65% of the country’s export earnings, it is beset by institutional
complexities, and low access to credit (FAPDA22, Undated; Odero, et al., 2015). The
related policy challenges have contributed to the decline of the sector’s productivity, low
diversification from traditional agriculture, and low commercialization of small scale
farming. Consequently, the country’s agriculture sector is weakly vertically integrated,
with poor institutional support for agricultural exports. Regarding trade policy, Kenya,
together with the other East African Community (EAC) partner states continues to restrict
imports of several agricultural products (European Commission, 2015a), for example
sugar, by imposing import quotas, and high tariffs. Such protectionist measures diminish
the transmission mechanism of world price shocks, thus leaving the domestic supply and
demand forces to largely influence the agricultural sector’s growth dynamics.

22

FAPDA stands for Food and Agriculture Policy Decision Analysis. It is a programme within the Food
and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.
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Industrial sector

Table 3-3: Real GDP in Key Sectors, 2014 and 2013

Mining and quarrying
(growth rate)
Manufacturing
(growth rate)
Electricity and water supply
(growth ate)
Construction
(growth rate)
Total
(growth rate)

Share
in GDP
(%)
0.9
10.9
2.4
4.8
19

2014
(Ksh
million)
35,196
(14.2%)
416,891
(3.4%)
91,908
(5.7%)
185,301
(13.1%)
729,296
(6.5%)

Source: Central Bank of Kenya (2015:6)

2013
(Ksh
million)
30,813
(-8.9%)
403,128
(5.6%)
86,917
(6.6%)
163,841
(5.8%)
684,699
(5.0%)

Recent statistics (see Table 33), paint a promising picture on
the performance of industrial
and construction sectors of the
Kenya

economy,

whose

aggregate value-added, as a
percentage of GDP, stood at
6.5% up from 5%, and 3.7%, in
2013, and 2009, respectively.

Data by the World Bank (2016) show that the level of industrialization in Kenya, as
measured by industry value-added share of GDP, has over the past 25 years (1990-2014)
been range-bound between 16% and 22%, with a spike of 21.9% in 2006. Kenya’s
expanding mining sector is poised for significant long-term growth given the country’s
major reserves of soda ash, fluorspar, and titanium oxide,23 and the recent discoveries of
recoverable oil reserves24.

A thriving manufacturing sector typically precipitate industrialization and, therefore, it is
worthwhile to look closer at the recent performance of the former. The top part of Table
3-4 gives the breakdown of the manufacturing sectors’ value of output, intermediate
consumption, value-added, and employee compensation at current prices over the period
from 2009 to 2014. The second part of Table 3-4 presents the quantum index ―an index
that track the evolution of quantities of goods produced― of selected manufactures over
23

See: http://www.oxfordbusinessgroup.com/kenya-2016/energy
Kenya’s recoverable oil reserves are estimated at about 600 million barrels with yet to be proven oil
reserves that are projected 20.1 billion barrels. The country plans that its first oil shipments in mid-2017 to
be the first oil exporter in East Africa. See: (i) http://www.energyglobal.com/pipelines/businessnews/07012016/Uganda-and-Kenya-recoverable-oil-reserves-could-impact-economies-depending-on-newexport-pipeline/;
(ii) http://www.africareview.com/Business---Finance/Explorer-confirms-more-Kenya-oil-reserves//979184/1979246/-/4opp6e/-/index.html; and (iii) (see article by Bloomberg, “Kenya From Nowhere Plans
East Africa’s First Oil Exports: Energy” at: http://www.bloomberg.com/)
24

47

the same period. The quantum index cover manufactures that accounted for about 80% of
the total value-added in 2013.

Table 3-4: Manufacturing sector's selected indicators, 2009 - 2014
Output, Intermediate Consumption, Value-Added, and Employee Compensation
(Current Prices, KSh billion)
2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

Value of output

770

1,259

1,581

1,620

1,738

1,822

Intermediate consumption

536

902

1,143

1,150

1,230

1,285

Value-added

235

357

438

470

508

537

75

92

98

106

127

141

Compensation of employees

Quantum Index of Production for Selected Manufactures
(Base: 2009 = 100)
2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

Meat products

100.0

98.1

105.1

109.2

109.4

108.8

Animal and vegetable fats/oils

100.0

103.7

101.1

98.9

111.4

118.8

Grain mill products

100.0

116.6

126.3

130.3

137.4

148.7

Other food products

100.0

122.1

116.3

113.8

129.7

133.8

Beverages

100.0

103.1

113.6

122.9

112.5

105.3

Textiles

100.0

106.2

110.4

117.7

112.1

115.2

Wearing apparel

100.0

107.7

112.8

119.0

132.7

139.1

Printing and production

100.0

100.4

100.5

100.2

102.3

99.3

Refined petroleum products

100.0

103.2

114.0

91.4

47.0

0.0

Chemical and chemical products

100.0

110.0

116.0

116.1

112.6

115.7

Rubber products

100.0

96.1

72.0

82.1

100.2

99.0

Plastic products

100.0

102.1

110.0

116.5

114.1

123.5

Other non-metallic minerals

100.0

109.9

119.3

125.3

135.1

156.1

Fabricated metals

100.0

110.6

123.1

131.7

154.3

175.1

Motor vehicle and trailers

100.0

104.9

113.1

123.3

119.3

125.9

Manufacture of furniture

100.0

108.4

150.2

164.2

183.8

208.3

Total Manufacturing

100.0

109.3

116.3

119.2

127.5

133.3

Source: Economic Survey, 2014 & 2015 (Government of Kenya, 2014b: 183/184; 2015a:195/196)

From 2009 to 2014, the output in the manufacturing sector expanded by 137% (KSh
1,052 billion). This mirrors the increase in quantities produced as reflected in the total
manufacturing quantum index that rose by 33.3 points above the 2009 base value. While
over the same 2009-2014 period, the value-added, and intermediate consumption in
manufactures also increased significantly by 129% (KSh 302 billion), and 140% (KSh
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749 billion), respectively, compensation to employees increased at a slower pace by 88%
(KSh 66 billion). Manufactures of furniture, fabricated metals, and other non-metallic
minerals, supported this high output growth trajectory, rising by 108.3 points, 75.1 points,
and 56.1 points, above the 2009 base value, respectively. Following this is a group of
manufactures comprising grain milling, wearing apparel, other food products (coffee, tea,
refined salts, etc.), motor vehicle and trailers, and plastics whose expansion ranged from
23.5 to 48.7 points. Manufactures of food products normally reflect the performance of
the agricultural sector. A third group that comprises the manufactures of animal and
vegetable fats/oils, chemicals, and textiles achieved growth of rates of between 15.2 and
18.8 points. In 2014, the refining of crude fuel from Kenya Petroleum Refineries Limited
was stopped. Output of meat products and beverages expanded by 8.8 points and 5.3
points, respectively, above the 2009 base value, while that of printing and production,
and rubber products, contracted by about 1 point.
On the policy front, Ronge and Nyangito (2000) define two phases relating to Kenya’s
industrialization strategy: import-substitution industrialization, and export-oriented
industrialization (see Table 3-5). Before the 1980s, the country’s policy stances aimed to
protect “infant-industries” through quantitative import controls, punitive tariffs, an
overvalued exchange rate, and export subsidies. Thanks to access to a wider export
market under the initial EAC customs union with Uganda, and Tanzania that was
launched in 1967, but collapsed in 1977, Kenya managed to expand its industrial base
over this period25. The collapse of the initial EAC treaty, in the backdrop of excessive
market distortions that eroded Kenya’s competitiveness in manufactures, however,
curtailed the county’s further progress towards industrialization.
Ronge and Nyangito (2000)’s second phase coincides with the push by the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank for developing countries to implement
structural adjustment programs of the 1980s. Kenya, on its part, launched its home-grown
25

See “The History Of The East African Community” at: http://eacgermany.org/eac-history/. The Treaty to re-launch
the EAC was signed on November 30, 1999 and was ratified by the initial member states, Kenya, Tanzania, and
Uganda on July 7, 2000. Rwanda and Burundi became full members of the re-launched EAC on July 1, 2007, and
South Sudan, on March 2, 2016.
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reforms through the Economic Management for Renewed Growth (Sessional Paper No. 1
of 1986) aiming to liberalize trade and the exchange rates, provide exports incentives,
and to privatize state enterprises. These goals faced uneven implementation leading the
IMF to withdraw its financial support in 1997. In the backdrop of major macroeconomic
imbalances and economic stagnation, the country issued its Industrial Transformation to
the Year 2020 (Sessional Paper No. 2 of 1996) policy framework that envisaged
industrialization as a pathway for rapid and sustained economic growth. In the new
paradigm that was implemented under the Eighth Development Plan (1997–2001), and
the Ninth Development Plan (2002–2008), the government was mandated to provide
incentives and strengthen institutional frameworks for private sector led industrialization.
These objectives were, however, not fully realized because of discontinuation of financial
support by the IMF, and the World Bank in the decade ending 2003 (Ronge and
Nyangito, 2000).

Table 3-5: Industrial Sector Development in Kenya: A Historical Perspective










Policy framework
Policy instruments
Phase I: Import-substitution industrialization (1963-1980)
Broadly followed the British colonial policy  Protecting “infant-industries”
Phase II: Export-oriented industrialization (1981-2008)
Economic Management for Renewed  Liberalization of trade and exchange rate,
Growth (Sessional Paper No. 1 of 1986)
provision of export incentives, and privatization
Industrial Transformation to the Year 2020  Stable macroeconomic framework, enhanced
(Sessional Paper No. 2 of 1996)
trade policy regime, infrastructural, human
resource, and institutional developments
Eighth Development Plan (1997–2001)
Ninth National Development Plan (2002-  Prudent macro-economic policies to sustain
2008)
growth
Phase III: Spatial-inclusive industrialization (2009 to date)
Kenya's Vision 2030 (2008-2030) with three  Fostering macroeconomic stability, while
pillars: Economic, Social, and Political
removing bottlenecks hampering expansion of
industry sector
The 2010 Constitution of Kenya, 6 May  Enhancing spatial distribution of industrialization
2010

Source: Author based on Ronge and Nyangito (2000), Kenya's Vision 2030, and 2010 Constitution

I add a third phase from 2009 that I have named, spatial-inclusive industrialization (Table
3-5). A new era for industrial take-off in Kenya began with the issuance of Kenya's
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Vision 2030 (2008-2030), and the enactment of the 2010 Constitution of Kenya (6 May
2010), that repealed the 1969 Constitution. The 2010 Constitution mandates the equitable
sharing of resources between national and county governments. Further, it established an
equalization fund to improve access to services to marginalized communities, that is
enhancing spatial distribution, and sustainability of industrialization initiatives. Also,
Kenya's Vision 2030 calls for the country’s transformation into a newly industrialized
middle-income country by 2030, and mandates the national government to implement
several enablers to accelerate industrialization including, rapid infrastructure, technology,
and human resources development (Government of Kenya, 2008). Good progress has
been made to implement projects envisaged in Kenya’s Vision 2030 under two plans:
First Medium Term Plan, 2008-2012; and Second Medium Term Plan, 2013–2017. Under
infrastructural projects, for example, the Kenya-Uganda standard-gauge railway26, and
Africa’s largest wind power project ―situated in a remote, marginalized northern region
and that is expected to meet 17% of Kenya’s power demand 27―, are creating new
opportunities that will overcome regional inequalities both in economic and spatial terms.
In the 2016 World Bank’s ease of doing business rating, Kenya was ranked as the highest
reformer in the region, edging up 21 positions to rank 108 out of 189 economies, a
demonstration that the country is creating a competitive environment for investments28.

26

The first phase of the railway, from Mombasa to Nairobi is nearing completion, and is expected to be
commissioned in 2017 well ahead of schedule. This phase cost US$3·6 billion, of which 90% is financed
by the China EximBank. Agreement with the Chinese has been signed to extend the standard gauge railway
by another 120 kilometers to serve a newly launched economic development zone at Naivasha in the Rift
Valley, close to Kenya’s geothermal energy source. See: http://www.railwaygazette.com/ news/
infrastructure/single-view/view/standard-gauge-to-serve-naivasha.html
27
The Lake Turkana Wind Power project is a US$690 private sector investment that is financed by a
consortium of investors including the African Development Bank, and the European Investment Bank. See
news article available at: http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2015/07/06/3677104/kenya-builds-africas-largestwind-farm/
28
See 2016 World Bank Ease of Doing Business rating for Kenya at: http://www.doingbusiness.org/
data/exploreeconomies/kenya
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Service sector

After recovering from the sharp contraction during the post-election crisis from
December 2007 to February 2008, Kenya's dominant services sector slowed slightly from
an annual growth rate of 6.2% in 2009, to an annual average growth rate of 5.9% over the
5-year ending 2014 (Table 3-2). Activities in the services sector that contributed
significantly to GDP in 2014 were: real estate (KSh 311 billion or 8%), wholesale and
retail trade (KSh 294.8 billion or 8%), education (KSh 267.8 billion or 7%), transport and
storage (KSh 252.5 billion or 7%), financial and insurance (KSh 229.9 billion or 6%),
public administration (KSh 150 billion or 4%), and information and communication (KSh
137.8 billion or 4%). The service sector activities that achieved the highest average
annual growth rate over the period 2010 to 2014, are: information and communication
(13.5%), financial and insurance (8.9%), education (8.5%), wholesale and retail trade
(8.1%), real estate (4.8%), and transport and storage (4.2%). Accommodation and
restaurant exhibited contraction in annual growth in both 2013 (-4.6%) and 2014 (17.2%) because of recent terrorist attacks that have heightened insecurity.

3.2.

International Trade Developments

3.2.1. Trade openness

Despite failed attempts to implement trade reforms before the 1980s (see Ronge and
Nyangito, 2000; Musila, et al., 2015), Kenya’s economy remained outward-oriented.
Reforms that the country introduced over the 1986-1989 period, therefore, provided
further impetus to openness of the economy. These include the gradual reduction of
tariffs and non-tariff barriers, and bringing the local currency under a managed float
exchange rate regime (1988-1989) that evolved to a free-floating exchange rate regime by
1995 (Musila, et al., 2015). Data by the World Bank (2016) support these facts showing
that from 1963 to 2014 Kenya’s trade openness ratio ―total trade (sum of exports and
imports of goods and services) as a percentage of GDP― averaged 58.4%, and goods
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merchandise trade as a percentage of GDP averaged 43.9%. More recently, during the
2001-2014 period, the degree of trade openness was lowest in 2009 (50.48%), and
highest in 2005 (64.47%) as shown in Table 3-6.

Table 3-6: Kenya's Exports, Imports, and Total Trade Ratios (%), 2001-2014
Year

Exports/
GDP

Imports/
GDP

Degree of
Openness

2001

23.19

31.18

54.37

2002

24.46

29.41

2003

24.22

28.58

2004

26.61

2005

Year

Exports/
GDP

Imports/
GDP

Degree of
Openness

2008

23.10

34.99

58.09

53.87

2009

19.95

30.53

50.48

52.80

2010

22.46

33.83

56.29

32.87

59.47

2011

23.61

38.97

62.58

28.51

35.96

64.47

2012

21.87

35.55

57.42

2006

23.02

31.64

54.66

2013

19.62

33.58

53.20

2007

22.10

31.48

53.58

2014

18.23

33.71

51.94

Source: Author based on trade data by United Nations (UN) Comtrade (2016) and GDP data by World Bank (2016)

3.2.2. Trade flows
Table 3-6 shows that over the 2001-2014 period, Kenya’s exports of goods and services,
as a percentage of GDP, spiked to 28.51% in 2005, and declined to their lowest level of
18.23% in 2014. Over the same period, as a percentage of GDP, imports declined to their
lowest level of 28.58%, in 2003 and spiked in 2011 to 38.97%. In value terms, Kenya’s
exports expanded by Ksh 138 billion (43%) to KSh 461 billion between 2009 and 2014,
while imports increased at a faster pace, by KSh 830 billion (105%) to KSh 1,618 over
the same period (see Table 3-7 and Table 3-8). Kenya's deteriorating terms of trade
mirror the depreciating of its currency. The KSh per US$, period average exchange rate,
declined sharply from KSh 7.42 in 1980 to KSh 77.35 in 2009, and KSh 87.92 in 2014
(Table 3-1; World Bank, 2016). Although the currency depreciation has adversely
affected imports, a positive response from the exports side has been slow. Consequently,
Kenya's current account deficit widened from 4.3% of GDP in 1990 to 10.4% in 2014
(IMF, 2016).
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Chart 3-2: Kenya’s Trade Structure, 2010 and 2014
Other
1%

Share of Total Trade (%) in
2010
Other
1%

Share of Total Trade (%) in
2014
Europe
20%
America
11%

Europe
23%

Asia
48%

Asia
50%

Africa
22%
America
6%

Africa
18%

Source: Author based on data by Central Bank of Kenya (2015)

As shown in Chart 3-2, data by the Central Bank of Kenya (2015) reveal that about 50%
of Kenya’s international trade in 2014 was with Asian region. This trade grew by a
compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 13.8% to reach KSh 1,090 billion in 2014,
from KSh 650 billion in 2010. European and African regions follow closely with trade
flows shares of about 20% (KSh 425 billion) and 18% (KSh 388 billion), respectively, in
2014. This trade expanded at CAGRs of 7.9%, and 8.7%, respectively, over the 20102014 period. Finally, trade with the America region was low at KSh 233 billion in 2014,
but grew fastest at a CAGR of 51.8% between 2010 and 2014.
Table 3-7, and Table 3-8, presents Kenya’s exports and imports over the period 20092014, respectively. Over this period, three economic categories ―food and beverages,
other consumer goods, and industrial supplies (non-food)― accounted for roughly 95%
of Kenya's annual export flows (Table 3-7). While food and beverages, and industrial
supplies (non-food), remained flat in their contribution to exports, other consumer goods,
have expanded their contributions, rising from 23.4% in 2011 to 27.9 in 2014. Kenya’s
imports were clustered in four economic categories, namely, industrial supplies (nonfood), fuel and lubricants, machinery and other capital equipment, and transport
equipment, taking up about 84% of annual import flows during the 2010-2014 period
(Table 3-8). Imports of industrial supplies (non-food), machinery and other capital
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equipment, and fuel and lubricants, have remained roughly constant over the 2009 to
2014 period, while imports of transport equipment are growing, albeit slowly and
unevenly.
Table 3-7: Kenya’s Export Values and Shares, 2009-2014
Total Export Value (KSh Billions)

2009
323

Broad Economic Category
Food and beverages (%)
42.26
Industrial supplies (non-food) (%)
26.99
Fuel and lubricants (%)
1.41
Machinery and other
capital equipment (%)
2.10
Transport equipment (%)
1.80
Consumer goods (others) (%)
25.43
Other goods (%)
0.01
Total Export Shares (%)
100.00
Government of Kenya (2014b, 2015b)

2010
385

2011
484

2012
480

2013
456

2014
461

44.12
28.07
1.93

40.36
30.26
2.07

41.17
29.61
0.84

42.81
27.69
0.35

40.84
27.02
0.71

2.34
1.71
21.80
0.03
100.00

2.31
1.56
23.42
0.02
100.00

2.86
1.64
23.74
0.14
100.00

2.14
1.78
24.92
0.31
100.00

1.63
1.57
27.89
0.34
100.00

Table 3-8: Kenya’s Import Values and Shares, 2009-2014
Total Import Value (KSh Billions)

2009
788

Broad Economic Category
Food and beverages (%)
11.48
Industrial supplies (non-food) (%)
29.45
Fuel and lubricants (%)
21.00
Machinery and other
capital equipment (%)
17.42
Transport equipment (%)
13.13
Consumer goods (others) (%)
7.32
Other goods (%)
0.20
Total Import Shares (%)
100.00
Source: Government of Kenya (2014b, 2015b)

2010
947

2011
1,301

2012
1,375

2013
1,413

2014
1,618

7.44
31.60
22.09

8.15
31.21
26.90

7.94
29.63
24.50

7.19
31.87
23.09

6.91
28.56
21.43

18.71
12.34
7.49
0.33
100.00

16.15
9.98
7.16
0.45
100.00

18.43
11.85
6.98
0.67
100.00

17.75
11.38
6.81
1.91
100.00

17.22
17.22
7.02
1.64
100.00

The analysis of Kenya’s trade with the rest of the world highlights important stylized
facts. Like other developing countries, primary and labor-intensive goods dominate
Kenya’s exports flows, while its imports are mainly capital-intensive goods and fossil
fuels based petroleum products. The latter is bound to change once the country starts
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producing crude petroleum fuel from its recently discovered oil reserves29. The main
destination for Kenya’s primary commodity exports, mainly horticulture, tea, and coffee,
is the European Union, while the destination for its manufactured goods is mainly to
other African countries (EAC and COMESA members) and the United States in respect
of apparels under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) framework. Kenya
imports capital-intensive goods and consumer goods mainly from Asian countries (India
and China), and crude petroleum fuel from the Gulf countries. The economic structure of
exports and import categories show trends that have not changed over the past decades,
and are expected to continue in the medium term.

3.2.3. Import tariffs
Kenya’s most favored nation, simple mean, tariff rate for all products averaged 12.5%
during the 2009-2014 (Table 3-1; World Bank, 2016). Nevertheless, tariff rates on
individual product classifications vary. In this regard, as a founding member of the EAC
and the COMESA free trade blocs30, that launched their customs unions in March 2004
and June 2009 respectively, Kenya is obliged to apply a Common External Tariff on
imports from outside the EAC and the COMESA countries. The COMESA’s Common
External Tariff is harmonized to that of the EAC (COMESA, 2015d)31. The EAC
Common External Tariff tariffs are set at 0% for raw materials and capital goods, 10%
for intermediated inputs, and 25% for finished goods. However, there are sensitive
29

Kenya is building a 960 MW coal-fired power plant in its coastal city of Lamu (Kant, et al., 2014).
Processing and exports of recently discovered crude petroleum is planned to commence in mid-2017 (see
article by Bloomberg, “Kenya From Nowhere Plans East Africa’s First Oil Exports: Energy” at:
http://www.bloomberg.com/).
30
The Protocol for the establishment of the EAC Customs Union ―the entry point into the EAC trading
block― was signed in 2004 (See: http://www.eac.int/customs/index.php?option=com_content&id=
100&Itemid=49), and came into effect on October 31, 2009. COMESA, established in 1994, evolved from
the Preferential Trade Area (PTA) that was launched in 1981. Its Treaty was signed in 1993 and ratified a
year later. Currently, the COMESA region cover twenty countries ―Burundi, Comoros, Congo (DRC),
Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles,
Sudan, South Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. To boost trade among member
countries, COMESA launched its customs union in June 2009 (COMESA, 2015a, b).
31
The overlaps between the EAC and COMESA might be eliminated in the medium-term if the June 2015
Sharm El Sheikh (Egypt) declaration by 24 African countries to launch a Tripartite Free Trade Area
(TFTA) covering the COMESA, the EAC, and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) is
actioned (see COMESA, 2015c).
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sectors that are sheltered from external competition, with tariff rates ranging from 35% to
100%. The products categorized as sensitive include dairy, cereals, sugar, textiles and
clothing.

Kenya, in September 2016, signed the European Union/East African Community
Framework Economic Partnership Agreement (FEPA) that was initiated in 2007. This
agreement is expected to offer EAC member states with quota free and duty free access
to the European Union (EU) market. Under this treaty, Kenya is required to progressively
liberalize 82.5% of its imports from the EU within 15 years, while having duty free
access to the EU market from the start. Under the existing EU-EAC trade agreement, raw
materials and capital goods from the EU (about 65.4% of the trade) are imported into
Kenya at zero tariff, and consequently, the effective extra trade liberalization is about
17.2% of goods imported from EU, of which about 15.2% are intermediate inputs that are
currently taxed at a 10% tariff rate (European Commission, 2015a, 2015b).

3.3.

Foreign Direct Investments

A country’s outward orientation is also measured by foreign direct investment (FDI)
flows. The net inflows of FDI32 to Kenya grew from US$ 116.26 million (0.31% of GDP)
in 2009 to US$ 1,437 million (2.27% of GDP) in 2015 (World Bank, 2016). The stock of
FDI increased by 26.1%, from KSh 366.8 billion in 2009 to KSh 462.5 billion in 2011
(Government of Kenya, 2014b). Over this period, the manufacturing sector received the
highest proportion of FDI inflows, followed by the financial and insurance sectors. Other
major sectoral recipients of FDI were electricity, gas, steam, and air conditioning
(Government of Kenya, 2014b).

The EU is a source of major investment to Kenya, taking up about 44% of the total
liability stocks in 2011, with the United Kingdom leading with 27% of total liabilities in
2011, while other sources included the Netherlands, France, and Belgium. The Asian
32

FDI net inflows, according to the World Bank (2016), represent acquisition by a foreign investor of a lasting
management interest of 10 percent or more of voting stock in an enterprise operating in an economy.
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countries (e.g. Japan, China, and India), and the United States are other major sources of
FDI (Government of Kenya, 2014b). Kenya, however, does not have a clear policy for
promoting FDI to specific sectors. In the medium term, the recent finds of mineral wealth
such as oil and coal could drive the next phase of sectoral allocation of FDI, but this may
not affect substantially the existing trading patterns.

3.4.

Environmental Developments

3.4.1. Environmental performance

Data by the World Bank (2016) show that the proportion of the Kenyan population
exposed to PM2.5 air pollution33 levels that exceed the World Health Organization
(WHO)’s guideline value, increased from 43.9% in 1990 to 59.8% in 2013. This is as
PM2.5 air pollution rose by 9% between 2000, and 2011. Over the same period,
emissions of nitrous oxide (NO2) increased by 24%, and those of methane (CH4) by
25%. Interestingly, while the emissions from carbon dioxide (CO2) increased by 30%,
the CO2 emissions from fossil fuel consumption increased by a whopping 340% (see
Table 3-9).

Table 3-9: Environmental Status in Kenya
CO2 emissions (kt) (Note 1)
CO2 emissions from solid fuel
consumption (% of total)
Other GHG emissions, HFC, PFC and SF6
(Note 1) (thousand metric tons of
CO2 equivalent)
Combustible renewables and waste
(% of total energy)
Methane (CH4) emissions
(kt of CO2 equivalent)
Nitrous oxide emissions (thousand
metric tons of CO2 equivalent)
PM2.5 air pollution, mean annual exposure

2000
10,418

2005
8,562

2009
12,350

2010
12,420

2011
13,568

1.69

3.90

2.97

5.05

7.43

5,032

2,142

1,398

1,409

1,409

78.19

77.69

74.13

72.85

73.20

22,283

25,615

27,437

27,477

27,752

9,248

10,595

12,012

11,363

11,477

33

Particulate matter (PM) ―also known as particle pollution―, comprise of tiny pieces of solids or liquids
that are found in the air, and if less than 2.5 micrometers, are harmful to human health when inhaled.
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(micrograms per cubic meter)

10.04

10.70

-

10.72

10.94

Source: World Bank (2016)

Note 1: Abbreviations: kt for kilotonnes; HFC for hydrofluorocarbons; PFC for perfluorocarbons; and SF6
for Sulfur hexafluoride

To fulfill its obligations as a non-Annex I party to the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), Kenya conducted, in 1994 and 2010,
greenhouse gas (GHG) inventories34. Table 3-10 provide a sectoral decomposition of
Kenya’s total GHG emissions in 2000 and 2010, as reported to UNFCCC in 2015. This
illustrates an upward trajectory in the country’s total GHG emissions in CO2 equivalent
(CO2e), having risen by 27%, from 54.953 CO2e million tons (MtCO2e) in 2000 to
69.576 MtCO2e in 2010. The relative contributions towards the total GHG emissions are,
52% for carbon dioxide (CO2), 29% for methane (CH4), and 19% for nitrous oxide
(N2O) (Government of Kenya, 2015a).
Table 3-10: Kenya’s Total Emissions by Sector, 2000 and 2010

Energy
Industrial processes
Agriculture
Waste
Sub-total (excluding
LULUCF)
Land use, land-use change
and forestry (LULUCF)
Total

Million
Tons
CO2e
(2000)
9.760
0.812
22.539
1.205

Share
(2000)
17.8%
1.5%
41.0%
2.2%

Share
Excl.
LULUCF
(2000)
28.4%
2.4%
65.7%
3.5%

Million
Tons
CO2e
(2010)
14.735
2.210
29.577
1.898

Share
(2010)
21.2%
3.2%
42.5%
2.7%

Share
Excl.
LULUCF
(2010)
30.4%
4.6%
61.1%
3.9%

34.316

62.5%

100%

48.420

69.6%

100%

20.637
54.953

37.6%
100%

21.156
69.576

30.4%
100%

Government of Kenya (2015a)

Emissions from the agriculture sector —e.g., methane (CH4) gas— accounted for 41%
(22.539 MtCO2e) of the total GHG in 2000, rising to 42.5% (29.577 MtCO2e) in 2010.
Land use, land use change and forestry (LULUCF), was the second highest emitting
34

Kenya as a non-Annex I party to the Convention is mandated to submit national communications on how it is
developing an inventory of greenhouse gas (CO2, CH4 and N20), and the steps it is taking to implement the
Convention to the Conference of the Parties (COP). The country has submitted two reports: on October 22, 2002 and
December 11, 2015. See: http://unfccc.int/national_reports/annex_i_natcom/ submitted_natcom/items/7742.php
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sector at 37.6% (20.637 MtCO2e) in 2000 and 30.4% (21.156 MtCO2e) in 2010. The
energy sector was third at 17.8% (9.76 MtCO2e) and 21.2% (14.735 MtCO2e) in 2010,
followed by industrial processes, and waste sector, that contributed 3.2% and 2.7% of the
total GHG in 2010, respectively, as shown in Table 3-10 (Government of Kenya, 2015a).

Kenya, however, is a low emitter of GHG. In 2013, the country emitted only 11.7 million
tons (MT) of CO2 from fuel combustion, compared to leading emitters like China and
India, that recorded emission levels of 9,023.1 MT of CO2, and 1,868.6 MT of CO2,
respectively (International Energy Agency (IEA), 2015). Despite this, the risks of
environmental degradation are rising because of a growing population at 2.7% per
annum, demographic shift towards urban, that is estimated at an annual rate of 4.15%
over the 2015-2020 period (United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs
(UN ESA), 2014), and a rapid pace of economic and infrastructure developments.
Kenya’s own projections show that total emissions are expected to increase from 70
MtCO2e in 2010 to 138 MtCO2e by 2030 (Government of Kenya, 2015a). The top three
activities that will drive this growth in emissions are electricity generation, industrial
processes, and transportation. The growth of emissions from the energy and
transportation sectors is projected to add 43 MtCO2eq of GHGs by 2030, compared to
the situation in 2013 (Kant, et al., 2014). In this regard, during 2013, Kenya’s fuel
combustion emissions grew by 12.8% from the level achieved in 2012, at a far higher
pace than the annual emissions growth in China (5.36%), India (4.97%), and South
Africa (3.1%), according to data by IEA (2015). With respect to energy generation, new
coal and natural gas resources are expected to be used to meet increasing energy demand,
thus driving up emissions substantially.

3.4.2. Environmental policy

The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de
Janeiro in 1992 enabled Kenya’s policy makers to link sustainable development to
environmental quality (Government of Kenya, 2013). This motivated Kenya to develop,
60

in 1994, an action plan on environment, and to release, in 1999, the Sessional Paper No. 6
that demonstrated the linkages between development and environmental performance.
Kenya’s first legal framework on environmental issues was the Environmental
Management and Coordination Act (EMCA) No. 8 of 1999. The EMCA created the
National Environmental Management Authority (NEMA) under the auspice of the
Ministry of Environment, Natural Resources, and Regional Development Authorities
(MENRRDA) to spearhead environmental management in the country. The EMCA also
established other complementary institutions ―the National Environment Council, the
Public Complaints Committee, the Standards and Enforcement Review Committee, the
National Environment Tribunal, the National Environment Action Plan Committees, and
the County Environment Committees―, to move forward the environmental agenda in
Kenya (Githaiga, C. W., 2013). Furthermore, the promulgation of a new Constitution in
2010 created a new dispensation for greener development through several provisions, for
example, on citizenry rights to a clean and healthy environment as enshrined in the Bill of
Rights (Government of Kenya, 2013).

Kenya issued its National Environment Policy in 2013 that provides a framework for an
integrated approach to the country’s natural resources management (Government of
Kenya, 2013). The policy complements other actions that the country has taken to
address environmental concerns. By ratifying the UNFCCC in 1994 as a non-Annex I
party, Kenya committed itself to take necessary measures to mitigate the adverse impacts
of climate change. As a result, the country has refocused its efforts for monitoring and
reporting on GHGs more consistently since 2010. Kenya ratified the Kyoto Protocol on
25 February 2005 (UNFCCC, 1997) and has actively participated in all events of
UNFCCC including the 2015 COP21 (Conference of Parties, 21st) Climate Conference in
Paris. To address the risks posed by climate change, Kenya, in addition to its National
Environment Policy, 2013, has also issued a National Climate Change Response Strategy
(NCCRS), 2010, and a National Climate Change Action Plan (NCCAP), 2013
(Government of Kenya, 2010, 2013).
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In conjunction with command and control instruments (emissions and technology
standards), market based instruments (MBIs), both direct (emission fees, and marketable
permits) and indirect (taxes, and subsidies), have played a role in pollution abatement in
developing countries. In the case of Kenya, however, the use of MBIs is limited to taxes
on use of petroleum products by consumers, and subsidies that are used to incentivize
reforestation and the adoption of cleaner technologies (Di Falco, et al., 2012). The lack of
clear policy intentions on the use of pollution abatement policies and weak administrative
capacity of the regulators, are binding constraints on use of MBIs as effective tools for
pollution abatement in Kenya.
There is a major paradox in that although the country’s NCCAP envisages a low-carbon
economy by 2030, on the contrary, Kenya’s Vision 2030 is driving industrialization
through higher utilization of fossil fuels for electricity generation (Kant, et al., 2014).
Kenya is, however, gifted by having a civil society that demand higher environmental
quality, building on the work of Wangari Maathai (1940-2011), the 2004 Nobel Peace
Prize Laureate, who called on her fellow Kenyans, and Africans in general, “to take
charge of their environment” (Green Belt Movement, 2015). But heightened civil society
activism, alone, is not enough to guarantee better environmental outcomes.

The focus, therefore, needs to shift towards creating adequate capacity in NEMA to
control and enforce environmental standards. NEMA is directing its attention towards
ensuring that proper environmental impact assessments (EIA) are conducted for projects,
and environmental audits and monitoring are enhanced. Nevertheless, as is the case in
many developing countries, the implementation of environmental standards in Kenya will
continue to be a challenge in the medium-term because of inadequacy of institutional
capacity and resources, to ensure proper monitoring and enforcement of the strict
standards, that would guarantee environmental sustainability in the backdrop of
accelerating industrialization.
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3.5.

Summary

The Kenyan economy is dominated by agricultural activities that traditionally are
associated with high chemical intensity, and emissions of methane (CH4) gas.
Additionally, increased trade liberalization, to drive the country’s industrialization
aspirations, will increasingly transform the economy to agro-industrial manufacturing.
Kenya is an attractive destination for foreign direct investments in the EAC region given
its relatively well-educated workforce that provide comparative advantages in
manufacturing and services. The country’s industrial operations are generally, more
capital-intensive, in the region. A free trade pack with the EU and the EAC member
countries that Kenya has been aggressively pursuing, and that was signed in September
2016 will deepen trade with the EU. It is likely that Kenya’s manufacturing sector will
expand considerably in the short-term. This is in the backdrop that 17% of Kenya’s
exports are in energy-intensive sectors whose activities are associated with significant
industrial emissions. Consequently, the proportion of industrial emissions will rise as
Kenya pursues the benefits of globalization, in the contexts of further trade opening, and
the planned oil production and exports starting in 2017.

This is in the backdrop of a growing population that is rising at an annual rate of 2.7%,
and increased urbanization. Regarding the former, a growing population implies higher
consumption of fossil fuels among other dirty goods. About the latter, estimates by UN
ESA (2014) show that Kenya’s average annual rate of change of the urban population
stood at 4.35% during the 2005-2010 period, and is growing at an annual rate of 4.15%
over the 2015-2020 period. Such a demographic shift to urban, coupled with high and
rising pollution from urban transportation systems and industrial activities that are urban
based, will have detrimental consequences to public health, and the overall environment
condition in the short-run.

These casual observations appear to indicate that Kenya will shortly be faced with a
major problem of addressing the environmental consequences of trade specialization. As
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the country intensifies its globalization agenda by taking advantages of its traditional
comparative advantages in its natural resources, a relatively well-educated workforce,
and a reasonable capital base for capital-intensive manufacturing, so will industrial
emissions rise. At the same time, the population is growing moderately and is shifting
from rural to urban centers, and this will intensify consumption related pollution.

If Kenya implements tough pollution abatement practices, the marginal costs of
production are likely to rise significantly as pollution abatement levels rise. This in turn
could adversely undermine the country’s current export competitiveness. Conversely, an
environmental tax on energy inputs will increase the price of goods, and if the tax is very
high, this might not be politically acceptable. This suggests that a trade-off could exist
between trade liberalization and environmental quality. Lower environmental quality
appears to imply a trade-off in terms of higher GDP growth rates in Kenya, while
economic growth itself, is partly driven by higher international trade flows. These
important conclusions support the need for Kenya’s policy makers to take concrete steps
to mitigate the adverse effects on the environment from further free trade initiatives,
while pursing outward-oriented trade policies.
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CHAPTER IV: METHOD OF ANALYSIS
Understanding the linkages between trade-driven growth and environmental quality is
important for evidence based policy responses in both developed and developing
countries. In respect of rapidly industrializing developing countries such as Kenya, it is of
uttermost urgency that policy makers have evidence based prescriptions on optimal
policies that would strike the right balance between expanding trade liberalization, on the
one hand, and reducing industrial pollution, on the other. Policy setting in Kenya,
however, is curtailed by the scarcity of research in the domain of trade and the
environment because of data constraints. A 2015 released dataset, in the form of the
Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) for Kenya, 2009, is now available for use by
researchers. To close gaps in the literature, this Chapter presents the static Computable
General Equilibrium (CGE) Model for Kenya in GAMS (General Algebraic Modeling
System) software ―the KenCGE Model― that is used to analyze the links between
further trade liberalization and the environmental quality in the country.

The KenCGE Model introduces new knowledge by applying the Löfgren (1993) model to
a different country and economic structure, and by extending the focal area of policy
analysis to the environment arena. The Löfgren (1993) model is enhanced to allow policy
simulations with highly disaggregated activity and commodity accounts, where an
activity can produce multiple commodities, and multiple activities can generate a
commodity (see Löfgren et al., 2002). Following Elshennawy (2011), there is a
separation between production (unskilled labor, capital, and land that are sector specific),
and non-production (skilled labor that is sectorally mobile) factors.

This Chapter starts with Section 4.1 that presents introductory remarks related to the CGE
model for Kenya. This is followed by section 4.2 that provides a complete mathematical
statement for the KenCGE Model, including the model’s equations. The latter cover
prices, production, factors and institutions, and system constraints. The parameter

requirements for the KenCGE Model’s calibration are noted in Section 4.3, that also
presents the SAM for Kenya, 2009. Finally, Section 4.4 concludes.

4.1.

A CGE Model for Kenya – An Introduction

The KenCGE Model is adapted from the CGE models in GAMS by Löfgren (1993), and
is theoretically rationalized on the CGE models for open developing economies that were
advanced by the World Bank (Dervis, et al., 1982). As such, the model is founded on
neoclassical assumptions of perfectly competitive products and factor markets (see
Robinson, 1989; Taylor, 1990; and Robinson et al., 1999). In this regard, the Kenyan
economy is market driven and therefore, the neoclassical assumptions of the model are
appropriate. The KenCGE Model’s prices in all sectors, by assumption, are determined
under competitive supply conditions in all markets, given an optimized use of inputs.
Kenya is a small player in the world’s goods markets, and consequently, the United
States dollar (US$) equivalent of the world prices, for both Kenyan imports and exports,
are given under the “small-country” assumption.

On the production side, key assumptions include constant returns to scale, and a fixed
supply of primary factors of capital and labor. Goods that are imported, and those that are
produced and consumed domestically (i.e. differentiation by place of origin), are modeled
through a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function.

Finally, producers

differentiate between production for the domestic market and for exports, through a
constant elasticity of transformation (CET) function (see Powell and Gruen, 1968).

Consumer optimization behavior determines the allocation of disposable incomes
between consumption and savings. Several constraints need to be satisfied, not by
individual agents (Robinson, 1989:907-908), but at a macro level, for example, the
equality between supply and demand for goods and factors. Unlike other domestic
institutions, a budget constraint does not bind the government. To maintain balance
between government revenues and expenditures, the government deficit/saving is
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endogenously derived. Under the current account closure rule, the difference between
foreign earning and expenditures is foreign savings, where the foreign exchange rate is
exogenous. The foreign savings balances the savings-investment account.

The KenCGE Model is static. It assumes that full adjustment occurs between equilibria,
through a convergence process that require the use of macro closure rules. As capital
stock remains fixed in the equilibrating process, the KenCGE Model may be referred to
as an “equilibrium short-run” model (see Norton and Hazell, 1986:300). The model
assumes that economic agents ―firms and households― optimize their actions in the
markets for goods, factors, and foreign exchange, and that endogenous prices clear these
markets. Being myopic, these agents base their optimization decisions on static
expectations of prices and quantities. The detailed equations of the proposed KenCGE
Model are presented in the following section.

4.2.

Mathematical Statement for the KenCGE Model

This section presents the equations of the KenCGE Model block-by-block following the
Löfgren (1993) model for Egypt in GAMS. The blocks cover prices, production, factors
and institutions, and system constraints. The equations are informed by Löfgren et al.,
(2002) in the areas of commodity production, allocation, and output aggregation, and by
Elshennawy (2011) regarding the derivation of primary factors’ demands and incomes.
Section 8.1. (Appendix 1) presents the definitions of the sets, the parameters, and the
variables. Regarding the notational conventions, the Greek alphabet is reserved for
parameters.

4.2.1. Price block equations

The price block has six equations (see Table 4-1). Equations (4.1.1), and (4.1.2),
e
represents the domestic currency prices of Kenya’s imports (pm
s ), and exports (ps ),

respectively. These tradable-goods prices are, respectively, equated to the world prices of
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we
imports (pwm
s ), and exports (ps ) under the open “small-country” assumption, and
e
adjusted for tariffs (τm
s ), and export taxes (σs ). There were no export taxes in the 2009

base year, however. The exchange rate, r, is used to convert the world prices in US$
equivalent to Kenya Shillings (KSh).

Table 4-1: Price Block
Import price:
wm
m
pm
s = ps [1 + τs ]r

s ∈ ST

(4.1.1)

s ∈ ST

(4.1.2)

s∈S
c∈C

(4.1.3)

s∈S

(4.1.4)

s∈S

(4.1.5)

s∈S

(4.1.6)

Export price:
e
pes = pwe
s [1 − σs ]r

Domestic supply price:
q

ps = [pds

ds
qs

] + [pm
s

ms
qc

]

| s ∈ ST,

c∈C

Domestic output price:
pxs = [pds

ds
xs

e

] + [pes s ]
xs

|

s ∈ ST

Activity price:
PA𝑠 = ∑ PXACs c • θs c
c∈C

Value-added price:
q

i
x
pva
s = [1 − τs ]ps − ∑ 𝜄𝑠 ′𝑠 ps′
s′ ∈ S′

The next two equations are the prices of domestic supply and output. Equation (4.1.3) is
q

the price of domestic supply (ps ), that is expressed as a weighted average of the domestic
goods price (pds ), and the import price (pm
s ), where the weights are the domestic share in
d

m

domestic good supply (qs ), and import share in domestic good supply ( q s ), respectively.
s

c

On the other hand, equation (4.1.4) expresses the domestic output price (pxs ) as a
weighted average of the domestic good price (pds ), and export price (pes ), where the
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d

weights are the domestic share of domestic output (x s ), and export share of domestic
s

es

output (x ), respectively. Domestic supply from imports, and domestic output, are
s

modeled as a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function. Further, domestic output
consumed locally and exported follow a constant elasticity of transformation (CET)
function. These two aggregations functions are linearly homogenous, and an application
of Euler’s Theorem, facilitate their derivation (see Löfgren, 1993:18/19).

The activity price (PA𝑠 ) is specified in equation (4.1.5) as a summation of the product of
producer prices (PXACs c), and yields (θs c ). This equation allows for the possibility that
an activity may produce several commodities. Finally, equation (4.1.6) defines the valuex
i
added price (pva
s ) as the market price of domestic output (ps ) after indirect taxes (τs ), less

the sum of the unit cost of intermediate inputs, where, 𝜄𝑠′ 𝑠 is the quantity of input per unit
of output.

4.2.2. Production block equations

Table 4-2 is a list of the fourteen equations that form the production block. A CobbDouglas production function, given by equation (4.2.1), is assumed to represent the
relationship between output and factor use at the sector level. Two parameters, a shift
xp

parameter in the production function (αs ), and a share parameter for factors in sectors
f
(𝛽𝑓𝑠 ), and one variable, the demand for factors in sectors (cfs
) enter this function.

Following Elshennawy (2011:16/17) the KenCGE Model disaggregates labor (L) into
production (unskilled), and nonproduction (skilled) labor, where sectorally, the former is
immobile, and the latter mobile (equation 4.2.2). There are four factors of production:
one sectorally mobile skilled labor (LNSP), and three sector-specific factors, namely,
unskilled labor (LSP), capital (K), and land (LAND)35.
35

Factors that are sector-specific can only be employed in their original sectors, while those that are
sectorally mobile, can be allocated to any sector. The KenSAM, 2009 defines quantities for three labor
factors: skilled, semi-skilled, and unskilled. This study groups skilled and semi-skilled labor into skilled
labor.
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Table 4-2: Production Block
Domestic output:
xp

x s = αs ∏
f∈F

|(f,s) ∈ MFS

f
cfs

βfs

s∈S

(4.2.1)

s∈S

(4.2.2)

f ∈ FS, s ∈ S
(f, s) ∈ MFS

(4.2.3)

Labor disaggregation:
𝐿 𝛼𝐿𝑆𝑃 𝑠

𝑓

𝐿 𝛼𝐿𝑆𝑁𝑃 𝑠

𝐿𝐿𝑆 𝑠 = 𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑃 𝑠

𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑁𝑃 𝑠

Factor demand – sector specific factors:
𝑓

𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑃 𝑠 =

𝑝s𝑣𝑎 x𝑠 𝛽𝐿𝑆 𝛼𝐿𝑆𝑃 𝑠
𝑠
𝑤𝐿𝑆𝑃
𝑠

𝑝s𝑣𝑎 x𝑠 𝛽𝑘𝑠
𝑤𝑘𝑠 𝑠

𝑓

𝐾𝑘 𝑠 =
𝑓

𝐿𝐴𝑁𝐷𝐿𝐴𝑁𝐷 𝐴𝑔𝑟 =

(4.2.3ʹ)
𝑝s𝑣𝑎 x𝑠 𝛽𝐿𝐴𝑁𝐷 𝐴𝑔𝑟
𝑠
𝑤𝐿𝐴𝑁𝐷
𝐴𝑔𝑟

(𝐴𝑔𝑟 = agriculture)

(4.2.3ʹʹ)

Factor demand – sectorally mobile factors:
𝑓

𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑁𝑃 𝑠 =

𝑝s𝑣𝑎 x𝑠 𝛽𝐿𝑆 𝑠 𝛼𝐿𝑆𝑁𝑃 𝑠
𝑤𝐿𝑆𝑁𝑃 𝑠

f ∈ FM, s ∈ S

(4.2.4)

Intermediate demand:
vs = ∑ ιss′ xs′

s∈S

(4.2.5)

s∈S
s ∈ CX

(4.2.6)

c ∈ CX

(4.2.7)

s∈S
c ∈ CX

(4.2.8)

s ∈ ST

(4.2.9)

s′ ∈ S′

Commodity production and allocation:
QXACs c = θs c • QA s
Output aggregation function:
xs =

αsc c

• (∑

δss cc

−ρsc c

1
−ρ

• QXACs c )

s∈S

First-order condition for output aggregation function:
PXACs c =

ps𝑥

• xs ( ∑

δss cc

•

−ρs c
QXACs c c )

−1

−ρs c−1

• δss cc • QXACs c c

s ∈ S′

Domestic supply aggregation:
q

q

q

−1
q

qs = αs [δs ms −ρs + (1 − δs )ds −ρs ] ρs
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(Table 4-2: Production Block) (continued)
Import demand:

1

pds δs 1+ρqs
ms = ds [ m
]
ps 1 − δs

s ∈ ST

(4.2.10)

Domestic output transformation:
x

x

1

x

ρs
xs = αxt
+ (4 − γs )ds ρs ] ρs
s [γs es

s ∈ ST

(4.2.11)

pes 1 − γs ρxs −1
es = ds [ d
]
ps γs

s ∈ ST

(4.2.12)

Domestic production for nontradables:
xs = ds

s ∈ SN

(4.2.13)

Domestic supply for nontradables:
qs = ds

s ∈ SN

(4.2.14)

Export supply:

1

Factor demands are derived by maximizing profits subject to the Cobb-Douglas function
(equation (4.2.1)). This is specified in equations (4.2.3), and (4.2.4), for sector specific
factors (unskilled labor, capital, and land), and sectorally mobile factor (skilled labor),
respectively. The price of factors in sectors (𝑤𝑓𝑠 ), enter as a denominator on right hand
side of equations (4.2.3) and (4.2.4). In equation (4.2.3) land is a specific factor in
agriculture sector.

Equation (4.2.5) shows that intermediate input demand (vs ) is

determined through fixed input coefficients under a Leontief production technology. In
KenSAM, 2009, activities can produce one or more commodities. This possibility is
accounted for through equations (4.2.6), (4.2.7) and (4.2.8). Equation (4.2.7) models the
aggregate domestic marketable output (xs ) as a CES function. The parameters that enter
sc
this function are a shift parameter (α𝑠𝑠𝑐 ), a share parameter (δsc
sc ), and an exponent (ρc ).

The quantities of marketed output of commodities (QXAC𝑠 𝑐 ), also enter the CES
function. These are derived in equation (4.2.6) as a product of the yields of output per
unit of activity (θs c ), and the corresponding quantity of activity (QAs ). Finally, equation
(4.2.8) lays out the first order condition for an optimization problem that determines the
choice between commodities produced by multiple activities.
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The composite good in supply domestically (q s ) is determined by an Armington constant
elasticity of substitution (CES) function, where a domestically produced good (ds ), and
an imported good (ms ), are assumed to be imperfect substitutes (equation (4.2.9)). For
q

this composite supply function, αs , and δs , are shift, and share parameters, respectively.
Producers determine their import demands (ms ), by minimizing costs of a combination of
domestic and imported inputs ―subject to the above Armington CES function (equation
(4.2.10)). On the other hand, a constant elasticity of transformation (CET) function
combines domestic output for domestic market (ds ), and domestic output for exports (es ),
under the assumption of imperfect transformability (equation (4.2.11))36.

Equation

(4.2.12) shows that producers determine export supply (es ) by maximizing sales revenue
―subject the above CET function―, by allocating output between domestic and export
markets37. Essentially, this equation expresses export supply as a function of domestic
output (ds ), and the ratio of prices of exports (pes ) to domestic sales (pds ). In equations
(4.2.13) and (4.2.14), domestic output (xs ), and domestic supply (q s ), respectively, are
both equated to domestic use of domestic output (ds ). This is because these equations
relate to nontradable goods.

4.2.3. Factor and institution block equations

The factor and institution block has nine equations as listed in Table 4-3. Incomes earned
𝑓

by labor, capital, and land (y𝑓 ), appropriately disaggregated into sector specific and
sectorally mobile, are defined in equations (4.3.1) through (4.3.2) as a summation of the
product of quantities demanded and prices. For sectorally mobile (nonproduction) labor
36

Imperfect substitutability and imperfect transformability are the reverse of each other (see Armington,
1969). To get the CET function for imperfect transformability, pre-multiply, by -1, all the exponents of the
CET function for imperfect substitutability. Because of the restrictions that are imposed on the parameter
(ρ), the isoquant for the output transformation function are concave to the origin (see Löfgren, H.,
1993:26/27).
37
The constant elasticity of transformation between two goods is modeled by the exponent [1/(ρxs − 1)]
(Condon et al., 1987) ― see equation (4.2.12). In the limiting cases, as (𝜌𝑠𝑥 ) approaches 1, from above, the
elasticity approaches ∞, and because of perfect transformability, the cheaper good is used. Alternatively, as
(𝜌𝑠𝑥 ) approaches ∞ we have the case of perfect complementarity, and the ratio between the two goods is
fixed irrespective of price changes. There is also an intermediate case where a combination of the two
goods is used (see Löfgren, H., 1993:28).
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factors, such income is augmented with remittances from abroad, (∅lw ) expressed in
domestic currency using the exchange rate, r. Factor incomes are transferred to
institutions in fixed proportions (ψfif ) as expressed in equation (4.3.3). Equation (4.3.4)
defines incomes of households (yii ), as comprising the sum of transfers from factors (t fif ),
ig

other institutions (t iii′ ), the government (∅i ), and the rest of the world (∅iw
i ). In the
KenCGE Model, households include enterprises and, therefore, the term transfers from
other institutions drops out of the equation. The price index, π
̅ (linked to government
transfers), and the US$ equivalence of remittances from abroad (later converted in
domestic currency using the exchange rate), are exogenous items in equation (4.3.4).
Intra-institutional transfers (t iii′ ) ―by domestic nongovernmental institutions to all other
institutions (domestic or foreign)― occur in fixed proportions (ψiii′ ) as given by equation
(4.3.5). Household consumption expenditure (ehh ) is specified in equation (4.3.6). The
totality of household income (yhi ) is allocated to direct taxes (𝜏hd ), and based on
household income shares (ψ), to other institutions and savings. To comply with
household budget constraint, consumption is the residual.
By assumption, households maximize a Stone–Geary utility function38 to derive their
consumption demands (CDhsh ) as expressed in equation (4.3.7). Equation (4.3.8) defines
government revenues (y g ) as comprising various taxes (including import tariffs) and
transfers ―including capital― from abroad. On the other hand, equation (4.3.9) defines
g

government spending (eg ), as a sum of transfers to households (∅i ) that are linked to an
exogenous price index, (𝜋̅), and its own consumption expenditure, where demand for
q

goods (γ̅s ) is exogenous. Savings are accounted for in the savings-investment balance, as
by assumption, the government is not faced with a budget constraint.

38

The Stone–Geary utility function is named after Geary (1950), who, informed by Klein and Rubin
(1947)’s work, derived a constant-utility index of the cost of living, and Stone (1954) who applied a linear
expenditure system on patterns of demand in Britain. Lluch, C. (1973) following a consumer utility
maximization procedure, derives an aggregate consumption function that is linked to a linear expenditure
system. Li, J. C. (2005: Appendix A, 271/2) presents a derivation of private consumption demand
following the Stone–Geary utility linear expenditure system.
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Table 4-3: Factor and Institution Block
Factor income - sector specific factors:
𝑓

f ∈ FS

𝑓

𝑠
y𝑘 = ∑ 𝑤ks
𝑘ks

(4.3.1)

𝑠∈𝑆
𝑓

𝑓

𝑠
y𝐿𝑆𝑃 = ∑ 𝑤LSP
𝐿LSP,

(4.3.1ʹ)

s

𝑠∈𝑆
𝑓

𝐴𝑔𝑟

𝑓

y𝐿𝐴𝑁𝐷 = ∑ 𝑤LAND 𝐿LAND,

(4.3.1ʹʹ)

Agr

𝑠 ∈ 𝐴𝑔𝑟

Factor income - sectorally mobile factors:
𝑓

𝑓

yLSNP = w𝐿𝑁𝑆𝑃 [∑ 𝐿LSNP, s ] + r∅lw

f ∈ FM

(4.3.2)

i ∈ I, f ∈ F
(i, f) ∈ MIF

(4.3.3)

i ∈ ID

(4.3.4)

i ∈ I, i′ ∈ ID
(i, i′ ) ∈ MIID

(4.3.5)

h∈H

(4.3.6)

h ∈ H, s ∈ S

(4.3.7)

s∈S

Factor transfers:
t fif = ψfif yff ;

∑ ψfif = 1
i∈I

Institutional income:
yii = ∑
f∈F

ig

|

(i,f) ∈ MIF

t fif + ∑ t iii′ + π
̅ ∅i + r∅iw
i
i′ ∈ ID

Intra-institutional transfers:
t iii′ = ψiii′ yii′
Household consumption expenditures:
ehh = [1 − ∑ ψiih − 𝜏hd − ψsh ] yhi
i∈ I

Household consumption demand:
ψesh ehh
CDhsh =
q
ps
Government revenue:
i
x
m
wm
y g = ∑ τdi yii + r∅iw
gov + ∑ τs ps x s + ∑ τs r πs ms
i∈ID

s∈S

(4.3.8)

s∈ST

Government expenditure:
g

q

q

(4.3.9)

eg = π
̅ ∑ ∅i + ∑ ps γ̅s
i ∈ ID

s∈S
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4.2.4. System constraint block equations

Table 4-4: System Constraint Block
Factor markets - sector-specific factors:
𝑘
𝐾ks
= λsks

f ∈ FS, s ∈ S
(f, s) ∈ MFS

𝐿𝐿LSP = λsLSP

(4.4.1)
(4.4.1ʹ)

Agr

(4.4.1ʹʹ)

𝐿𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑑
LAND = λLAND
Factor markets – sectorally mobile factors:
∑ 𝐿𝐿LSNP = λ𝐿𝑆𝑁𝑃

f ∈ FM

(4.4.2)

s∈S

(4.4.3)

𝑠∈𝑆

Domestic goods markets:
h
qs = vs + ∑ csh
+ γ̅s + ι̅s
h∈H

Current account:
we
∅lw
+ ∑ ∅iw
es + s w
i
i + ∑ ps
i∈I

=

1
[∑
|
r
i ∈ ID

s ∈ ST

(row, i) ∈ MIID

t irow, i + t frow,

lab ]

+ ∑ πwm
ms
s

(4.4.4)

s ∈ ST

Savings-investment balance:
q
∑ ψsi yii + (y g − eg ) + rs w = ∑ ps ι̅s
i∈ID

(4.4.5)

s∈S

Price-normalization:
q

∑ ps ωs = π
̅

(4.4.6)

s∈S

Table 4-4 lists the six equations of the system constraint block. The closure in the factor
markets is predicated on two assumptions; one that the economy is at its full employment
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level, and the other, that factor prices are flexible39. The latter assumption fosters the
equilibration of supply and demand in factor markets. Equation (4.4.1) and (4.4.2) define
the demands for sector-specific factors, and sectorally mobile factors, respectively, as
equal to a fixed supply of such factors, assuming flexible factor prices and full
employment. The goods market equilibrium requires that domestic supply ―from
Armington transformation of imported goods and domestic output― be equalized to the
economy-wide demand (equation (4.4.3)). In this equation, government and investment
demands are exogenous, and prices are the equilibrating variables.

Equation (4.4.4) is expressed in foreign currency. It defines the equilibrium between
Kenya’s foreign earnings and spending. The difference between current earning and
expenditure is foreign savings, where the latter is the equilibrating variable.

After

incorporating fixed shares of savings by households (includes enterprises) and the
government account, foreign savings, expressed in domestic currency (KSh) equilibrate
total savings and investments, as shown in equation (4.4.5). By Walras’ law (Walras,
1874), this equation will be dropped, and savings and investment assumed to be in
equilibrium. Finally, equation (4.4.6) is the price index.

4.3.

Model Calibration

4.3.1. A SAM for Kenya, 2009

Like other CGE models, the KenCGE Model builds on the economy wide circular flow
of income that depicts how economic actors earn and spend their incomes. Households
own factors of production, and receive income and transfers from enterprises and the
government. Enterprises and the foreign sector sell goods and services, and in return
receive incomes. In the KenCGE Model, however, enterprises are included in
households.
39

The system constraint block equations apply economy-wide, and not at an individual actor level.
Closure balances in the factors and goods markets are referred to as real balances, while those in respect of
savings-investment and current accounts are nominal balances.

76

Table 4-5: Kenya's 2009 Basic SAM Structure

Activities
Activities

Commodities

Factors

Commodities
Marketed
production by
industries

Intermediate
inputs by
industries
Value-added

Enterprises

Taxes less
subsidies on
products

Import tariffs
and custom
duties

Factor
income to
households
Factor
income to
enterprises
Factor
income to
government,
factor taxes

Savingsinvestment

Imports

Rest of
world (RoW)
TOTAL

Activity

Households

Enterprises

Private
consumption

Households

Government

Factors

Supply
expenditure

Factor
payments to
RoW
Factor
expenditure

Interhousehold
transfers

Government

Government
consumption

Distributed
income to
households

Aggregate
demand
Factor
income
Household
income

Transfer to
enterprises
from RoW
Transfers to
Government
from RoW

Enterprise
income

Foreign
savings
(capital
transfers)

Savings

Enterprise
savings

Government
savings

Transfers to
RoW

Government
transfers to
RoW
Government
expenditure
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Exports

Transfer to
enterprises

Household
saving

Source: Author, based on Government of Kenya (2015b)

TOTAL
Gross
output

Remittances
from RoW

Taxes on
income and
wealth

Enterprise
expenditure

Investment

Rest of world
(RoW)

Transfers to
households

Taxes on
household
income

Household
expenditure

Savingsinvestment

Government
revenue

Foreign
exchange
outflow
Investment
expenditure

Foreign
exchange
inflow

The government provides public goods and in return receives tax revenues. It also
subsidizes productive activities, and make transfers to households. The Social
Accounting Matrix (SAM) for Kenya, 2009 (KenSAM, 2009) that was prepared and
officially released by the Kenyan statistical agency ―the Kenya National Bureau of
Statistics (KNBS)― in 2015 (Government of Kenya, 2015a, 2015b)40 replicate these
complex direct and indirect linkages between diverse sectors and economic agents in the
Kenya economy, and is the database that calibrates the KenCGE Model’s parameters.
The KenSAM, 2009 provide the baseline data representing the Kenyan economy in 2009
that is assumed to be in equilibrium. Table 4-5, explains verbally, the contents of the
SAM for Kenya, 2009.

4.3.2. Dimensions of the SAM
A social accounting matrix (SAM), represents an overview of the accounts of an
economy’s circular flows in production, factors, domestic institutions, and the outside
world (Löfgren, 1993). It is an empirical data set, that forms a crucial framework for
economy-wide policy analysis work as it explicitly portrays the linkages of payments and
receipts by economic agents and institutions in the system (see pioneering work by Stone,
1970; Pyatt and Round, 1979, 1985). The micro SAM for Kenya, 2009 is square, as its
headings in the rows and the column are similar, with equal row and column totals. Each
cell in the SAM represents an expenditure for the column account and an income for the
row account.
Table 4-6, illustrates that Kenya’s industrial sector is well diversified and produces a
wide range of capital and consumer goods. There are several non-energy intensive
manufacturing industries —food manufactures (e.g., meats, fish, fruits and vegetables,
coffee, tea, and beverages), and non-food manufactures (e.g., textiles, printing,
machinery, and transport equipment).
40

Acknowledgment: The author would like to thank Mr. Collins M. Omondi, Director, Macroeconomics
Statistics, the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS), for providing the disaggregated Kenya’s 2009
balanced micro Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) for use in this study (Government of Kenya, 2015c).
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Table 4-6: Dimensions of the SAM for Kenya, 2009
Activities/commodities (34)
Agriculture (1)/a
Primary energy (2)/b
Energy-intensive (11)/c
Non-energy intensive (17)/d
Construction (1)
Transport (1)/e
Other services (1)/f
Factors (3)
Labor (unskilled and skilled)
Capital
Land
Institutions (3)
Households (including enterprises)
Government
Rest of the world
Source: Author

Notes:
a.
The agriculture sector is an aggregation of 5 sectors are: (1) crop, (2) animal, (3) support services,
(4) forestry & logging, and (5) fishing & aquaculture.
b.
The 2 sectors are: (1) petroleum, and (2) electricity.
c.
The 11 sectors are: (1) mining & quarrying, (2) non-metal minerals, (3) chemicals, (4) rubber &
plastics, (5) water supply and sewerage, (6) leather, (7) paper, (8) pharmaceuticals, (9) wood, (10)
basic chemicals, and (11) metals.
d.
The 17 sectors are: (1) meat, (2) fish, (3) fruit & vegetable, (4) vegetable/animal oils & fats, (5)
dairy, (6) grain, (7) bakery, (8) sugar, (9) coffee, (10) tea, (11) other food, (12) beverages, (13)
tobacco, (14) textiles/clothing, (15) printing & reproduction, (16) machinery & equipment
(including transport equipment), and (17) other manufactures.
e.
The transport sector aggregates 6 sectors which are: (1) railways, (2) passenger road, (3) freight
road (4) pipeline, (water), and (6) air.
f.
Other services aggregates 35 sectors, of which the top 15 in value are: (1) wholesale & retail trade,
(2) motor trade, (3) real estate, (4) public administration, (5) other monetary intermediation, (6)
telecommunications, (7) accommodation & food, (8) secondary education, (9) human health, (10)
primary education, (11) professional, scientific & technical, (12) insurance & pension, (13) IT &
other information, (14) other administration & support, (15) higher education, ………….., (35).

The economy has two primary energy sectors (electricity generation, and petroleum fuel),
one of which ―electricity generation― use energy more intensely41. Other energyintensive industries include those that produce non-metal minerals, chemicals, rubber and
41

The EU’s regulations on pollution prevention defines an energy-intensive industry (or company) as one
whose energy costs comprise 3% or more of the total production costs (see: UK’s House of Commons.
Hansard. Energy Intensive Industries (see: https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/2016-03-10/
debates/16031031000002/ EnergyIntensiveIndustries). This definition has been used to estimate energy
intensity.
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plastics, leather, pharmaceuticals, wood, and metals. Finally, construction, transportation,
and other services also consume relatively more energy.

The official detailed micro SAM for Kenya, 2009 has a total of 81 activities and
commodities with some activities producing several commodities, and there are
commodities that are generated by multiple activities. For the purposes of this study,
these are aggregated into 34 activities/commodities (see Table 4-6): 1 agriculture, 3
services,

and

30

industries.

The

industrial

sector’s

disaggregation

into

30

activities/commodities (two of which relate to primary energy) is appropriate for the
intended purpose of this study, which is to empirically examine trade-induced sectoral
specialization in dirty industries in the Kenyan economy.

The modeled economy has three primary factors of production; labor, capital, and land.
The labor factor is disaggregated into unskilled, and skilled (includes, semi-skilled).
There are three institutions (one households ―including enterprises―, government, and
the rest of the world). The aggregated Kenya SAM 2009 that is verbally explained in
Table 4-5 is a good description of the sources of the data that is used to calibrate the
KenCGE Model’s base year scenario. Finally, the Kenya SAM, 2009 is sufficient for this
study, and does not require to be supplemented with data from external sources.

4.3.3. Structure of the economy
Table 4-7 presents the sectoral characteristics of Kenya’s economy in 2009 ―the base
year for the proposed study. The industry sector accounts for thirty-four of the eighty-one
activities in 2009, in both energy-intensive, and non-energy intensive sectors. A country
is classified as semi-industrialized if the composition of agriculture and services sectors’
output exceeds 40% (Dervis, et al., 1982:262). As shown in column (2) of Table 4-7, this
threshold is exceeded as Kenya’s services sector, and agriculture sector, contributed
40.8%, and 17% of the 2009 output, respectively.
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Table 4-7: Structure of the Kenyan Economy in 2009

Agriculture
Primary energy
Petroleum
Electricity
Energy-intensive
Mining & quarrying
Non-metal minerals
Chemicals
Rubber & plastics
Water supply & sewerage
Leather
Paper and wood
Other (energy-intensive)
Non-energy intensive
Construction
Transport
Services
TOTAL

(1)
O
826

(2)
O'
17.0

(3)
GDP
548

(4)
GDP'
18.7

(5)
VA
25.2

(6)
D
15.0

(7)
X
13.0

(8)
M
8.4

(9)
T
8.2

(10)
EI
1.6

(11)
OI/O
17.6

(12)
VA/O
80.8

(13)
X/O
9.0

(14)
M/D
0.1
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1.6
1.5

-40
19

-1.3
0.6

0.8
1.4

4.6
1.4

2.1
0.2

12.6
0.1

28.9
2.4

0.5
32.2

73.8
16.2

25.7
51.6

15.0
1.3

0.4
0.0

31
40
66
56
37
16
53

0.6
0.8
1.4
1.2
0.8
0.3
1.1

-48
0
-27
4
24
15
-13

-1.6
0.0
-0.9
0.1
0.8
0.5
-0.5

0.6
0.4
0.8
0.5
0.9
0.2
0.5

1.5
1.0
2.6
1.2
0.6
0.3
1.4

0.9
1.8
4.3
1.3
0.0
0.8
0.8

6.7
1.5
8.8
1.7
0.0
0.4
2.4

0.1
0.7
2.0
1.3
0.0
0.7
0.7

19.1
10.1
11.7
5.8
6.0
5.4
7.9

28.2
62.7
126.6
71.8
28.0
59.7
142.3

52.6
27.1
61.7
22.4
65.9
34.9
49.8

0.7
0.2
1.0
0.2
0.0
0.2
0.4

105
719
311
467
1,984
4,866

2.2
14.8
6.4
9.6
40.8
100

-30
568
264
350
1,303
2,938

-1.0
19.3
9.0
11.9
44.4
100

1.3
8.6
4.1
7.8
46.9
100

3.3
19.7
5.2
8.0
34.3
100

4.4
26.8
0.0
20.2
23.6
100

10.0
38.1
0.0
1.4
7.9
100

1.8
39.4
0.0
2.9
11.0
100

10.2
1.3
4.3
22.8
3.8

197.8
66.9
61.1
33.1
33.6

91.9
31.8
34.6
44.1
62.5

15.6
25.7
93.6
13.6
0.0
28.0
16.7
112.
3
21.3
0.0
24.8
6.8

1.5
0.3
0.0
0.0
0.0

Source: Author based on the Kenya's 2009 Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) provided by the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics

Notes:
Abbreviations:
Column (1):
Column (3):
Columns 2 & 4-9:
Column 10:
Columns 11-14:

42

O: for gross output; GDP: for gross domestic product (market prices); VA: for value-added; D: for final demand; X: for
exports; M: for imports; T: for import duties/tariffs; EI: for energy intensity; OI: for other intermediate inputs.
Gross output (O), billions of 2009 KSh
GDP, billions of 2009 KSh market prices
Percentage points (%) contributions to: gross output (O), gross domestic product (GDP), value-added (VA), final demand
(D), exports (X), imports (M), and import duties/tariffs (T), respectively
Energy intensity42 (EI) is the ratio of primary energy to total activity expenditure times 100.
Ratios: other intermediate inputs to gross output, value-added to gross output, exports to output, and imports to final demand,
respectively.

Ibid.
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Within the industrial sector, the non-durable food sector ―classified as non-energy
intensive― dominate, followed by the following top five activities (basic metals,
petroleum, electricity, rubber and plastics, and chemicals). Columns (4), (5), and (6) of
Table 4-7 emphasize the important roles that services, agriculture, nondurable food,
transport, and construction play in supporting GDP growth, value-added and total
demand, respectively. Columns (7) and (8) show the sectoral trade orientation. All sectors
have tradable goods and services, except for water supply and sewerage, and construction
sectors. Interestingly, column (13) shows that energy-intensive and highly polluting
goods (see column 10 for estimates of energy intensities), dominate the top positions in
the ranking of the ratio of exports to output. Within the industrial sector, the energyintensive industries include chemicals, pharmaceuticals, other non-food manufacturers,
leather, non-metal minerals, metals, rubber and plastics, and paper products. The mining
and quarrying sector, and the transport sector are also energy-intensive. The ratio of
imports to aggregate demand appears to be more balanced (see column 14). Sectors with
the highest ratio of imports to aggregate demand are chemicals, pharmaceuticals, mining,
non-food manufacturers, petroleum, and metals products.

4.3.4. Exogenously determined parameters

There are certain parameters and exogenously determined variables (by assumption) that
are estimated from external data sources. These are: the elasticity of substitution between
domestic use and imports, the elasticity of transformation between domestic use and
exports, and the elasticity of substitution in domestic commodity aggregation function.
This thesis draws on academic literature for the needed values of these elasticities.
Dervis, et al., (1982) provide trade substitution and price elasticities, while Löfgren
(1994) surveys developing countries’ elasticities for CGE models. Maskus, el al. (1997)
have applied relevant substitution elasticities in their CGE model of Egypt to evaluate
trade policy reforms in the context of the country’s trade partnership with the European
Union. Chapter 5 presents the assumed elasticity values that are used to calibrate the
KenCGE Model.
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4.4.

Summary

This Chapter has presented the complete mathematical definitions of the KenCGE
Model’s equations, sets, parameters, and variables. The model is static and is developed
to facilitate the quantitative exploration of the main channels through which deeper trade
liberalization affects environment quality in Kenya. It uses the most recent dataset ―the
KenSAM 2009―, and is adapted from the CGE model by Löfgren (1993), with
modifications from Löfgren, et al., (2002). Moreover, theoretically, it follows the
tradition of CGE models for open developing economies that were proposed by the
World Bank (Dervis, et al., 1982). Based on the current state of academic literature, there
does not appear to be a study on Kenya, that has used the methodology that is like the one
underpinned by the KenCGE Model, and is described in this Chapter.
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CHAPTER V: ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
Chapter five presents the outcomes of the assessment of Kenya’s trade liberalization and
environment policies. This investigation focuses on the assumed trade-off between trade
liberalization and pollution abatement policies. It seeks to uncover whether such tradeoffs could provide incentives for Kenya to specialize in dirty industries, to exploit its
comparative advantages in trade. This Chapter starts by highlighting additional features
of the model that was presented in Chapter IV, and importantly, presenting the
experiments that underpin this study. Next is Section 5.2 that investigates the question
whether further trade liberalization policy, alone, affects the pattern of trade
specialization in Kenya and what, if any, are the implications for the country’s
environment. Thereafter, Section 5.3 analyzes the impacts of implementing an
environmental tax policy, alone, on Kenya’s international trade competitiveness. This is
followed by Section 5.4 that assesses the implications of implementing joint policies of
further trade liberalization, and pollution abatement, on the country’s trade
competitiveness, and the pattern of industrial specialization. Finally, Section 5.5
concludes.

5.1.

The Experiments

The computable general equilibrium (CGE) model for Kenya in GAMS ―the KenCGE
Model― that was presented in Chapter IV was employed to execute the experiments that
inform the outcomes of this thesis. The KenCGE Model was calibrated to the base-run
solution based on the data drawn from the 2009 Kenya’s Social Accounting Matrix
(KenSAM, 2009), as discussed in Chapter IV. However, the parameters related to the
constant elasticities of substitution, and transformation functions, that are also required to
calibrate the KenCGE Model were estimated, drawing on the works of Dervis, et al.,
(1982), Löfgren (1994), and Maskus, el al. (1997). From these academic sources, the
following were judged as reasonable estimates for these parameters: the elasticity of
substitution between domestic use and imports = 2; the elasticity of transformation
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between domestic use and exports = 5; and the elasticity of substitution in domestic
commodity aggregation function = 4.
Table 5-1: Policy Simulation – KenCGE Model
Simulation
Exp 1
exp2
exp3
exp4

Description
2009 base-run
100% reduction in import tariffs
10% increase in energy (petroleum) inputs taxes
exp2 + exp3

Using KenCGE Model, four
policy experiments (exp) were
executed, as outlined in Table 51. The first experiment (exp1) is

the 2009 base-run that is the reference competitiveness, pattern of specialization, and
emissions path if Kenya does not change its trade liberalization and environment policies.
As discussed in Chapter III, Kenya’s has a robust policy on trade liberalization, and
intends to further deepen its initiatives in this area. The KenSAM 2009 has a tariff rate of
12.4%. In contrast, Kenya’s environmental management instruments are weak and vastly
nonexistent. There is a tax that is paid by final consumers of petroleum products but the
tax is not assigned as an environmental instrument. Kenya’s prices of petroleum products
are relatively lower compared to those of its neighbors, and are below the world average
prices. The base-run experiment (exp1) results are not reported in this thesis; they,
however, provided a counterfactual base for comparing the effect of policy shocks on
macroeconomic variables, and sectoral changes in output, trade flows, and prices of
factors and commodities.

The second experiment (exp2) comprises the implementation of a unilateral trade
liberalization policy that entail a 100% elimination of import duties. This effectively
equalizes the domestic and international prices of imports, and reduces the cost of
imported commodities by 12.4%, compared to the 2009 base year. A substantial increase
in imports of pollution-intensive consumer goods might reduce pollution by changing the
production mix in Kenya’s industrial sector, from dirtier to cleaner goods. However,
there is a priori expectation that tariff reforms might also boost sectors with imported
inputs, and this could lead to an expansion of activity output. On the downside, such an
expansion in output might have adverse implications on the environment, through higher
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use of petroleum fuel inputs. In the third experiment (exp3), a restrictive 10% tax policy
is imposed on the price of petroleum fuel inputs. A priori considerations suggest that a
carbon tax on petroleum fuel will incentivize industries to reduce demand for pollutionintensive energy inputs. There is an expectation that this could also lower output of
energy-intensive industries, and in the longer run, provide industries with the incentive to
shift to cleaner energy sources. Finally, a joint reform (exp4) that brings together the two
separate policies (exp2 + exp3), is implemented, but the net outcome of such a
coordinated policy is difficult to predict, a priori. This is because sectoral responses to
the tariff elimination, on the one hand, and those from the extra environmental tax on
energy inputs, on the other, are unpredictable as they, separately, have divergent effects
on the pattern of trade specialization and environmental outcomes.

5.2.

Trade Liberalization Policy

This section reviews the results of the second experiment (exp2) that involves a policy of
100% elimination of import tariffs, alone, compared to the 2009 base-run.

Table 5-2: Aggregate Short-Run Impact of Tariff
and Energy Tax Reforms

Variable

% Change from base-run
(exp1)
exp2
exp3
exp4

Nominal GDP
Real GDP
Imports (value, domestic currency)
Exports (value, domestic currency)
Consumption demand in current prices
Consumption demand in real terms
Government revenues
Foreign savings
Nonproduction labor real wage rate

-1.37
-0.64
-2.92
2.37
2.57
3.33
-19.61
47.62
3.68

-0.40
0.01
-0.42
1.23
-0.95
-0.53
2.12
-7.80
-0.51

-1.73
-0.63
-3.31
3.46
1.71
2.85
-17.63
40.32
3.22

Macroeconomic

effects:

As shown in Table 5-2,
trade reforms (exp2) that
leads to full convergence
of the domestic and world
prices of imports, induces
a small contraction in the
real GDP of 0.64%, in the
short-run, compared to the

base-run. Also, the removal of tariffs caused reductions in nominal GDP by 1.37%, and
the value of imports by 2.92%, and an expansion in the value of exports by 2.37%. The
fall in the value of imports boosted industrial activities and consumer demand, and
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enhanced household welfare, as evidenced by the increase in real consumer demand by
3.33%. There was a substantial increase in foreign savings by 47.62%, compared to the
base-run. However, the government was the main loser of the trade reform policy as its
revenues fell by 19.61%, compared to the base-run, because of dwindling in revenues
from taxes on commodities and international trade.

Sectoral effects: A tariff reforms policy has favorable effects on activity output, imports,
and exports, as shown in Table 5-3, and by detailed data in Table 8-5 in Section 8.2
(Appendix 2). Broadly, evidence suggests that trade liberalization could incentivize
Kenya to specialize in dirtier industries. The elimination of import tariffs stimulated
growth in activity output across sectors. As a result, most industries recorded relatively
higher increases in activity output, compared to the base-run, that ranged from 1%10.7%. These include those that produce pharmaceuticals, bakery, rubber and plastics,
and chemical products. Of these, the production of pharmaceuticals, rubber and plastics,
and chemical goods require high use of energy inputs, specifically, of between 3% to
8.6% of production costs in the base year.

Conversely, trade liberalization reforms caused contraction in outputs, for example, in
industries manufacturing paper, other foods, sugar, and wood products, and in mining and
quarrying sector. These recorded output contractions of between 0.6%-2.8%. Thanks to
the contraction, trade liberalization policy, could advance pollution abatement and
mitigation goals, in energy-intensive industries producing paper, wood, and metals
products, and in mining and quarrying activities. Other industries’ output responses after
trade liberalization fall in between these cases, but the storyline, regarding the
environmental implications of the related changes in output is not that promising.
Overall, a significant observation is that 10 out of 15 sectors in the 2009 baseline that are
energy-intensive experienced positive output responses after trade was fully liberalized.
Conversely, sectors that pollute less, for example, food manufactures, and agriculture,
either recorded lackluster expansion in output or at worse contracted after the trade
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liberalization policy was effected. Consequently, from an output perspective, one would
expect increasing pollution from scale effects, with further trade liberalization.

Table 5-3: Sectoral Short-Run Impact of Tariff and Energy Tax Reforms

Sector
Agriculture
Mining and quarrying
Meat processing
Fish processing
Fruit and vegetable
products
Vegetable and
animal oils/fats
Dairy products
Grain mill products
Bakery products
Sugar manufacture
Coffee processing
Tea processing
Other food products
Beverages products
Tobacco products
Textiles and clothing
Leather products
Wood products
Paper products
Printing and
reproduction
Petroleum products
Basic chemicals
Chemical products
Pharmaceuticals
Rubber and plastics
Other non-metal
minerals
Metal products
Machinery and
equipment
Other manufactures
Power generation/
distribution
Water supply and
sewerage
Construction
Transport
Other services

Activity output
exp2
exp3
exp4

% Change from base-run (exp1)
Quantity of imports
Quantity of exports
exp2
exp3
exp4
exp2
exp3
exp4

-0.08
-1.06
0.20
0.05

0.01
-0.11
-0.04
0.14

-0.07
-1.17
0.17
0.17

28.49
3.05
35.23
30.51

-1.16
0.02
-1.77
-1.18

27.17
3.07
33.09
29.15

0.75
32.09
-10.11
-0.97

2.21
-0.30
4.37
1.13

2.71
31.73
-6.60
0.03

0.30

0.54

0.78

22.70

-0.49

22.18

3.41

1.14

4.41

0.55
0.89
0.09
3.65
-1.11
-0.07
0.21
-2.75
0.59
0.64
-0.12
0.20
-0.61
-1.92

0.16
-0.12
-0.05
-0.37
0.02
0.06
0.12
0.28
-0.06
0.36
0.06
0.06
0.00
0.10

0.71
0.79
0.06
3.33
-1.08
-0.01
0.31
-2.48
0.55
0.96
-0.06
0.25
-0.61
-1.84

14.82
30.61
28.89
29.93
26.99
32.64
32.99
23.50
32.33
22.94
23.14
26.12
19.05
8.64

-0.63
-1.36
-1.52
-1.41
-1.26
-1.02
-1.21
-1.03
-1.51
-0.88
-0.80
-1.06
-0.26
-0.03

14.17
29.03
27.18
28.27
25.59
31.44
31.56
22.39
30.55
21.97
22.28
24.95
18.80
8.62

16.19
0.44
0.86
11.55
-0.81
-0.83
-0.58
3.46
-3.13
1.82
5.42
2.95
16.72
27.91

0.80
2.55
3.62
2.24
2.51
0.37
0.51
2.37
3.00
0.63
1.07
1.24
0.56
0.30

16.95
2.74
4.05
13.90
1.40
-0.50
-0.13
5.62
-0.51
2.37
6.37
4.07
17.26
28.21

-0.07
0.10
1.31
1.23
10.69
1.55

0.02
0.01
0.10
-0.43
0.55
0.02

-0.05
0.11
1.41
0.86
11.34
1.60

26.41
6.81
3.48
14.74
8.21
14.43

-0.37
-0.42
-0.04
-0.36
-0.34
-0.53

26.01
6.42
3.46
14.35
7.86
13.89

4.87
31.37
10.26
18.40
21.14
24.19

0.91
0.67
0.14
-0.25
0.88
0.88

5.69
32.02
10.40
18.21
22.18
25.17

0.12
-0.18

-0.03
0.05

0.10
-0.13

13.41
8.22

-0.07
-0.07

13.33
8.15

15.43
23.85

0.02
0.22

15.45
24.07

0.15
-0.16

0.03
0.03

0.18
-0.13

2.68
16.68

-0.10
-0.54

2.57
16.13

13.77
17.84

0.11
1.01

13.87
18.81

0.60

-0.48

0.17

28.28

1.49

29.89

3.77

-5.04

-0.73

0.20
0.03
0.38
-0.06

-0.05
0.00
-0.33
0.06

0.16
0.03
0.10
-0.02

0.00
0.00
2.62
3.30

0.00
0.00
-0.84
-1.23

0.00
0.00
1.84
2.15

0.00
0.00
-2.18
-6.49

0.00
0.00
0.27
2.66

0.00
0.00
-1.88
-4.21

Although tariff reforms induced strong sectoral imports and exports responses as shown
in Table 5-3, the responses were strikingly dissimilar. All sectors expanded their imports
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after trade reforms. However, imports in non-energy intensive sectors, expanded fastest,
compared to the base-run scenario. Virtually all sectors related to food processing, and
agriculture, that are relatively more protected through import tariffs recorded substantial
increases in imports ranging between 23.5%-35.23% over the 2009 base-run. The only
exception in the category of sectors that responded strongly in their demand for imports,
and that use energy intensely, are: electricity generation and distribution (increase of
28.28%); leather production (increase of 26.12%); and wood products (an increase of
19.05%). With these exceptions, other energy-intensive sectors had lower imports
responses after trade liberalization reforms, of between 2.62% to 14.74%.

Unlike on the imports side, where non-energy intensive sectors dominated in expanding
their activity after trade reforms, Kenya's export growth was concentrated in pollutionintensive sectors (11 out of the 24). In this regard, after trade reforms, exports grew by
between 21.14% to 32.09% in mining and quarrying whose activities are energyintensive, and in energy-intensive industries involved in the production of paper, rubber
and plastics, metals, and pharmaceuticals products. While most industries expanded their
exports activity, there were eight industries that experienced contractions, two of which
―transportation (contracted by 2.18%), and other services (contracted by 6.49%)― are
energy-intensive. The non-energy intensive sectors that recorded export activity
contractions of between 0.58% and 10.11% are in food manufacturing industries that
process meat, beverage, fish, coffee, sugar, and tea products.

Interestingly, while exports expanded across all sectors of the economy after trade
reforms, compared to the base-run, the quantity sold domestically of domestic output
contracted across sectors. Importantly, most of the industries that diverted their output to
exports, were energy-intensive. These include other non-metal minerals, paper, metals,
pharmaceuticals, and basic chemicals. These energy-intensive industries, sharply reduced
the supply of their goods to the domestic market, in favor of exports. The fact that
Kenya’s trade reforms intensify the production, for exports rather than domestic
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consumption, of energy-intensive and, therefore, potentially pollution-intensive goods,
has a major implication on the level of emissions in the country.

The above analysis reveal that trade opening might enable Kenya to specialize in
producing dirtier goods where it has a comparative advantage, because of lower
opportunity costs. The experiments show that import response after trade reforms is
lackluster in sectors that are energy and pollution-intensive. Conversely, spectacular
growth in imports emerge in sectors that are associated with lower energy intensities, and
are more labor intensive, such as food manufactures and agricultural activities. Recall
from Chapter III that Kenya imposes punitive tariffs, ranging between 35% and 100% on
some imports in sectors that are classified as sensitive —for example, cereals, sugar, and
textiles and clothing. Simulation in exp2 show that with further trade opening, imports in
these and other sectors that have lower-carbon emissions in the Kenyan economy could
grow at a faster pace than in sectors with high-carbon emissions. Conversely, on the
exports side, this situation is reversed; substantially high growth was achieved in energyintensive sectors, that pollute more, than in sectors that are associated with lower-carbon
emissions.

Impact on households: At the macro and sectoral levels, freer trade is welfare enhancing.
In real terms, consumer demand increased by 3.33%, and nonproduction labor wage rate
by 3.68%, compared to the base-run (see Table 5-2). At the sectoral level, the real wage
rate for production labor increased substantially in virtually all sectors compared to the
base-run (see Section 8.2, Appendix 2, Table 8-6). Mining and quarrying sector and three
industries —other foods, wood products, and paper products, however, recorded
contractions in the real wages of between 0.48% and 8.96%. The top three industries that
recorded the highest growth in production labor wages, were those producing
pharmaceutical, meat, and bakery products, where the real wage rate rose by 25.8%,
21.54%, and 20.82%, respectively, compared to the base-run. However, increased output
in dirty industries would intensify pollution, and in the longer-term lead to detrimental
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effects on public health and labor productivity. Such developments have negative impact
on social welfare.

Impact on environment: The analysis of the existing trade patterns as documented in
Chapter III reveal that Kenya’s exports are dominated by primary commodities and laborintensive manufactured goods, while capital-intensive goods dominate on the imports
side. Is this pattern of trade specialization likely to change if a trade reform policy, alone,
is implemented? And if so, what are the implications for Kenya’s environmental quality?
The analysis so far seems to suggest that, yes, the pattern would change if trade reforms
involve removal of all trade tariffs. Without any further analysis or environmental policy
actions, it appears that Kenya is likely to specialize in the production of dirtier goods, as
it intensifies its exports in relatively dirtier goods, after trade liberalization. Further, it is
evident that imports in the Kenyan case are not a substitute instrument for abating
pollution when trade is fully liberalized as exp2 show that imports in cleaner sectors rise
relatively faster than those in dirtier sectors. In summary, further trade liberalization
policy, alone, would increase the country’s pattern of specialization towards dirty
industries if Kenya does not take concrete actions to implement complementary pollution
abatement actions to mitigate pollution that is likely to emerge with further trade opening.

5.3.

Pollution Abatement Policy

The third experiment (exp3) involved a policy change that imposes a 10% environmental
tax on petroleum (energy) inputs to curtail harmful emissions, compared to the 2009
baseline. The experiment for this standalone policy change on energy taxes was
conducted under the assumption of no further trade liberalization.

Macroeconomic effects: The short-run effects of this restrictive environmental tax
policy, on aggregate variables are presented in Table 5-2. Under the pollution abatement
policy (exp3), alone, there was a small increase in real GDP by 0.01% from the 2009
base scenario, a far better result than the contraction of 0.64% that was experienced under
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a trade reform policy, alone (exp2). The nominal GDP, however, contracted by 0.4%
after the environmental tax policy was effected, but at a slower pace than the contraction
experienced under the trade reforms policy, alone of 1.37% compared to the base-run.
Furthermore, compared to the 2009 base-run, foreign savings contracted sharply by 7.8%
unlike in exp2 where such savings increased by 47.62%. Finally, government revenues,
compared to the base-run, increased by 2.12%, unlike in exp2 where such revenues
declined by 19.61%.

Under an environmental tax policy alone, there are several effects that feed back to
depress real GDP growth. First, the assumption that capital is sector specific impedes
sectoral reallocation of capital and amplifies impacts on the macroeconomic variables
because of a restrained equilibrating process. Furthermore, in the base 2009 economy,
Kenya is an oil importer, and, therefore, the higher energy prices have a higher adverse
effect on energy-intensive production and consumption.

These adverse effects are

reflected in contraction in nominal GDP (reduced by 0.4%), and nominal consumption
(reduced by 0.95%), as shown in Table 5-2. The value of exports expanded, however, by
1.23%, but this increase, compared to the base-run, was about half of the increase in
exports of 2.37% under trade reforms, alone (exp2). The government was the main
beneficiary of the environmental tax policy as its revenues increased by 2.12% in exp3 as
compared to the reduction of 19.61% under the trade reforms policy only (exp2) because
of the mobilization of both environmental and international trade taxes. Conversely,
households were the main losers of the standalone environmental tax policy. This is
reflected in the decline in real consumer demand, and real nonproduction labor wage rate
by, respectively, 0.53% and 0.51% under exp3 compared to an increase of 3.33% and
3.68%, under the trade reform policy, alone (exp2).

Sectoral impacts: Results in Table 5-3, and Table 8-5 in Section 8.2 (Appendix 2) show
that an environmental tax on energy inputs has, broadly, adverse effects on output, and
trade flows. Compared to the trade reform policy, alone, the standalone environmental
tax policy reform caused the activity output across sectors to expand at a slower pace, of
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less than 1%, as data in Table 5-3 demonstrate. For example, the pharmaceutical industry,
that had achieved a substantial activity output expansion of 10.69% under the trade
reform policy alone, responded weakly under the environmental tax policy alone with an
activity output growth of only 0.55%, compared to the base-run. As expected, far fewer
energy-intensive industries expanded their output under the environmental tax policy. In
the top five position, only the pharmaceutical industry, that is pollution-intensive,
maintained its stronger output expansion response to the environmental tax policy reform,
alone. This contrasts with the trade reform policy, alone, where more energy-intensive
industries responded strongly in expanding their production capacities. The electricity
(power) generation and distribution, transportation, and chemicals sectors that rely
heavily on fuel were most adversely affected by the environmental tax policy.

Another interesting comparison between the output performance under trade reforms
alone, and an environmental tax alone, is the variation in outcomes. Data in Table 5-3
show that under the trade reform policy, alone, the range of industrial output response
was wider (contraction: -0.48%; expansion: 10.69%), compared to the range under the
environmental tax policy, alone, (contraction: -1.69%; expansion: 0.55%). This suggests
that in the Kenya case, an environmental tax policy is a better, and more targeted
instrument for pollution abatement than the trade policy reforms policy. Indeed, a closer
scrutiny of the output data reveal that the response of activity output to the energy tax,
alone, is more evenly spread across industries (both energy-intensive and non-energy
intensive) compared to the case of the trade reform policy, alone.

Regarding trade flows, performance vary across sectors of the economy, but generally,
imports and exports activity decline (see Table 5-3). On the imports side, only two
sectors marginally increased their imports under the energy tax policy; electricity (power)
generation and distribution (by 1.49%) and mining and quarrying (by 0.02%), both of
which are energy-intensive. On the exports side, higher production costs caused the
following energy-intensive industries to curtail activities; electricity (power) generation
and distribution (by 5.04%), and chemicals (by 0.25%). Also, exports from the mining
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and quarrying sector, that is also energy-intensive, contracted by 0.3%. Other industries
in the tradable sector increased exports by between 0.02% and 4.37%, with all the
energy-intensive ones increasing their exports at rates below average, except for other
services sector that expanded its exports by 2.66%.

These results suggest that without mitigating actions, an environmental tax policy in the
form of an energy tax, alone, could harm Kenya’s international trade competitiveness.
The outcomes of exp3 show that a 10% increase in the price petroleum fuel, which is
viewed as harmful to the environment, imposes substantial costs on the Kenyan economy
in terms of reduction in trade flows of both imports and exports, activity output, and the
prices of labor. It is unlikely, without compensatory measures, that the Kenyan public
would readily accept to bear the cost of increased energy prices, even if they have
heightened environmental awareness.

Impacts on households: At the aggregate level, compared to the base-run, the energy tax
policy caused household welfare to fall, as real consumer demand contracted by 0.53%.
This is a worse off outcome for consumers as under the trade liberalization policy, their
real consumption had increased by 3.33% compared to the base-run. Another source of
declining welfare for household arose from the contraction of the real wage rate for
nonproduction labor, by 0.51% compared to the base-run, and an increase of 3.68% under
the trade reform policy, alone. At the sectoral level, an energy tax is not welfare
enhancing, as well. The real wage rate for production labor contracted across the sector
after the energy tax was imposed, compared to a clear pattern of increases across sectors
under the trade liberalization reforms (see Section 8.2, Appendix 2, Table 8-6).

These results illustrate that an environmental tax has adverse effects on sectoral output.
As production costs rise because of rising energy prices, enterprises scale back their
activities, leading to declining overall output and use of primary labor factors. This
causes an overall fall in the wage rate, and consequently, household incomes. In this
analysis, however, it is not possible make deeper analysis of the effects of the policy
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shocks on households’ welfare, because households are not disaggregated into quintile
income groups. On the positive side, however, lower output and the likelihood of a
cleaner environment might in the longer term have beneficial effects on public health and
the productivity of labor, and consequently, lead to enhanced social welfare.

Impact on environment: Although there are unfavorable effects of the environmental tax
policy, alone, on Kenya’s international trade competitiveness, such a policy has positive
effects on environmental quality. Evidence of decline in aggregate domestic output, in
energy-intensive industries, after the implementation of an environmental tax policy,
suggest that the pollution intensity of output will decline through scale effects. As such,
compared to the 2009 baseline, the higher energy taxes would cause a decrease in
emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2), and ambient particulate matter (PM10). A reduction
in PM10 will in turn have favorable effects on public health. However, estimates of the
reductions of these emissions, after an environment tax policy is introduced, is an
empirical question that is outside the scope of this study.

5.4.

Policy Coordination

Table 5-2 shows the effects of a policy that combines a 10% environmental tax on fuel
products, and 100% import tariffs cut (exp4).

Macroeconomic effects: The impact of the coordinated policy on the macroeconomic
variables is more moderated compared to outcomes under separate policies. Abolition of
tariffs reduce the prices of imported inputs and final goods, and foster higher trade. This
dampens the economy-wide negative effects of the higher energy prices that arise
because of the environmental tax. As Table 5-2 illustrate, the real GDP responded to the
joint policy by contracting marginally by 0.63%, compared to the base-run. Government
revenues contracted sharply by 17.63% because the loss in revenues from the tariff cuts
(a decrease of 19.61% per exp2) was only partially offset by the extra resources that were
mobilized from the environmental tax (an increase of 2.12% per exp3).
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Both the

domestic value of exports (increase of 3.46%), and the domestic value of imports
(decrease of 3.31%) under the joint policy depict a far better terms of trade position
compared to the stand-alone policies. Finally, the real consumer demand increased by
2.85% under the joint policies compared to a deterioration under an environment policy
alone.

Sectoral effects: Compared to the environmental tax policy alone, there is considerable
improvement in the sectoral effects of the coordinated policy (see Table 5-3, above, and
detailed data in Table 8-5 in Section 8.2 of Appendix 2). Regarding activity output, the
responses of the coordinated policy are evenly distributed across sectors, unlike in the
case of stand-alone policies where responses are clustered in unique patterns. Table 5-3
show that industries that achieved above average output outturns that ranged between
1.44% to 11.34% under the coordinated policy are those that produce pharmaceuticals,
bakery, rubber and plastics, and basic chemicals products. The pharmaceutical industry
recovered strongly by achieving an activity output growth of 11.34% under the
coordinated policy, compared to the slow-down of 0.55% under the environmental tax
policy, alone. The top five sectors whose output contracted the most under the
coordinated policy are mining and quarrying, and those that cover industries producing
wood, paper, sugar, and other food products. These contracted by between 0.61% and
1.56%, compared to the base-run. It is noticeable that under the coordinated policy, there
is no systematic pattern of specialization of activity output, as energy-intensive industries
feature in both expanding (for example, pharmaceutical and chemicals), and contracting
(for example, wood production), and in mining and quarrying activities.

Under the coordinated policy, tariff cuts benefit output more, while the effects of higher
energy prices are still evident, with energy-intensive sectors being negatively impacted
more than non-energy intensive sectors. As shown in Table 5-3, despite all sectors
expanding their imports under the coordinated policy, the energy-intensive ones faired far
worse than non-energy intensive ones; only two energy-intensive sectors —electricity
(power) generation and distribution, and the production of leather products— had import
96

expansion above 20% under the coordinated policy, compared to the base-run. On the
exports side, the pattern of distribution of responses to the coordinated policy show a
relatively more symmetrical distribution of energy-intensive industries, although more
industries expanded their activities than those that recorded contractions. The mining and
quarrying sector, and industries producing paper, rubber and plastics, metal products, and
pharmaceuticals expanded their exports by above average rates. The energy-intensive
industries that achieved contraction in export growth are electricity generation,
transportation, and other services. These outcomes demonstrate the balanced nature of the
coordinated policy unlike under the stand-alone policies where outcomes depict patterns
of specialization in activity outputs and trade flows.

Impact on households: The coordinated policy still has negative effects on households
when compared with the stand-alone trade policy, but broadly, is welfare improving. As
shown in Table 5-2, the real consumer demand increased by 2.85% compared to the baserun, a far better performance compared to the stand-alone environmental tax policy where
such demand contracted by 0.53%. This, however, is a weaker performance compared to
the higher real consumer demand of 3.33% that was reached under the trade reform
policy, alone, compared to the base-run. At the macro level, the real wage rate for
nonproduction labor increased by 3.22% compared to the base-run. This is slightly less
than the level achieved under the trade reforms policy alone (an increase of 3.68%), but a
far better result than the outcome under the environmental policy (a contraction of
0.51%). At a sectoral level, the real wage rate for production labor under the coordinated
policy increased across all sectors except in four (other foods, wood products, mining and
quarrying, and paper) (see Section 8.2, Appendix 2, Table 8-6). These outcomes are far
better for households than the contraction experienced under the environment policy
alone.

Environmental effects: The implications of implementing joint policies of further trade
liberalization, and pollution abatement, on the environment are similar to those achieved
under an environmental policy, alone. However, the environmental impacts are expected
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to be more moderated under the coordinated policy, as compared to the policy of
environmental tax, alone.

5.5.

Summary

The removal of trade tariffs has a favorable effect on sectoral output and trade flows, but
increases the risks that Kenya might specialize in dirty industries. On the other hand,
sectors that are energy-intensive are more negatively impacted by an environmental tax
on energy inputs. Although the adverse effects of an environmental tax policy do not
dissipate under the joint policy, the impact on macroeconomic and sectoral variables are
dampened. Sectorally, the effects of a coordinated trade-environment policy will depend
on energy intensities and trade orientation, but broadly, the benefits of a coordinated
policy are evident.
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CHAPTER VI: CONCLUSION
This thesis moves forward the discourse on the consequences of outward oriented trade
policy on the environment. It advances the debate on the assumed trade-off between trade
liberalization and environmental quality using the case of Kenya, a new entrant to middle
income country status, and a country that is aggressively pursuing industrialization as an
instrument for enabling its citizens to reap the dividends of globalization. Understanding
the linkages between trade-driven growth and environmental quality is important for
evidence based policy responses, particularly for developing countries, such as Kenya,
with low institutional, and implementation capacities, for environmental management. In
respect of Kenya, a progressively industrializing developing country, it is of uttermost
urgency that policy makers have evidence based prescriptions on optimal policies that
would strike the right balance between expanding trade liberalization, while controlling
trade-driven industrial pollution. Such evidence based policy prescriptions are, however,
curtailed by the scarcity of theoretically founded research on Kenya, as is for many
developing economies.

A Computable General Equilibrium Model for Kenya (the KenCGE Model) was
developed, as part of this thesis, to close the gaps in the literature. Technically, founded
on the Löfgren (1993)’s static open economy general equilibrium model for Egypt, the
model is theoretically grounded on the tradition of the World Bank’s neoclassical CGE
models (see Dervis, et al., 1982). The model is developed taking Kenya’s economy as
open, under a small country assumption where world prices for the country’s imports and
exports are given. Domestic factor and product markets are taken as perfectly
competitive. The model is calibrated using the Social Accounting Matrix for Kenya, 2009
(KenSAM, 2009), and is simulated to run on the GAMS (General Algebraic Modeling
System) software (see Brooke et al., 1988). The KenCGE Model incorporates a detailed
definition of the industrial sector ―thirty, out of thirty-four sectors―, structural
characteristics (markets for goods, labor, capital, and land), and institutions (one
household ―incorporating enterprises―, the government, and the rest of the world). The
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KenCGE Model was used to analyze the effects of three policy choices: a 100% cut in
import tariffs, alone; a 10% environmental tax on petroleum inputs, alone; and a
combined trade reforms and environmental tax policies.

6.1.

Key Outcomes

Trade reforms ―100% elimination of import tariffs― as an instrument for abating
pollution lead to several short-run responses. At the macro level, real GDP (Gross
Domestic Product) decline by 0.64%, as domestic and international prices converged
under the small country assumption. At the sector level, trade reforms, alone, induce
output specialization towards dirtier industries, and consequently, has the potential to
increase pollution through scale effects. Above average output increases (range of
between 1%-11.7%), over the base-run, were noticed in industries that are energyintensive such as pharmaceuticals, rubber and plastics, and chemical products. Further,
out of the 15 industries that are categorized as energy-intensive, only 5 had activity
output reductions after trade was fully liberalized. This suggest that trade reforms in
Kenya increases the risk of specialization in dirtier industries, as 67% of energy-intensive
industries had positive output responses.

Trade tariff reforms, alone, induced strong imports and exports responses across
tradeable sectors, compared to the base-run. While imports increased in all sectors, nonenergy intensive sectors, for example food processing and agriculture, expanded their
imports at a faster pace. On the exports side, the responses induced by trade reforms
were mixed. Surprisingly, stronger positive responses in exports were noticeable in
energy-intensive sectors. These include mining and quarrying, and the production of
rubber and plastics, paper, metals, and pharmaceuticals products. Unlike in the case of
imports, only a handful non-energy intensive sectors ―these are vegetable and animal
oils and fats, machinery and equipment, bakery products, and other manufactures―
achieved noticeable increases in exports after trade reforms, compared to the base-run.
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There was evidence of diversion of output of energy-intensive industries (for example,
basic chemicals, and pharmaceuticals) to exports, from the domestic market, after trade
opening reforms. This is a highly significant finding as trade reforms incentivized dirty
industries to intensify exports of dirtier goods, while curtailing supply to the domestic
market. This, in turn, has the potential of increasing the level of pollution in the Kenyan
economy, after full trade liberalization is realized. In sum, under exp2, compared to the
base-run (exp1), trade reforms, alone, induced in most sectors increases of activity
output, imports, and exports. Although exports expanded in 24 out of 32 tradable sectors,
imports increased in all tradable sectors. The diversion of trade to the export caused the
quantity of goods supplied domestically, from the domestic output, to contract in most
industries. With domestic and international prices, having converged after Kenya’s trade
was fully liberalized, product prices across all sectors fell. The falling domestic prices
caused an in increase net exports as domestic goods became more competitive in
international markets. This suggests that trade reforms, alone, increases the risk that the
Kenyan economy might specialize in dirty industries. This would intensify emissions, if
no complementary mitigating policy actions are taken to protect the environment.

Finally, a trade liberalization policy, alone, enhances economic welfare. At the macro
level, real consumer demand, and the real nonproduction labor wage rate, increased by
3.33%, and 3.68%, respectively. Sectorally, the real wage rate for production labor
increased in virtually all sectors. The higher real wages translate into rising real incomes
and, consequently, higher economic welfare of household. Conversely, increased output
that is induced by trade liberalization might lead to intensification of pollution, and this
has adverse consequences on social welfare.

A policy of pollution abatement that entails levying a 10% energy input tax, alone,
resulted in a small increase in real GDP by 0.01%. At the sector level, the environmental
tax had mixed results. Most of the energy-intensive sectors posted relatively weaker
output increases, while a few contracted (for example, mining and quarrying,
transportation, chemicals, and electricity generation). Imports in energy-intensive sectors
101

declined, with two exceptions where small increases were noted (electricity generation,
and mining and quarrying). Finally, exports responded weakly, with notable, below
average increase responses from energy-intensive industries. These results suggest that
without mitigating actions, an energy tax policy alone, might cause significant damage to
Kenya’s international trade competitiveness.

An energy tax, alone, does not enhance economic welfare. At an aggregate level, real
consumer demand declined by 0.53%, and this adversely impacted consumer welfare.
Real wages for labor factors contracted in tandem with economic output downturn. These
outcomes unfavorably impacted households’ welfare, compared to the base-run. On a
positive note the decline in aggregate domestic output, after the energy policy reform, is
expected to result in decline in pollution of energy-intensive industries, and this might, in
the longer-term, contribute to a cleaner environment and improved social welfare.

The final experiment is a coordinated policy reform that comprises a 100% cut in tariffs,
and a 10% tax on petroleum fuel inputs. This resulted in contraction of real GDP by
0.63%. Generally, changes in aggregate variables under joint policy reform, were more
moderated compared to the stand-alone reforms on trade and the environment. Further,
the sectoral activity output outcomes of the joint policy change improved, though they
varied depending on sector specific energy intensities. Exports also increased in most
sectors. However, because of diversion of trade from the domestic to foreign markets, the
quantity of domestic output sold domestically declined across sectors, compared to the
base-run. As is in the case of the trade policy alone, the joint policy appears to cause an
increase in net exports because of increasing competitiveness of the domestic goods in
world markets. However, the environmental component of the joint policy might mitigate
the risk of specialization in dirty industries that Kenya is faced with under a trade
liberalization policy reform, alone.

In conclusion, industrial responses to the coordinated policy lead to a more evenly
distributed activity outputs across sectors. This suggests that the significant patterns of
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specialization in production that arose under the trade policy, alone, have been mitigated
through policy coordination. Tariff cuts were beneficial to output, while the effects of
higher energy prices are still evident with energy-intensive industries being relatively
more negatively impacted than non-energy intensive ones. Despite economy wide
expansion of imports under the coordinated policy, all energy-intensive sectors faired far
worse than non-energy intensive ones. The welfare of households increased under the
coordinated policy, as reflected in the improvement in real consumer demand unlike in
the case of an environmental tax policy, alone, where real consumption demand
contracted. This, however, was a weaker performance as under the trade reform policy
alone, the real consumer demand was higher. Finally, given that environmental policy
reforms are included in the joint policy, growth in output is bound to occur in a
sustainable cleaner environment, and this, in the longer-term will enhance social welfare.
These findings are in stark contrast with those of Gumilang, et al. (2011) who concluded
that the impact of deepening Indonesia’s trade liberalization on the environment was
insignificant. The findings, however, demonstrate the advantages of coordinating trade
and environmental policies.

6.2.

Policy Implications

Kenya is currently, a low emitter of greenhouse gases. As such the concerns relating to
the inevitable growth-environment trade-off (Beghin, et al., 2002b) that Kenya is
currently faced with are manageable, as the country’s industrial emissions have not
reached a critical level. The analysis in this thesis suggest that there is need for “caution”
(Beghin, et al., 2002b:4), if Kenya were to manage the transition to industrialized status
through a sustainable trade opening growth path that is also environmental friendly. To
address the challenges posed by the risks of specialization in dirty industries, the analysis
presented in this study, as in Beghin, et al., (2002b), suggest that Kenya will need to
coordinate its trade opening policy with an appropriate pollution abatement policy. Kenya
should, therefore, incorporate in its environmental policy tools, specific economic
instruments that address directly environmental concerns.
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To overcome emerging environmental challenges that might arise from further trade
liberalization, an energy tax or a carbon tax on petroleum fuel inputs and new sources of
hydrocarbon fuels such as coal, should be considered as a key policy instrument for
abating pollution. The carbon tax, should target energy-intensive industries, but could be
calibrated at different rates across sectors based on the objectives the environmental
policy seeks to achieve, and in consideration of the country’s growth, and household
welfare objectives. As the Kenyan public is likely to oppose such a new tax, incentives
could be incorporated to channel part of the additional revenues that are mobilized from
the carbon tax, to subsidies for low income households and public transportation. The
Kenya’s National Environment Management Authority (NEMA) should use the balance
of the revenues from the carbon tax to reinforce its capacity to monitor, and control
industrial pollution.

6.3.

Other Matters for Consideration

The KenCGE Model is particularly strong in supporting policy makers in Kenya in their
quest to implement optimal economic policies in the areas of trade and industrial
pollution. The model’s household sector, however, is highly aggregated and, therefore, it
can only provide broad insights on the impact of trade and environmental quality on
household welfare. Disaggregation of households into various income quantiles is an
enhancement that is essential for the model to provide insights of the impact of policy
changes on various income groups. Another area that disaggregation could be helpful
relates to labor factors. Collectively, such disaggregation would enhance the economic
and welfare related policy prescriptions that arise from the analysis of the linkages
between trade liberalization and environmental policies.

The focus of the model was on identifying the impact on patterns of industrial
specialization of a trade opening policy, on the one hand, and a pollution abatement
policy, on the other. The next logical step is for the model to be enhanced to account for
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further environmental impacts by connecting emissions to both the use of primary inputs
―petroleum and electricity―, and the final consumption demand (see Beghin, et al.,
2002b). In this case, Beghin, et al (1996) approach is informative. Further, as in Beghin,
et al (1996), the model’s structure could be made dynamic in the areas of accumulation of
productive factors (capital and labor), and technological growth. This is important
because emissions abatement technology play an important part in both enhancing
production processes, and in the design of a robust environmental policy.
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VIII. APPENDICES
8.1.

Appendix 1: KenCGE Model – Definition of Sets, Parameters, and Variables

Table 8-1: KenCGE Model - Alphabetical List of Sets
Sets --- One – Dimensional
= commodities
c∈C
= commodities with domestic production
c ∈ CX(⊂ C)
= factors
f∈F
= sectorally mobile factors
f ∈ FM (⊂ F)
= sector-specific factors
f ∈ FS (⊂ F)
= households
h ∈ H (⊂ I)
= institutions
i∈I
= domestic non-government institutions
i ∈ ID (⊂ I)
= ID
i′ ∈ ID′
= sectors/good
s∈S
= S
s′ ∈ S′
= non-tradable sectors/goods
s ∈ SN (⊂ S)
= tradable sectors/goods
s ∈ ST (⊂ S)
Sets --- Two – Dimensional
= mapping between factors (capital, labor, land) and sectors
(f, s) ∈ MFS
= mapping between institutions and factors (capital, labor, and land)
(i, f) ∈ MIF
(i ∈ i′ ) ∈ MIID = mapping between institutions and domestic non-government institutions

Table 8-2: KenCGE Model - Alphabetical List of Parameters
xp

αs
α𝑠𝑥𝑡
q
αs
α𝑠𝑠𝑐
αLSNP
αLSP
𝛽𝑓𝑠
𝛾𝑠
𝛾̅𝑠
δsc
sc
𝛿𝑠
𝜄𝑠 ′ 𝑠
ι̅𝑠
λsfs
λm
f
λsks
λLNP
λsLSP
𝐴𝑔𝑟
λland Agr

=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=

shift parameter in the production function
shift parameter in the output transformation function
shift parameter in the composite supply function
shift parameter for domestic commodity aggregation function
share of nonproduction labor in sector s
share of production labor in sector s
share parameter for factor f in sector s
share parameter in the output transformation function
government demand
share parameter for domestic commodity aggregation function
share parameter in the composite supply function
quantity of input 𝑠 ′ per unit of output s
investment demand
fixed supply of sector-specific factor f in sector s
fixed supply of sectorally mobile factor f
fixed supply of capital
fixed supply of nonproduction labor
fixed supply of production labor
fixed supply of land in the agriculture sector
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(Table 8-2: KenCGE Model - Alphabetical List of Parameters) (continued)
pwm
s
Π
θsc
ρxs
q
ρs
ρ𝑎𝑐
𝑐
σes
τ𝑑i
τ𝑖s
τ𝑚
s
∅𝑙𝑤
𝑖𝑔
∅i
∅𝑖𝑤
i
ψ𝑒sh
ψfif
ψ𝑖ii′
ψsi
ω𝑠

=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=

world import price (US$)
price index (KSh)
yield of output c per unit of activity a
substitution parameter in the output transformation function
substitution parameter in the composite supply function
domestic commodity aggregation function exponent
export tax rate
rate of direct tax for institution i
indirect tax rate
tariff rate
transfers to labor from Rest of the World (RoW) (US$)
transfer to institution i from government (KSh)
transfer to institution i from RoW (US$)
expenditure share for good s for household h
share to institution i from the income of factor f
share to institution i from the income of institution 𝑖 ′
(excluding direct taxes to the government)
= income share for institution i to savings
= weight in price index for good s

Table 8-3: KenCGE Model - Alphabetical List of Variables
CDℎsh
f
cfs
𝑓
𝐾𝑘𝑠
𝑓
𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑁𝑃
𝑓
𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑃
𝑓
𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑑𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐴𝑔𝑟
d𝑠
e𝑠
𝑒𝑔
eℎh
m𝑠
𝑝s𝑑
𝑝s𝑒
𝑝s𝑚
𝑞
𝑝s
𝑝s𝑣𝑎
𝑝s𝑤𝑒
𝑝s𝑥
PA𝑠
PXAC𝑠 𝑐
q𝑠
QA𝑠
QXAC𝑠 𝑐
𝑟
𝑠𝑤

=
=
=
=
=
=

consumption demand for good s from household h
demand for factor f in sector s
demand for capital in sectors
wage for non-production labor in sectors
demand for production labor
demand for land in the agriculture sector

=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=

domestic output sold domestically
exports
government expenditures (KSh)
consumption expenditures for household h (KSh)
imports
domestic price of domestic output (KSh)
domestic export price (KSh)
domestic import price (KSh)
domestic supply price (KSh)
value-added price (KSh)
world export price (US$)
market price of domestic output (KSh)
activity price (unit gross revenue) (KSh)
producer price of commodity c for activity a (KSh)
domestic supply (from domestic output and imports)
quantity (level) of activity
quantity of marketed output of commodity c from activity a
foreign exchange rate (KSh/US$)
foreign savings (US$)
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Table 8-3: KenCGE Model - Alphabetical List of Variables
𝑓

𝑡𝑖𝑓

𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖 ′
v𝑠
𝑤f𝑚
𝑤fs𝑠
𝑠
𝑤𝑘𝑠
𝐴𝑔𝑟
𝑤𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐴𝑔𝑟
𝑠
𝑤𝐿𝑆𝑁𝑃
𝑠
𝑤𝐿𝑆𝑃
x𝑠
𝑓
yk
𝑓
𝑦𝐿𝑆𝑁𝑃
𝑓
𝑦𝐿𝑆𝑃
𝑓
yland
𝑦𝑔
𝑦i𝑖

= income transfer to institution i from factor f (KSh)
=
=
=
=
=
=

income transfer to institution i from institution 𝑖 ′ (KSh)
intermediate demand for good s
price of sectorally mobile factor f (KSh)
price of sector-specific factor f in sector s (KSh)
price of capital in sectors
price of land in agriculture sector

=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=

wage for nonproduction labor
wage for production labor
domestic output
income of capital (KSh)
income nonproduction labor (KSh)
income of production labor (KSh)
income of land (KSh)
government income (KSh)
income of institution i (KSh)
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8.2.

Appendix 2: Results of the KenCGE Model

Table 8-4: List of Abbreviations Used In KenCGE Model Results Tables

EXPERIMENTS
Abbreviation
exp1
exp2
exp3
exp4

Meaning
2009 base-run (not reported in the results, below)
100% reduction in imports tariffs
10% increase in energy (petroleum) inputs taxes
exp2 + exp3

ACTIVITIES / COMMODITIES
Abbreviation
Meaning
AGRICULTURE
AGRICU
Agriculture
INDUSTRY
IMINIG
IMEATP
IFISHP
IFRVEG
IOILFT
IDAIRY
IGMILL
IBAKRY
ISUGAR
ICOFFE
ITEAP:
IOTFDS
IBEVEG
ITOBAC
ITEXTL
ILEATH
IWOODP
IPAPER
IPRINT
IPETRO
IBCHEM
ICHEMP
IPHARM
IRPLST
INOMTL
IMETAL
IMEQPT
IOMANU
IPOWER
IWATER

Abbreviation
SERVICES
SCONST
STRNSP
SOSERV

Mining and quarrying
Meat processing
Fish processing
Fruit and vegetable products
Vegetable and animal oils/fats
Dairy products
Grain mill products
Bakery products
Sugar manufactures
Coffee processing
Tea processing
Other food products
Beverages products
Tobacco products
Textiles and clothing
Leather products
Wood products
Paper products
Printing and reproduction
Refined petroleum products
Basic chemicals
Chemical products
Pharmaceuticals
Rubber and plastics
Other non-metal mineral products
Metal products
Machinery and equipment
Other manufactures
Power generation/distribution
Water supply and sewerage
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Meaning
Construction
Transportation
Other services

Table 8-5: KenCGE Model Results –Quantities– % Change From Base-Run

Sectors
AGRICU
IMINIG
IMEATP
IFISHP
IFRVEG
IOILFT
IDAIRY
IGMILL
IBAKRY
ISUGAR
ICOFFE
ITEAP
IOTFDS
IBEVEG
ITOBAC
ITEXTL
ILEATH
IWOODP
IPAPER
IPRINT
IPETRO
IBCHEM
ICHEMP
IPHARM
IRPLST
INOMTL
IMETAL
IMEQPT
IOMANU
IPOWER
IWATER
SCONST
STRNSP
SOSERV

Activity output
exp2
exp3
exp4

Aggregate quantity
exp2
exp3
exp4

Quantity of imports
exp2
exp3
exp4

-0.08
-1.06
0.20
0.05
0.30
0.55
0.89
0.09
3.65
-1.11
-0.07
0.21
-2.75
0.59
0.64
-0.12
0.20
-0.61
-1.92
-0.07
0.10
1.31
1.23
10.69
1.55
0.12
-0.18
0.15
-0.16
0.60
0.20
0.03
0.38
-0.06

-0.08
-1.06
0.16
-0.04
0.30
0.72
0.89
0.09
3.65
-1.38
-0.07
0.21
-1.69
0.59
0.64
-0.12
0.20
-0.61
-1.63
-0.07
0.10
1.35
1.09
10.69
1.55
0.07
-0.18
0.15
-0.15
0.60
0.20
0.03
0.38
-0.06

28.49
3.05
35.23
30.51
22.70
14.82
30.61
28.89
29.93
26.99
32.64
32.99
23.50
32.33
22.94
23.14
26.12
19.05
8.64
26.41
6.81
3.48
14.74
8.21
14.43
13.41
8.22
2.68
16.68
28.28
0.00
0.00
2.62
3.30

0.01
-0.11
-0.04
0.14
0.54
0.16
-0.12
-0.05
-0.37
0.02
0.06
0.12
0.28
-0.06
0.36
0.06
0.06
0.00
0.10
0.02
0.01
0.10
-0.43
0.55
0.02
-0.03
0.05
0.03
0.03
-0.48
-0.05
0.00
-0.33
0.06

-0.07
-1.17
0.17
0.17
0.78
0.71
0.79
0.06
3.33
-1.08
-0.01
0.31
-2.48
0.55
0.96
-0.06
0.25
-0.61
-1.84
-0.05
0.11
1.41
0.86
11.34
1.60
0.10
-0.13
0.18
-0.13
0.17
0.16
0.03
0.10
-0.02
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0.01
-0.11
-0.03
0.05
0.54
0.01
-0.12
-0.05
-0.37
0.07
0.06
0.12
0.16
-0.06
0.36
0.06
0.06
0.00
0.09
0.02
0.01
0.09
-0.31
0.55
0.02
-0.03
0.05
0.03
0.03
-0.48
-0.05
0.00
-0.33
0.06

-0.07
-1.17
0.14
0.00
0.78
0.75
0.79
0.06
3.33
-1.31
-0.01
0.31
-1.54
0.55
0.96
-0.06
0.25
-0.61
-1.56
-0.05
0.11
1.44
0.83
11.34
1.60
0.05
-0.13
0.18
-0.12
0.17
0.16
0.03
0.10
-0.02

-1.16
0.02
-1.77
-1.18
-0.49
-0.63
-1.36
-1.52
-1.41
-1.26
-1.02
-1.21
-1.03
-1.51
-0.88
-0.80
-1.06
-0.26
-0.03
-0.37
-0.42
-0.04
-0.36
-0.34
-0.53
-0.07
-0.07
-0.10
-0.54
1.49
0.00
0.00
-0.84
-1.23

27.17
3.07
33.09
29.15
22.18
14.17
29.03
27.18
28.27
25.59
31.44
31.56
22.39
30.55
21.97
22.28
24.95
18.80
8.62
26.01
6.42
3.46
14.35
7.86
13.89
13.33
8.15
2.57
16.13
29.89
0.00
0.00
1.84
2.15

Table 8-5: KenCGE Model Results –Quantities– % Change From Base-Run (continued)

Sectors
AGRICU
IMINIG
IMEATP
IFISHP
IFRVEG
IOILFT
IDAIRY
IGMILL
IBAKRY
ISUGAR
ICOFFE
ITEAP
IOTFDS
IBEVEG
ITOBAC
ITEXTL
ILEATH
IWOODP
IPAPER
IPRINT
IPETRO
IBCHEM
ICHEMP
IPHARM
IRPLST
INOMTL
IMETAL
IMEQPT
IOMANU
IPOWER
IWATER
SCONST
STRNSP
SOSERV

Quantity of exports
exp2
exp3
exp4
0.75
32.09
-10.11
-0.97
3.41
16.19
0.44
0.86
11.55
-0.81
-0.83
-0.58
3.46
-3.13
1.82
5.42
2.95
16.72
27.91
4.87
31.37
10.26
18.40
21.14
24.19
15.43
23.85
13.77
17.84
3.77
0.00
0.00
-2.18
-6.49

2.21
-0.30
4.37
1.13
1.14
0.80
2.55
3.62
2.24
2.51
0.37
0.51
2.37
3.00
0.63
1.07
1.24
0.56
0.30
0.91
0.67
0.14
-0.25
0.88
0.88
0.02
0.22
0.11
1.01
-5.04
0.00
0.00
0.27
2.66

2.71
31.73
-6.60
0.03
4.41
16.95
2.74
4.05
13.90
1.40
-0.50
-0.13
5.62
-0.51
2.37
6.37
4.07
17.26
28.21
5.69
32.02
10.40
18.21
22.18
25.17
15.45
24.07
13.87
18.81
-0.73
0.00
0.00
-1.88
-4.21

Quantity sold
domestically of
domestic output
exp2
exp3
exp4
-0.17
-7.86
0.22
0.45
-2.68
-4.05
0.91
0.08
3.60
-1.44
1.66
1.93
-2.22
0.82
-2.98
-1.90
-0.88
-1.40
-5.19
-0.19
-5.63
-12.24
-3.57
-6.92
-2.44
-5.07
-6.33
-11.94
-2.55
0.56
0.20
0.03
1.22
0.40

-0.21
-0.07
-0.06
-0.52
-0.03
-0.22
-0.26
-0.08
-0.38
-0.19
-0.62
-0.72
-0.07
-0.25
-0.45
-0.27
-0.41
-0.02
0.06
0.00
-0.11
0.01
-0.33
0.01
-0.13
-0.05
0.01
-0.04
-0.10
-0.42
-0.05
0.00
-0.52
-0.14
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-0.36
-7.92
0.18
-0.01
-2.71
-4.26
0.69
0.02
3.27
-1.60
1.10
1.27
-2.27
0.61
-3.38
-2.14
-1.23
-1.43
-5.15
-0.19
-5.74
-12.22
-3.86
-6.91
-2.55
-5.11
-6.32
-11.98
-2.65
0.18
0.16
0.03
0.76
0.29

Quantity of goods
supplied domestically
("composite supply")
exp2
exp3
exp4
2.64
0.07
0.35
3.56
1.22
6.82
2.38
4.43
3.83
5.01
1.79
2.38
3.23
2.29
7.87
4.04
5.44
0.09
0.20
0.18
2.44
1.21
4.01
6.64
2.11
0.70
0.59
1.74
2.56
0.79
0.20
0.03
1.27
0.51

-0.31
0.00
-0.06
-0.60
-0.10
-0.46
-0.32
-0.31
-0.39
-0.45
-0.63
-0.73
-0.28
-0.31
-0.64
-0.40
-0.57
-0.04
0.02
-0.01
-0.31
-0.03
-0.34
-0.31
-0.24
-0.05
-0.03
-0.10
-0.22
-0.40
-0.05
0.00
-0.54
-0.18

2.34
0.07
0.30
3.01
1.12
6.37
2.09
4.13
3.49
4.58
1.23
1.72
2.96
2.01
7.24
3.66
4.90
0.05
0.22
0.17
2.15
1.19
3.68
6.32
1.89
0.65
0.56
1.64
2.35
0.42
0.16
0.03
0.80
0.36

Table 8-6: KenCGE Model Results –Prices– % Change From Base-Run

Sectors

Real wage rate
for production labor
exp2
exp3
exp4

Nominal wage rate
for production labor
exp2
exp3
exp4

AGRICU
IMINIG
IMEATP
IFISHP
IFRVEG
IOILFT
IDAIRY
IGMILL
IBAKRY
ISUGAR
ICOFFE
ITEAP
IOTFDS
IBEVEG
ITOBAC
ITEXTL
ILEATH
IWOODP
IPAPER
IPRINT
IPETRO
IBCHEM
ICHEMP
IPHARM
IRPLST
INOMTL
IMETAL
IMEQPT
IOMANU
IPOWER
IWATER
SCONST
STRNSP
SOSERV

1.39
-6.28
21.54
4.11
4.98
6.61
11.27
5.28
20.82
1.69
2.27
7.87
-0.48
9.93
6.22
2.20
5.29
-2.37
-8.96
1.28
9.01
12.30
6.59
25.80
9.89
8.42
1.21
8.67
0.42
6.44
6.01
3.88
7.47
3.50

0.65
-6.97
20.65
3.35
4.21
5.82
10.46
4.51
19.94
0.94
1.52
7.07
-1.21
9.12
5.45
1.45
4.52
-3.09
-9.63
0.53
8.21
11.48
5.81
24.88
9.09
7.62
0.47
7.87
-0.31
5.66
5.23
3.12
6.68
2.74

-0.18
-1.54
-3.34
0.66
1.73
0.30
-1.48
-1.26
-2.06
-0.47
0.81
1.88
-0.10
-1.12
0.85
0.23
-0.07
-0.51
0.15
0.23
-0.08
0.12
-1.48
0.53
-0.44
-1.52
0.21
0.45
0.06
-2.59
-1.08
-0.53
-3.56
-0.35

1.25
-7.69
18.43
4.70
6.56
6.94
9.89
4.19
18.73
1.28
2.99
9.53
-0.53
8.91
7.03
2.42
5.29
-2.80
-8.84
1.50
9.09
12.48
5.23
26.66
9.64
7.08
1.43
9.12
0.53
3.98
5.04
3.40
4.24
3.17
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-0.59
-1.95
-3.74
0.24
1.30
-0.12
-1.89
-1.67
-2.46
-0.89
0.39
1.46
-0.52
-1.54
0.43
-0.19
-0.49
-0.92
-0.27
-0.19
-0.49
-0.30
-1.89
0.12
-0.85
-1.93
-0.21
0.03
-0.36
-3.00
-1.49
-0.94
-3.96
-0.77

0.13
-8.71
17.12
3.54
5.38
5.76
8.67
3.04
17.41
0.16
1.85
8.32
-1.64
7.71
5.84
1.29
4.12
-3.88
-9.85
0.38
7.88
11.24
4.07
25.26
8.42
5.90
0.31
7.91
-0.58
2.83
3.88
2.25
3.09
2.03

